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Cited by 34

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Epistemic Authority: Preemption or Proper Basing?

Dormandy, Katherine · 2018 · Erkenntnis

Abstract

Sometimes it is epistemically beneficial to form a belief on authority. When you do, what happens to other reasons you have for that belief? Linda Zagzebski’s total-preemption view says that these reasons are “preempted”: you still have them, but you do not use them to support your belief. I argue that this situation is problematic, because having reasons for a belief while not using them forfeits you doxastic justification. I present an alternative account of belief on authority, the proper-basing view , which enables the agent to base her belief on as many reasons as she has. A salient result is that the notion of a preemptive reason, useful though it may be in accounting for acting on authority, does not have any place in an account of believing on authority or in epistemology more generally.

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Research works printed but not linked: 22

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  12. Keren, A. (2007). Epistemic authority, testimony and the transmission of knowledge. Episteme, 4(3), 368–381. · DOI
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  14. Korcz, K. A. (2000). The causal doxastic theory of the basing relation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 30(4), 525–550. · doi:10.1080/00455091.2000.10717542
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  20. Swain, M. (1981). Reasons and knowledge. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
  21. Zagzebski, L. (2014). Epistemic authority and its critics. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 6(4), 169–187. · DOI
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Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Dormandy, K.
Venue
Erkenntnis
Published
2017-07-19
Volume
83
Issue
4
Pages
773-791
ISSN
  • 0165-0106
  • 1572-8420
Cited by
34
References
2
Language
en

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