The DOI matches its Crossref record; 135 of the 135 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
TESTING ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES IN THE FIELD: THREAT, MORAL APPEAL AND SOCIAL INFORMATION
Open accessAbstract
We run a large-scale natural field experiment to evaluate alternative strategies to enforce compliance with the law. The experiment varies the text of mailings sent to potential evaders of TV license fees. We find a strong effect of mailings, leading to a substantial increase in compliance. Among different mailings, a threat treatment which makes a high detection risk salient has a significant deterrent effect. Neither appealing to morals nor imparting information about others’ behavior enhances compliance on aggregate. However, the information condition has a weak positive effect in municipalities where evasion is believed to be common.
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1 retracted
RETRACTED: Procrastination, Deadlines, and Performance: Self-Control by Precommitment
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RetractedCrime and Punishment: An Economic Approach
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Nudge: improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness
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Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis
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Interaction terms in logit and probit models
Ai, C., & Norton, E. C. (2003) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/s0165-1765(03)00032-6 · Cited by 4,599
The Constructive, Destructive, and Reconstructive Power of Social Norms
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Incentives and Prosocial Behavior
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The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory of Self-Concept Maintenance
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Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion
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Worms: Identifying Impacts on Education and Health in the Presence of Treatment Externalities
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Cited by
No Taxation without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in the Value Added Tax
Pomeranz, D. (2015) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20130393 · Cited by 822
The behavioralist as tax collector: Using natural field experiments to enhance tax compliance
Hallsworth, M., List, J. A., Metcalfe, R. D., & Vlaev, I. (2017) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.02.003 · Cited by 764
Bhargava, S., & Manoli, D. (2015) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20121493 · Cited by 640
Hummel, D., & Maedche, A. (2019) · Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics · doi:10.1016/j.socec.2019.03.005 · Cited by 543
Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivations for Tax Compliance: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Germany
Dwenger, N., Kleven, H., Rasul, I., & Rincke, J. (2016) · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.20150083 · Cited by 300
Metadata
- Authors
- Fellner, G., Sausgruber, R., & Traxler, C.
- Venue
- Journal of the European Economic Association
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2013-06
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 634-660
- ISSN
- 1542-4766 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1920751234
- Cited by
- 370
- References
- 135
- FWCI
- 65.94
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: TESTING ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES IN THE FIELD: THREAT, MORAL APPEAL AND SOCIAL INFORMATION. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/jeea.12013
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- Fellner, G., Sausgruber, R., & Traxler, C. (2013). TESTING ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES IN THE FIELD: THREAT, MORAL APPEAL AND SOCIAL INFORMATION. Journal of the European Economic Association. https://doi.org/10.1111/jeea.12013
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
