CoChat

Experts or Authorities? The Strange Case of the Presumed Epistemic Superiority of Artificial Intelligence Systems

Open access

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 71 of the 71 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 10 of the 40 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Abstract

The high predictive accuracy of contemporary machine learning-based AI systems has led some scholars to argue that, in certain cases, we should grant them epistemic expertise and authority over humans. This approach suggests that humans would have the epistemic obligation of relying on the predictions of a highly accurate AI system. Contrary to this view, in this work we claim that it is not possible to endow AI systems with a genuine account of epistemic expertise. In fact, relying on accounts of expertise and authority from virtue epistemology, we show that epistemic expertise requires a relation with understanding that AI systems do not satisfy and intellectual abilities that these systems do not manifest. Further, following the Distribution Cognition theory and adapting an account by Croce on the virtues of collective epistemic agents to the case of human-AI interactions we show that, if an AI system is successfully appropriated by a human agent, a hybrid epistemic agent emerges, which can become both an epistemic expert and an authority. Consequently, we claim that the aforementioned hybrid agent is the appropriate object of a discourse around trust in AI and the epistemic obligations that stem from its epistemic superiority.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

The paper argues that AI systems cannot be genuine epistemic experts or authorities of understanding because they lack understanding and the relevant research- and novice-oriented abilities; at most they can have weak expertise and authority of belief. It proposes that successful human-AI appropriation yields a hybrid agent that can become an epistemic expert or authority, making that hybrid the proper subject for debates about trust and epistemic obligation.

Key findings

  • AI systems do not qualify as Croce-style epistemic experts: they lack understanding, research-oriented abilities, mental states, and cognitive agency, so high predictive accuracy alone does not generate an epistemic obligation to rely on them. They can at best be repositories of extensive “weak knowledge” limited to predictive tasks and under the guardianship of human experts.
  • AI systems may in some contexts be ascribed authority of belief, but not authority of understanding, because they lack novice-oriented abilities such as sensitivity to laypeople’s epistemic needs and maieutic ability; epistemic opacity further precludes fostering understanding in many human-AI interactions.
  • Human-AI interactions can produce a hybrid cognitive and epistemic agent when a human successfully appropriates an AI system to achieve an epistemic goal. Adapting Croce’s non-summativist account of collective epistemic agents, the paper argues such hybrids can be epistemic experts and authorities even though the AI part alone is not.
  • The paper proposes a “minimum quantitative criterion” for successful appropriation: for any prediction, the human supported by the AI must have accuracy higher than or equal to the accuracy the human and AI would achieve independently without interaction. It illustrates this with a technology-savvy physician using a sepsis-prediction AI and a grandfather using ChatGPT to answer an astronomy question.

Methods

  • Conceptual and philosophical analysis; no empirical study, dataset, or sample is reported.
  • The argument draws on virtue epistemology accounts of expertise and authority (Croce, Zagzebski), Alvarado’s account of AI as epistemic technology, Distributed Cognition theory, and Croce’s collective-agent account.
  • Main analysis proceeds by critiquing claims that medical AI has epistemic expertise/authority, then adapting a non-summativist collective virtue account to human-AI hybrids and illustrating it with two examples. No statistical analysis or quantitative results are reported.

Limitations

  • The paper states that future research should investigate the conditions that grant reliability to the emergence of hybrid agents and their epistemic superiority, and how perception of the hybrid agent’s expertise and authority unfolds, including conditions fostering appropriate assessment by third parties.
  • The paper states that it refrains from modeling the relation between appropriation dimensions, their interactions, and the degree of successful appropriation in a quantitative way.
  • Evident from the text: the argument is not empirically tested, and the two examples are illustrative rather than data-driven; the paper also acknowledges that its minimum criterion does not explain how the hybrid’s superior accuracy is achieved, justified, or communicated.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1007/s11023-024-09681-1

Cites

71 of 71 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

9 Valid · 2 Not valid · 23 Not checked · 71 Own results and interpretations

44 more claims

Create a free account to see all 105 claims and every source verdict.

See all claims — free account
  • Probably not a substantial claim. 45
  • It may state two separate claims as one. 16

Create a free account to see these claims.

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

1 of 1

Citations

Cites

Show all 71 references

Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. Termine, A. (2023). Probabilistic model checking with Markov models semantics: New developments and applications. Ph. D. thesis, Università degli Studi di Milano
  2. Turri, J., Alfano, M., & Greco, J. (2021). Virtue epistemology. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Winter 2021 ed.). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University

Cited by

See all 64

Metadata

Authors
Ferrario, A., Facchini, A., & Termine, A.
Affiliations
  • University of Zurich (CH)
  • University of Applied Sciences and Arts of Southern Switzerland (CH)
Corresponding author
Ferrario, Andrea
Venue
Minds and Machines
Published
2024-07-06
Volume
34
Issue
3
ISSN
  • 0924-6495 (ISSN-L)
  • 1572-8641
OpenAlex
W4400386326
Cited by
64
References
61
Citations by year
2026: 36 · 2025: 26 · 2024: 2
FWCI
176.83
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Minds and Machines (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
Keywords
machine learning prediction, trust in AI, human-AI interaction, epistemic obligation, understanding, virtue epistemology

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

The claim verdicts this report counts are experimental: their accuracy is not yet measured.

A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-01, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).

A second model labelled each claim on 2026-10-01 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).

Cited sources are checked with a language model’s help (gpt-6-sol).

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Experts or Authorities? The Strange Case of the Presumed Epistemic Superiority of Artificial Intelligence Systems. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s11023-024-09681-1
The paper
Ferrario, A., Facchini, A., & Termine, A. (2024). Experts or Authorities? The Strange Case of the Presumed Epistemic Superiority of Artificial Intelligence Systems. Minds and Machines. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-024-09681-1

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.