The DOI matches its Crossref record; 39 of the 39 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Voice matters in a dictator game
Abstract
We conducted a laboratory experiment to study the effects of communication in a dictator game, while maintaining subjects’ anonymity. In the experiment, the recipient has an opportunity to state a payoff-irrelevant request for his/her share before the dictator dictates his/her offer. We found that the independence hypothesis that voice does not matter is rejected. In particular, if the request is for less than half of the pie, the dictator's offer increases as the recipient's request increases. Additionally, there is no dictator who is other-regarding and, at the same time, does not react to the recipient's request.
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K‐means clustering: A half‐century synthesis
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Metadata
- Authors
- Yamamori, T., Kato, K., Kawagoe, T., & Matsui, A.
- Venue
- Experimental Economics
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2008-12
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 336-343
- ISSN
- 1386-4157 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-6938
- OpenAlex
- W2103682712
- Cited by
- 324
- References
- 39
- FWCI
- 37.89
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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