Cooperative interaction of rich and poor can be catalyzed by intermediate climate targets: A letter
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
International climate negotiations that aim at reducing global greenhouse gas emissions are strongly influenced by a conflict between rich and poor countries and by a lack of consensus about the urgency of emission reduction measures. We have previously in an experimental game characterised the implied challenge of avoiding dangerous climate change as the “collective-risk social dilemma”. Here we introduce heterogeneous wealth and two time horizons into the collective-risk social dilemma game. We show that rich players are willing to substitute for missing contributions by the poor, provided the players collectively face intermediate climate targets that, if not reached, are potentially followed by simulated intermediate costly climate risks. However, despite some increase in the contributions of the rich against the final collective target, the final target is reached less often than the intermediate target. Our results provide experimental evidence that similar, intermediate time horizons between climate risks and climate change mitigation planning are a necessary, though not sufficient, component of successful climate negotiations.
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Cites
Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2010) · Nature · doi:10.1038/466029a · Cited by 3,441
Cited by
A bottom-up institutional approach to cooperative governance of risky commons
Vasconcelos, V. V., Santos, F. C., & Pacheco, J. M. (2013) · Nature Climate Change · doi:10.1038/nclimate1927 · Cited by 183
Barfuss, W., Donges, J. F., Vasconcelos, V. V., Kurths, J., & Levin, S. A. (2020) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1916545117 · Cited by 87
Combination of institutional incentives for cooperative governance of risky commons
Sun, W., Liu, L., Chen, X., Szolnoki, A., & Vasconcelos, V. V. (2021) · iScience · doi:10.1016/j.isci.2021.102844 · Cited by 80
“Recent experimental and theoretical studies concerning collective-risk social dilemmas have revealed that the risk of collective failure plays an important role in promoting the evolution of cooperation (Milinski et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2009, 2010; Santos and Pacheco, 2011; Milinski et al., 2011; Jacquet et al., 20…”
BackgroundHumans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion
Milinski, M., Hilbe, C., Semmann, D., Sommerfeld, R., & Marotzke, J. (2016) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/ncomms10915 · Cited by 62
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Metadata
- Authors
- Milinski, M., Röhl, T., & Marotzke, J.
- Venue
- Climatic Change
- Published
- 2011-10-15
- Volume
- 109
- Issue
- 3-4
- Pages
- 807-814
- ISSN
- 0165-0009 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-1480
- OpenAlex
- W1983611514
- Cited by
- 97
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 9.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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- Milinski, M., Röhl, T., & Marotzke, J. (2011). Cooperative interaction of rich and poor can be catalyzed by intermediate climate targets: A letter. Climatic Change. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-011-0319-y
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