Mind the gap: responsible robotics and the problem of responsibility
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“Firstly, a responsibility and accountability gap denotes implications where digital transformation processes make decisions without human interference. The issue at stake problematizes who is responsible for the machine's actions (e.g., Gunkel,2020; Matthias,2004).”
From Research on digital discretion—The subjectification of street‐level work in public administration (2025) · cites this paper as Gunkel,2020
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Cited by
Coeckelbergh, M. (2020) · Science and Engineering Ethics · doi:10.1007/s11948-019-00146-8 · Cited by 475
“Moreover, in response to the control problems, one may also take a hybrid approach and conceptualize responsibility as distributed across a network of humans and machines (Gunkel 2018a).”
BackgroundCarter, S. M., Rogers, W., Win, K. T., Frazer, H., Richards, B., & Houssami, N. (2020) · The Breast · doi:10.1016/j.breast.2019.10.001 · Cited by 312
“There is a clear ‘ regulatory gap ’ [49] or ‘ regulatory vacuum ’ [45] with respect to the clinical application of AI, and it is not clear how best to fi ll this gap.”
Patiency is not a virtue: the design of intelligent systems and systems of ethics
Bryson, J. J. (2018) · Ethics and Information Technology · doi:10.1007/s10676-018-9448-6 · Cited by 285
Bleher, H., & Braun, M. (2022) · AI and Ethics · doi:10.1007/s43681-022-00135-x · Cited by 164
“The view taken on these automated system activities and the system’s ability to interact determines the attri-bution or negation of moral agency or moral consideration to or in AI-driven systems [26, 50–54].”
BackgroundFormosa, P. (2021) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1007/s11023-021-09579-2 · Cited by 144
“Whether social robots or AIs could ever become persons or moral agents are further questions beyond our scope (but for discussion see, for example, Gunkel, 2020; Sparrow, 2012; Fosch-Villaronga et al., 2020).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Gunkel, D. J.
- Affiliations
- Northern Illinois University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Gunkel, David J.
- ORCID
- Gunkel, David J.
- Venue
- Ethics and Information Technology
- Published
- 2017-07-19
- Volume
- 22
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 307-320
- ISSN
- 1388-1957 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8439
- OpenAlex
- W2739225241
- Cited by
- 174
- References
- 76
- Citations by year
- 2026: 28 · 2025: 39 · 2024: 22 · 2023: 22 · 2022: 20 · 2021: 20 · 2020: 13 · 2019: 8 · 2018: 1 · 2017: 1
- FWCI
- 13.65
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- www.springer.com/tdm (vor)
- Locations
- Ethics and Information Technology (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Social Robot Interaction and HRI
- Social Sciences › Law › Literary and Philosophical Studies
- Keywords
- moral responsibility, robots, autonomous technologies, machine learning, social robots, machine ethics, attribution of responsibility
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