Social robots, fiction, and sentimentality
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
I examine the nature of human-robot pet relations that appear to involve genuine affective responses on behalf of humans towards entities, such as robot pets, that, on the face of it, do not seem to be deserving of these responses. Such relations have often been thought to involve a certain degree of sentimentality, the morality of which has in turn been the object of critical attention (Sparrow in Ethics Inf Technol 78:346–359, 2002 ; Blackford in Ethics Inf Technol 14:41–51, 2012 ). In this paper, I dispel the claim that sentimentality is involved in this type of relations. My challenge draws on literature in the philosophy of art and in cognitive science that attempts to solve the so called paradox of fictional emotions, i.e., the seemingly paradoxical way in which we respond emotionally to fictional or imaginary characters and events. If sentimentality were not at issue, neither would its immorality. For the sake of argument, however, I assume in the remaining part of the paper that sentimentality is indeed at play and bring to the fore aspects of its badness or viciousness that have not yet been discussed in connection with robot pets. I conclude that not even these aspects of sentimentality are at issue here. Yet, I argue that there are other reasons to be worried about the wide-spread use of ersatz companionship technology that have to do with the potential loss of valuable, self-defining forms of life.
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Citations
Cites
Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions
Nussbaum, M. C. (2001) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511840715 · Cited by 4,347
Upheavals of thought: the intelligence of emotions
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Granny and the robots: ethical issues in robot care for the elderly
Sharkey, A., & Sharkey, N. (2012) · Ethics and Information Technology · doi:10.1007/s10676-010-9234-6 · Cited by 985
Wada, K., & Shibata, T. (2007) · IEEE Transactions on Robotics · doi:10.1109/tro.2007.906261 · Cited by 583
A sociable robot to encourage social interaction among the elderly
Kidd, C. D., Taggart, W., & Turkle, S. (2006) · Proceedings 2006 IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation, 2006. ICRA 2006. · doi:10.1109/robot.2006.1642311 · Cited by 319 · cited 2×
“There are, however, at least some studies whose results are convincing (Kidd et al. 2006; Wada K, Shibata T. 2007).”
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Cited by
The use of care robots in aged care: A systematic review of argument-based ethics literature
Vandemeulebroucke, T., Dierckx de Casterlé, B., & Gastmans, C. (2018) · Archives of Gerontology and Geriatrics · doi:10.1016/j.archger.2017.08.014 · Cited by 258
Emotional attachment to AI companions and European law
Boine, C. (2023) · MIT Case Studies in Social and Ethical Responsibilities of Computing · doi:10.21428/2c646de5.db67ec7f · Cited by 34
Self‐Deception in Human–AI Emotional Relations
Kaczmarek, E. (2025) · Journal of Applied Philosophy · doi:10.1111/japp.12786 · Cited by 12
Anthropomorphizing Machines: Reality or Popular Myth?
Coghlan, S. (2024) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1007/s11023-024-09686-w · Cited by 12
“18 Rodogno (2016) reviews philosophical arguments that we are irrational or mis-taken when we respond in relevant emotional and engaged ways to fictional charac - ters (Radford, 1975).”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Rodogno, R.
- Venue
- Ethics and Information Technology
- Published
- 2015-08-06
- Volume
- 18
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 257-268
- ISSN
- 1388-1957 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8439
- OpenAlex
- W1103264754
- Cited by
- 35
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 2.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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