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Group polarization in the team dictator game reconsidered

Open access
Luhan, Wolfgang J., Kocher, Martin G., Sutter, Matthias·2009·Experimental Economics

Abstract

While most papers on team decision-making find that teams behave more selfishly, less trustingly and less altruistically than individuals, Cason and Mui (1997) report that teams are more altruistic than individuals in a dictator game. Using a within-subjects design we re-examine group polarization by letting subjects make individual as well as team decisions in an experimental dictator game. In our experiment teams are more selfish than individuals, and the most selfish team member has the strongest influence on team decisions. Various explanations for the different findings in Cason and Mui (1997) and in our paper are discussed.

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Metadata

Authors
Luhan, W. J., Kocher, M. G., & Sutter, M.
Venue
Experimental Economics
Published
2009-03
Volume
12
Issue
1
Pages
26-41
ISSN
  • 1386-4157 (ISSN-L)
  • 1573-6938
OpenAlex
W2238716234
Cited by
247
References
1
FWCI
36.06
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Group polarization in the team dictator game reconsidered. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s10683-007-9188-7
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Luhan, W. J., Kocher, M. G., & Sutter, M. (2009). Group polarization in the team dictator game reconsidered. Experimental Economics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-007-9188-7

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