The DOI matches its Crossref record; 50 of the 50 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Market discipline, disclosure and moral hazard in banking
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Cites
(2001) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 27,577
Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have
Myers, S. C., & Majluf, N. S. (1984) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(84)90023-0 · Cited by 18,957
La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250042 · Cited by 18,025
Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have
Myers, S., & Majluf, N. (1984) · doi:10.3386/w1396 · Cited by 6,745
Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital.
Botosan, C. A. (1997) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/tar-9709240185 · Cited by 3,436
The Economic Consequences of Increased Disclosure
Leuz, C., & Verrecchia, R. E. (2000) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2672910 · Cited by 2,370
Bank regulation and supervision: what works best?
Barth, J. R., Caprio, G., & Levine, R. (2004) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2003.06.002 · Cited by 2,296
The Economic Consequences of Increased Disclosure
Leuz, C., & Verrecchia, R. E. (1999) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.171975 · Cited by 2,101
Merton, R. C. (1977) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/0378-4266(77)90015-2 · Cited by 1,920
Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in BankingPreprint
Keeley, M. C. (1988) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 1,723
Cited by
Network models and financial stability
Nier, E., Yang, J., Yorulmazer, T., & Alentorn, A. (2007) · Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control · doi:10.1016/j.jedc.2007.01.014 · Cited by 819
Self-citationAccounting discretion, loan loss provisioning, and discipline of Banks’ risk-taking
Bushman, R. M., & Williams, C. D. (2012) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2012.04.002 · Cited by 784
Fonseca, A. R., & González, F. (2010) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2009.09.020 · Cited by 253
A critical examination of the climate engineering moral hazard and risk compensation concern
Reynolds, J. (2015) · The Anthropocene Review · doi:10.1177/2053019614554304 · Cited by 96
Metadata
- Authors
- Nier, E., & Baumann, U.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Intermediation
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2006-07
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 332-361
- ISSN
- 1042-9573 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2123637674
- Cited by
- 695
- References
- 50
- FWCI
- 36.33
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Nier, E., & Baumann, U. (2006). Market discipline, disclosure and moral hazard in banking. Journal of Financial Intermediation. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2006.03.001
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.