The DOI matches its Crossref record; 46 of the 46 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
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In the citing paper
“if A wholly explains B then B supervenes upon A”
From Nomothetic Explanation and Humeanism about Laws of Nature (2020) · cites this paper as deRosset (2010, section 4)
Citations
Cites
American Philosophical Quarterly
(2023) · American Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.5406/21521123.60.4.09 · Cited by 3,225
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Essence and Modality: The Second Philosophical Perspectives Lecture
Fine, K. (1994) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.2307/2214160 · Cited by 1,383
Schaffer, J. (2009) · Metametaphysics · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199546046.003.0012 · Cited by 1,382
Ayer, A. J. (1972) · Philosophical Essays · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-00132-3_9 · Cited by 984
Monism: The Priority of the Whole
Schaffer, J. (2010) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-2009-025 · Cited by 925 · cited 5×
“If Schaffer’s historical claims in Schaffer (2009a, 2010) are correct, then priority theory has a long and distinguished pedigree reaching back to Plato.”
BackgroundInfluentialMerricks, T. (2001) · doi:10.1093/0199245363.001.0001 · Cited by 811
Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation
Chalmers, D. J., & Jackson, F. (2001) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-110-3-315 · Cited by 691
Potter, M., & Lewis, D. (1993) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2219902 · Cited by 680
Research works printed but not linked: 3
- Fine, K. (1994). Essence and modality. In: Tomberlin, J. E. (Ed.), Philosophical Perspectives: Logic and Language (Vol. 8, pp. 229–294). Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company.
- Kaplan, D. (1989). In: J. Almog, J. Perry, H. Wettstein (Eds.), Themes from Kaplan (pp. 481–564). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Cited by
Against Grounding Necessitarianism
Skiles, A. (2015) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-014-9669-y · Cited by 420
“Louis deRosset (2010) offers a sophisticated version of this style of argument.39 Say that a confounding case for an explanatory proposal of the form ‘‘p because q1, q2,…’’ is any possible scenario in which ‘‘p’’ is false yet ‘‘q1’’, ‘‘q2’’,… are all true.”
BackgroundInfluentialGrounding: Necessary or Contingent?
Trogdon, K. (2013) · Pacific Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1111/papq.12009 · Cited by 286
Leuenberger, S. (2014) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2013.855654 · Cited by 329
Clark, M. J., & Liggins, D. (2012) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/ans086 · Cited by 149
Grounding, Explanation, and the Limit of Internality
Litland, J. (2015) · doi:10.1215/00318108-3147011 · Cited by 98
What Is the Well-Foundedness of Grounding?
Dixon, T. S. (2016) · doi:10.1093/mind/fzv112 · Cited by 93
“Fine (2012a) both endorses (∨I-L) and (∨I-R) (58) and admits infinite disjunctions (60-62).”
BackgroundGrounding and metaphysical explanation: it’s complicated
Maurin, A. (2018) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-018-1080-0 · Cited by 96
“Cf. also deRosset (2010) and Rodriguez Pereyra (2015).”
BackgroundNomothetic Explanation and Humeanism about Laws of Nature
Bhogal, H. (2020) · Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 12 · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192893314.003.0006 · Cited by 74
Priority and Particle Physics: Ontic Structural Realism as a Fundamentality Thesis
McKenzie, K. (2014) · British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/axt017 · Cited by 74
“66deRosset [2010], p.”
Grounding and metaphysical explanation
Thompson, N. (2016) · doi:10.1093/arisoc/aow012 · Cited by 62
Tugby, M. (2020) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02781-2 · Cited by 55
“Among those who favour this necessitarian view of grounding are Audi (2012a), Dasgupta (2014), deRosset (2010), Fine (2015), Rosen (2010) and Trogdon (2013).”
BackgrounddeRosset, L. (2017) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.12437 · Cited by 32
“9 See [Audi, 2012], [Correia, 2010], [deRosset, 2010, 2011, 2013], [Fine, 2001], [Rosen, 2010], [Schaffer, 2009], and [Trogdon, 2009].”
Self-citationHeterogeneous network games: Conflicting preferences
Hernández, P., Muñoz-Herrera, M., & Sánchez, A. (2013) · Games Econ. Behav. · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2013.01.004 · Cited by 31
Fundamentality And Modal Freedom
Wang, J. (2016) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.1111/phpe.12082 · Cited by 29
“DeRosset (2009) suggests that we distinguish between necessary relations like these, and necessary connections, though he does not offer a criterion whereby to distinguish them.”
BackgroundFundamental Quantification and the Language of the Ontology Room
Korman, D. (2015) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12027 · Cited by 29
“31 For a dissenting voice, see deRosset (2010).”
BackgroundBhogal, H. K. (2016) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048402.2016.1241289 · Cited by 26
Razing Structures to the Ground
Rocca, M. D. (2014) · Analytic Philosophy · doi:10.1111/phib.12048 · Cited by 27
A grounding solution to the grounding problem
Saenz, N. B. (2014) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0405-x · Cited by 20
deRosset, L., & Linnebo, Ø. (2023) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.13036 · Cited by 18
Self-citationVagueness and the Laws of Metaphysics
Wasserman, R. (2017) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.12269 · Cited by 17
Philosophical Analysis: The Concept Grounding View
Horvath, J. (2018) · doi:10.1111/phpr.12378 · Cited by 15
Trogdon, K. (2017) · doi:10.1111/phc3.12458 · Cited by 14
“And there are also objections that target common elements of priority monism and atomism. deRosset (2010), for example, argues that the priority monist and atomist are both committed to an implausible principle concerning explanation, viz. the existence and features of the concrete objects alleged…”
BackgroundRettler, B. (2017) · Canadian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00455091.2017.1282306 · Cited by 12
Muñoz, D. (2020) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2019.1658634 · Cited by 11
“14Necessitation is the ‘default view among proponents of grounding’ (Bliss and Trogdon 2014, §5), endorsed by Correia (2005, Witmer, Butchard, and Trogdon (2005), deRosset (2010), Rosen (2010), Audi (2012a, 2012b), Trogdon (2013), and Dasgupta (2014).”
BackgroundGrounding is necessary and contingent
Richardson, K. (2019) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2019.1612777 · Cited by 11
“This is the complete explanation response (deRosset 2010; Trogdon 2013a).”
BackgroundSchulte, P. (2018) · Pacific Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1111/papq.12259 · Cited by 10
McKenzie, K. (2017) · dialectica · doi:10.1111/1746-8361.12189 · Cited by 9
Living without microphysical supervenience
Moran, A. (2021) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-021-01664-7 · Cited by 8
“(2015: 199) 13 Note that the truth of Generality would also help to explain why a related principle is true, which, following deRossett (2010), we can refer to as the Determination Constraint.”
BackgroundPotentiality: Actualism minus naturalism equals platonism
Giannini, G., & Tugby, M. (2020) · doi:10.4454/philinq.v8i1.278 · Cited by 7
“For instance, the orthodox (e.g. deRosset 2010; Fine 2015) view of grounding is that if Γ (fully) grounds Β , then it is metaphysically necessary that Β exists if Γ does.”
BackgrounddeRosset, L. (2015) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198729242.003.0007 · Cited by 7
“See (Yi, 1999) and (deRosset, 2010, §6) for criticism of Lewis’s contention.”
BackgroundSelf-citationAesthetic Supervenience versus Aesthetic Grounding
Benovsky, J. (2012) · doi:10.33134/eeja.96 · Cited by 6
Symmetry fundamentalism in quantum mechanics
Schroeren, D. (2021) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-021-01634-z · Cited by 3
“14 (Schaffer 2009; deRosset 2010; Audi 2012; Dasgupta 2014).”
On the Coherence of Aristotelian Universals
Imaguire, G. (2021) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03112-9 · Cited by 5
“6 For this default view, according to which grounding is a kind of necessary relation see Audi (2012b), Dasgupta (2014), deRosset (2010), Rosen (2010) and Trogdon (2013).”
BackgroundGrounding and the Myth of Ontological Innocence
Barker, J. (2020) · doi:10.1080/00048402.2020.1752746 · Cited by 5
A Simple Proof of Grounding Internality
Lovett, A. (2019) · Thought: A Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1002/tht3.416 · Cited by 5
Russell, J. (2017) · doi:10.5840/jphil2017114931 · Cited by 5
Tugby, M. (2022) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198855101.001.0001 · Cited by 4
On Shaky Ground? Exploring the Contingent Fundamentality Thesis
Wildman, N. (2018) · Oxford Scholarship Online · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198755630.003.0015 · Cited by 4
“…of answers have been given; specifically, metaphysicians have suggested that ‘is fundamental’ can apply to truths (Williams 2010, Sider 2011), facts (deRosset 2010, Rosen 2010, Fine 2012, Audi 2012, Raven forthcoming), states of affairs (Armstrong 1997), concrete and abstract objects (Schaffer…”
BackgroundBalaguer, M. (2017) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1403-2 · Cited by 4
“Nonetheless, in contrast with necessity-of-the-metaphysical-laws, there are at least some arguments in the literature for necessity-of-grounding—see, e.g., Trogdon (2013) and deRosset (2010).”
BackgroundWilsch, T. (2015) · doi:10.7282/t3xw4mpc · Cited by 4
“3 deRosset (2010) presents other versions of Generalization and the motivation in the text.”
BackgroundContingent Grounding Physicalism
Moran, A. (2025) · Analytic Philosophy · doi:10.1111/phib.12383 · Cited by 3
Grounding, necessity, and relevance
Hirèche, S. (2023) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-023-01968-w · Cited by 3
“explanation (DeRosset 2010), essence (Audi 2012b; Fine 2012b; Trogdon 2013a; Dasgupta 2014; O’Conaill 2018; Correia & Skiles 2019), metaphysical laws (Wilsch 2015), grounding internality (Lovett 2019).”
BackgroundCausal necessitarianism and the monotonicity objection
Hirèche, S. (2020) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02902-x · Cited by 3
“Another argument runs roughly as follows: if A grounds C, then A provides a good explanation for C; if A provides a good explanation for C, then A does not have “confounding cases”, namely possible cases where A obtains and C does not; thus, GN is true (see DeRosset 2010).”
BackgroundA challenge to the new metaphysics: deRosset, Priority, and explanation
Fisher, D., Hong, H., & Perrine, T. (2019) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02468-3 · Cited by 4
“Our aim here is to evaluate a recent objection to Priority Theory made by deRosset (2010). deRosset objects that Priority Theory is unpromising because its proposed explanations violate an adequacy constraint on explanations he calls theDetermination Constraint.”
BackgroundPrimitiveness, Metaontology, and Explanatory Power
Benovsky, J. (2013) · Dialogue · doi:10.1017/s0012217313000383 · Cited by 3
“22 Bricker ( 2006 ), DeRosset (2010), Schaffer ( 2009 ), and Schaffer (manuscript).”
Sijuwade, J. (2023) · Faith and Philosophy · doi:10.37977/faithphil.2022.39.1.4 · Cited by 2
Grounding interventionism: Conceptual and epistemological challenges
Bryant, A. (2022) · Metaphilosophy · doi:10.1111/meta.12542 · Cited by 2
“See deRosset (2010), Rosen (2010), and Trogdon (2013).”
Grounding and a priori epistemology: challenges for conceptualism
Siscoe, R. W. (2021) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03297-z · Cited by 2
Grounding as minimal necessitation
McDaniel, B. (2019) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2019.1658632 · Cited by 2
“3Among those who accept necessitarianism are: Audi (2012), Cameron (2018), Dasgupta (2014a), (2014b), deRosset (2010), (2013b), Rosen (2010), Trogdon (2013), and Wilsch (2015).”
BackgroundPleonastic propositions and the face value theory
Steinberg, A. (2018) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-018-1742-7 · Cited by 2
“18 Perhaps, not all truths about the pleonastic (or any kind of entity) can be fully grounded in truths entirely about other objects, as deRosset (2010) argues.”
BackgroundDoes Negative Epistemic Disjunctivism Solve the Screening Off Problem?
Moran, A. (2026) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048402.2026.2669936
Metaphysical Rationalism Requires Grounding Indeterminism
Pearce, K. L. (2025) · Journal of the American Philosophical Association · doi:10.1017/apa.2024.17 · Cited by 1
The problem of extrinsic grounding
Imaguire, G. (2024) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-024-04614-y · Cited by 1
“We usually appeal to 2 deRosset (2010) presented a similar problem (“the determination argument”) for Priority Theories.”
Methodological worries for humean arguments from evil
Perrine, T. (2024) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-024-02135-5 · Cited by 2
Saenz, N. B. (2022) · Canadian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1017/can.2023.17 · Cited by 1
“Where ‘F’ and ‘G’ are predicates that correspond to qualitative properties (the latter corresponding to the 19 deRosset (2010, 83) gets close to noticing this.”
BackgroundA Brighter Shade of Categoricalism
Paoletti, M. P. (2021) · Axiomathes · doi:10.1007/s10516-021-09578-z · Cited by 1
Physicalism and the burden of parsimony
Zanotti, G. (2021) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03281-7 · Cited by 1
“Interestingly, one can also opt for a different approach, arguing that “fundamental entities are not explained in terms of anything else; […] one takes them as basic and gives a theory of how they relate to everything else in the world” (Chalmers, 2010, p. 16; see also deRosset, 2010).”
BackgroundThe Nomological Account of Ground
Wilsch, T. (2015) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0470-9 · Cited by 191
Emery, N. (2018) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-018-1077-8 · Cited by 97
Grounding and the argument from explanatoriness
Kovacs, D. (2016) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0818-9
“(deRosset 2010: 74 ff) ‘‘[Grounding is transitive]: just as the explanation of an explanation also explains the explanandum, so too the grounds of the grounds of the grounded also ground the grounded.’’”
BackgroundDixon, T. S. (2015) · Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Scientific Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10670-015-9744-z
The myth of the myth of supervenience
Kovacs, D. (2018) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-018-1106-7
von Solodkoff, T. (2011) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-011-9745-y
Universal Grounding Facts Ground Grounding Facts
Imaguire, G. (2026) · Philosophia · doi:10.1007/s11406-026-00984-4
On the explanatory demands of the Special Composition Question
Spencer, J. (2019) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02147-3
An Explanatory Framework for Legal Grounding
Janik, B. (2023) · Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej · doi:10.36280//afpifs.2023.2.34
Might Laws of Nature ‘Ground’ Phenomena?
Laudisa, F. (2020) · Fundamental theories of physics · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-46777-7_9
Metadata
- Authors
- deRosset, L.
- Affiliations
- University of Vermont (US)
- Corresponding author
- deRosset, Louis
- ORCID
- deRosset, Louis
- Venue
- Philosophical Studies
- Published
- 2010-04-03
- Volume
- 149
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 73-97
- ISSN
- 0031-8116 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0883
- OpenAlex
- W2054804254
- Cited by
- 155
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 36 · 2022: 19 · 2021: 19 · 2020: 23 · 2019: 6 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 8 · 2016: 5 · 2015: 7 · 2014: 6 · 2013: 8 · 2012: 2
- FWCI
- 4.59
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Philosophical Studies (publishedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Logic and Philosophy of Science
- Keywords
- ontological commitment, scientific ontology, ontological parsimony
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