For A Service Conception of Epistemic Authority: A Collective Approach
Open accessAbstract
This paper attempts to provide a remedy to a surprising lacuna in the current discussion in the epistemology of expertise, namely the lack of a theory accounting for the epistemic authority of collective agents. After introducing a service conception of epistemic authority based on Alvin Goldman’s account of a cognitive expert, I argue that this service conception is well suited to account for the epistemic authority of collective bodies on a non-summativist perspective, and I show in detail how the defining requirements of an expert can apply to epistemic groups.
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Hybrid agents can be epistemic experts and authorities.
“we show that hybrid agents can be epistemic experts and authorities.”
From Experts or Authorities? The Strange Case of the Presumed Epistemic Superiority of Artificial Intelligence Systems (2024) · cites this paper as Croce, 2019b
Section 3 argues that collective agents, including research teams, can be epistemic experts, and Section 1 proposes an account of their epistemic authority. The paper does not establish the more specific claim about hybrid agents; its example of engineers using a computer in Section 3.1 treats the engineers as the knowing group, not the human–computer combination as an agent. (LLM, conf=0.81)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredA hybrid agent, differently from AI systems, can be endorsed with genuine forms of epistemic expertise and authority.
“Finally, we show that an hybrid agent, differently from AI systems, can be endorsed with genuine forms of epistemic expertise and authority.”
From Experts or Authorities? The Strange Case of the Presumed Epistemic Superiority of Artificial Intelligence Systems (2024) · cites this paper as Croce, 2019b
Section 1 says the paper aims to explain how a collective agent can possess epistemic authority, and section 3.2 describes intellectual virtues that an expert group can display. These passages support the possibility of collective expertise and authority, but they do not establish that a hybrid agent has them or contrast hybrid agents with AI systems; a search for those terms found no relevant passage. Page numbers were not available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.82)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredA hybrid agent can possess epistemic abilities even if one of its parts, i.e., the AI system, taken individually, fails to have them.
“The point here is that a hybrid agent can possess epistemic abilities even if one of its parts, i.e., the AI system, taken individually, fails to have them.”
From Experts or Authorities? The Strange Case of the Presumed Epistemic Superiority of Artificial Intelligence Systems (2024) · cites this paper as Croce, 2019b
Section 3.2 says a collective can display intellectual virtues even when its individual members lack them, supporting the claim’s general point about abilities of a whole and its parts. The examples concern teams of people, however; the paper does not establish that the same holds for a human–AI hybrid or that its AI component lacks epistemic abilities. No page numbers are available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredA hybrid, as a collective agent, possesses the ascribed abilities if (1) the human and the AI jointly commit to the end of that virtue, and (2) the hybrid proves to reliably achieve that end.
“We contend that a hybrid (as a collective agent) possesses the ascribed abilities if (1) the human and the AI jointly commit to the end of that virtue, and (2) the hybrid proves to reliably achieve that end (Croce, 2019b).”
From Experts or Authorities? The Strange Case of the Presumed Epistemic Superiority of Artificial Intelligence Systems (2024) · cites this paper as Croce, 2019b
Section 3.2 states the two conditions for a group's skill-based virtue: members jointly commit to its end, and the group reliably achieves that end. Its examples concern human teams; it does not establish that a human–AI hybrid can make such a joint commitment or possess the virtue. (LLM, conf=0.85)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
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- Thanks to Aidan McGlynn, Duncan Pritchard, Sven Rosenkranz, and two anonymous reviewers of this journal for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. I am especially grateful to Maria Baghramian and Carlo Martini for including my work in this special issue. Work on this article has received funding from the European Union's 2020 Research and Innovation Programme under Grant Agreement no. 675415.
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Cited by
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Ferrario, A., Facchini, A., & Termine, A. (2024) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1007/s11023-024-09681-1 · Cited by 64 · see citing works
“According to Croce, an epistemic agent is an expert, respectively authority, if the agent exhibits research, respectively, novice-oriented abilities (Croce, 2019a).”
InfluentialArtificial Epistemic Authorities
Hauswald, R. (2025) · Social Epistemology · doi:10.1080/02691728.2025.2449602 · Cited by 46 · see citing works
“Publications discussing preemption include Benton (2014), Bokros (2021), Boyd (2022), Constantin and Grundmann (2020), Croce (2018, 2019), Dormandy (2018), Grundmann (2021a, 2021b), Jäger (2016), Keren (2014a, 2014b, 2020), Lackey (2016, 2018, 2021), Leefmann and Lesle (2020), McMyler (2014),…”
ChatGPT, Education, and Understanding
Malfatti, F. I. (2025) · Social Epistemology · doi:10.1080/02691728.2025.2449599 · Cited by 13 · see citing works
“Epistemic care is, in a first approximation, care about another agent’s epistemic well-being (Croce 2018, 2019; Johnson 2022).”
- Authors
- Croce, M.
- Affiliations
- University of Edinburgh (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Croce, Michel
- ORCID
- Croce, Michel
- Venue
- Social Epistemology
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2019-03-04
- Volume
- 33
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 172-182
- ISSN
- 0269-1728 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-5297
- OpenAlex
- W2939008600
- Cited by
- 27
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2025: 7 · 2024: 5 · 2022: 15
- FWCI
- 23.05
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- philpapers.org
- Locations
- Social Epistemology (publishedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- CINECA IRIS Institutial Research Information System (University of Genoa) (submittedVersion)
- Edinburgh Research Explorer (University of Edinburgh) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Funders
- European Union 2020 Research and Innovation Programme (Grant Agreement no. 675415)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Educational Strategies and Epistemologies
- Keywords
- epistemic authority, epistemology of expertise, Alvin Goldman, cognitive expertise, collective agents
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