The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Relativism and disagreement
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Citations
Cites
Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment
Gibbard, A. (1990) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198249856.001.0001 · Cited by 2,619
Scorekeeping in a language game
Lewis, D. (1979) · Journal of Philosophical Logic · doi:10.1007/bf00258436 · Cited by 2,467
Knowledge and Practical Interests
Stanley, J. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0199288038.001.0001 · Cited by 1,653
Levi, I., & Brandom, R. B. (1996) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2940874 · Cited by 1,147
Kaplan, D. M. (1989) · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · Cited by 913
(1973) · Problems of the Self · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511621253.011 · Cited by 622
Future Contingents and Relative Truth
MacFarlane, J. (2003) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00315 · Cited by 614
Self-citationAlmog, J., Perry, J. O., & Wettstein, H. K. (1989) · Oxford University Press eBooks · Cited by 589
Thought without Representation
Perry, J., & Blackburn, S. (1986) · Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume · doi:10.1093/aristoteliansupp/60.1.137 · Cited by 415
Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgement.
Hubin, D. C., & Gibbard, A. (1991) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2219603 · Cited by 414
Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment.
Ripstein, A., & Gibbard, A. (1992) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2185966 · Cited by 346
Epistemic modals, relativism and assertion
Egan, A. (2007) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-006-9003-x · Cited by 311
XIV*-MAKING SENSE OF RELATIVE TRUTH
MacFarlane, J. (2005) · Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9264.2005.00178.x · Cited by 267
Self-citationDeRose, K. (2004) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1023/b:phil.0000029347.01790.f2 · Cited by 154
Teller, P. (1972) · Philosophia · doi:10.1007/bf02381591 · Cited by 91
Zimmerman, A. Z. (2006) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-005-4604-3 · Cited by 13
Cited by
MacFarlane, J. (2009) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-007-9286-2 · Cited by 300
Self-citationSARKISSIAN, H., PARK, J., TIEN, D., WRIGHT, J. C., & KNOBE, J. (2011) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2011.01428.x · Cited by 184
Moral Disagreement and Moral Semantics
Khoo, J., & Knobe, J. (2018) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12151 · Cited by 82
Finlay, S. (2017) · Oxford Scholarship Online · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198805076.003.0008 · Cited by 42
“22 On this issue for content-relativism more generally, see also Lasersohn 2005, MacFarlane 2007: 20, Stephenson 2007, and discussion in Sundell 2011: 284f. 23 For example, Khoo & Knobe suggest analyzing such disagreements “in terms of something about A’s disposition to reject certain claims B has…”
BackgroundThe Many Relativisms: Index, Context, and Beyond
de Sa, D. L. (2011) · A Companion to Relativism · doi:10.1002/9781444392494.ch6 · Cited by 24
Metadata
- Authors
- MacFarlane, J.
- Venue
- Philosophical Studies
- Published
- 2007-01-12
- Volume
- 132
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 17-31
- ISSN
- 0031-8116 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0883
- OpenAlex
- W2070800487
- Cited by
- 372
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 136.24
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.