Monism: The Priority of the Whole
Abstract
Which is prior, the whole or its parts? The monist holds that the whole is prior to its parts, and thus views the cosmos as fundamental, with metaphysical explanation dangling downward from the One. The pluralist holds that the parts are prior to their whole, and thus tends to consider particles fundamental, with metaphysical explanation snaking upward from the many. There seem to be physical and modal considerations that favor the monistic view. Physically, there is good evidence that the cosmos forms an entangled system and good reason to treat entangled systems as irreducible wholes. Modally, mereology allows for the possibility of atomless gunk, with no ultimate parts for the pluralist to invoke as the ground of being.
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PM holds that there exists exactly one basic concrete particular: the whole cosmos.
“(PM) There exists exactly one basic concrete particular: the whole cosmos.”
From Priority Cosmopsychism and the Advaita Vedānta (2019) · cites this paper as Schaffer 2010
Schaffer has persuasively argued that Sider fails to make the notion of metaphysical privilege earn its keep by demonstrating its theoretical utility.
“However, Schaffer has persuasively argued that Sider fails to do this.”
From Cosmopsychism, Micropsychism and the Grounding Relation (2019) · cites this paper as Schaffer 2010: 47
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References 127 · Cited by 925
- Authors
- Schaffer, J.
- Corresponding author
- Schaffer, Jonathan
- ORCID
- Schaffer, Jonathan
- Venue
- The Philosophical Review
- Publisher
- Duke University Press
- Published
- 2010-01-01
- Volume
- 119
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 31-76
- ISSN
- 0031-8108 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-1470
- OpenAlex
- W2115902680
- Cited by
- 925
- References
- 127
- Citations by year
- 2026: 106 · 2025: 115 · 2024: 85 · 2023: 31 · 2022: 64 · 2021: 59 · 2020: 55 · 2019: 52 · 2018: 72 · 2017: 55 · 2016: 41 · 2015: 54 · 2014: 45 · 2013: 34 · 2012: 22
- FWCI
- 22.03
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Philosophical Review (publishedVersion)
- HighWire Press Open Archive (submittedVersion)
- ANU Open Research (Australian National University) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
- Keywords
- monism, pluralism, part-whole relations, metaphysical grounding, quantum entanglement, mereology, fundamental ontology
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