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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Understanding and the facts

Elgin, Catherine · 2007 · Philosophical Studies

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1007/s11098-006-9054-z

Cites

4 of 4 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

We couldn’t retrieve this paper’s full text, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

Citations

Cites

Show all 5 references

Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. Sellars, W. (1963). The language of theories. In Science, perception and reality (pp. 106–126). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Cited by

See all 374

Metadata

Authors
Elgin, C.
Affiliations
Harvard University (US)
Corresponding author
Elgin, Catherine
Venue
Philosophical Studies
Published
2006-11-30
Volume
132
Issue
1
Pages
33-42
ISSN
  • 0031-8116 (ISSN-L)
  • 1573-0883
OpenAlex
W2056803344
Cited by
309
References
5
Citations by year
2026: 24 · 2025: 32 · 2024: 25 · 2023: 36 · 2022: 26 · 2021: 28 · 2020: 14 · 2019: 39 · 2018: 15 · 2017: 12 · 2016: 15 · 2015: 17 · 2014: 7 · 2013: 8 · 2012: 2
FWCI
5.30
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
Locations
Philosophical Studies (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
Keywords
understanding, factivity, idealization, scientific models, exemplification, philosophy of science, epistemology of understanding

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

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How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Understanding and the facts. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s11098-006-9054-z
The paper
Elgin, C. (2007). Understanding and the facts. Philosophical Studies. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9054-z

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.