Cited by 80Evolutionary Game Theory and CooperationExperimental Behavioral Economics StudiesGame Theory and Applications

Combination of institutional incentives for cooperative governance of risky commons

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Sun, Weiwei, Liu, Linjie, Chen, Xiaojie, Szolnoki, Attila, Vasconcelos, Vítor V.·2021·iScience

Abstract

Finding appropriate incentives to enforce collaborative efforts for governing the commons in risky situations is a long-lasting challenge. Previous works have demonstrated that both punishing free-riders and rewarding cooperators could be potential tools to reach this goal. Despite weak theoretical foundations, policy makers frequently impose a punishment-reward combination. Here, we consider the emergence of positive and negative incentives and analyze their simultaneous impact on sustaining risky commons. Importantly, we consider institutions with fixed and flexible incentives. We find that a local sanctioning scheme with pure reward is the optimal incentive strategy. It can drive the entire population toward a highly cooperative state in a broad range of parameters, independently of the type of institutions. We show that our finding is also valid for flexible incentives in the global sanctioning scheme, although the local arrangement works more effectively.

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  • Agents' behaviors may be affected by noise, such as imitation error and behavioral mutation, in the process of social learning.

    “Second, agents' behaviors may be affected by noise (such as imitation error and behavioral mutation) in the process of social learning [37, 38, 47], which is usually ignored by previous theoretical models.”

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  1. Hardin G. The tragedy of the commons Science 162 1968 1243 1248 5699198

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Authors
Sun, W., Liu, L., Chen, X., Szolnoki, A., & Vasconcelos, V. V.
Affiliations
  • University of Electronic Science and Technology of China (CN)
  • Institute for Technical Physics and Materials Science (HU)
  • University of Amsterdam (NL)
Corresponding author
Chen, Xiaojie
Venue
iScience
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2021-08
Volume
24
Issue
8
Pages
102844
ISSN
2589-0042 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3180739853
Cited by
80
References
71
Citations by year
2026: 8 · 2025: 13 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 26 · 2022: 19 · 2021: 2
FWCI
20.44
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • iScience (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • Repository of the Academy's Library (Library of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences) (acceptedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
  • Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Funders
  • Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities
  • National Natural Science Foundation of China (61976048, 62036002)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
Keywords
commons governance, cooperative behavior, institutional incentives, free-riding, sustainability of cooperation

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