On What Grounds What
Abstract
On the now dominant Quinean view, metaphysics is about what there is. Metaphysics so conceived is concerned with such questions as whether properties exist, whether meanings exist, and whether numbers exist. I will argue for the revival of a more traditional Aristotelian view, on which metaphysics is about what grounds what. Metaphysics so revived does not bother asking whether properties, meanings, and numbers exist. Of course they do! The question is whether or not they are fundamental.
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It is widely accepted that a ground necessitates what it grounds.
“But it is widely accepted that a ground necessitates what it grounds.”
From Panpsychism and Russellian Monism (2019) · cites this paper as Schaffer 2009
We have good reason, independent of Humeanism, to think that a relation of metaphysical explanation exists and is different from nomothetic explanation.
“We have good reason, independent of Humeanism, to think that a relation of metaphysical explanation exists and is different from nomothetic explanation.”
From Nomothetic Explanation and Humeanism about Laws of Nature (2020) · cites this paper as Schaffer (2009)
The grounding relation is a non-causal explanatory relation that holds between facts.
“The grounding relation is taken to be a non-causal explanatory relation that holds between facts.”
From Cosmopsychism, Micropsychism and the Grounding Relation (2019) · cites this paper as Schaffer 2009
Metaphysical explanation is an asymmetric relation central to philosophical theorizing in many areas.
“many authors recently have noted that an asymmetric relation of metaphysical explanation is central to philosophical theorizing in many areas”
From Nomothetic Explanation and Humeanism about Laws of Nature (2020) · cites this paper as Schaffer (2009)
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- Authors
- Schaffer, J.
- Corresponding author
- Schaffer, Jonathan
- ORCID
- Schaffer, Jonathan
- Venue
- Metametaphysics
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2009-02-19
- Pages
- 347-383
- OpenAlex
- W2248695218
- Cited by
- 1,382
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 56 · 2025: 94 · 2024: 104 · 2023: 148 · 2022: 118 · 2021: 90 · 2020: 174 · 2019: 111 · 2018: 85 · 2017: 75 · 2016: 79 · 2015: 64 · 2014: 68 · 2013: 54 · 2012: 22
- FWCI
- 72.93
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- ANU Open Research (Australian National University) (submittedVersion)
- Oxford University Press eBooks
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy, Science, and History
- Keywords
- metaphysics, grounding, Aristotelian metaphysics, existence, property, meaning, numbers, fundamentality
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