The DOI matches its Crossref record; 122 of the 136 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“Moreover, asCuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014) emphasize, a given system of rules might only count as a moral system if it agrees with a sufficiently large number of claims that they call 'moral fixed points'”
From Hope for the Evolutionary Debunker: How Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and Arguments from Moral Disagreement Can Join Forces (2022) · cites this paper as Cuneo and Shafer-Landau 2014
Citations
Cites
Johnson, K., & Nozick, R. (1975) · The Western Political Quarterly · doi:10.2307/447864 · Cited by 7,692
Nozick, R. (2018) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctv19fvzzk.69 · Cited by 6,691
Putnam, H. (1981) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625398 · Cited by 5,626
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.
Feldman, F., & Mackie, J. L. (1979) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2184791 · Cited by 5,076
Scanlon, T. (2000) · Harvard University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctv134vmrn · Cited by 3,053
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy
Williams, B. (2006) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780203969847 · Cited by 2,741
Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics
Brink, D. O. (1989) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511624612 · Cited by 1,932
Plantinga, A. (1993) · doi:10.1093/0195078640.001.0001 · Cited by 1,703
Dancy, J. (2004) · doi:10.1093/0199270023.001.0001 · Cited by 1,677
Dworkin, R. M. (2011) · Harvard University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctvjf9vkt · Cited by 1,461
Research works printed but not linked: 7
- Audi, R. (2004). The good in the right. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Aune, B. (1985). Metaphysics. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Blackburn, S. (1971). Moral realism. Essays in quasi-realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Reprinted from Blackburn 1993).
- Blackburn, S. (1985). Errors and the phenomenology of value. Essays in quasi-realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Reprinted from Blackburn 1993).
- Cuneo, T. (forthcoming b). The evolutionary objection to knowing moral reasons. In D. Star (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of reasons and normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- FitzPatrick, W. (forthcoming b). Why there is no Darwinian dilemma for moral realism. In M. Bergman & P. Kain (Eds.), Challenges to religious and moral belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sturgeon, N. (1988). Moral explanations. In G. Sayre-McCord (Ed.), Essays on moral realism (pp. 229–255). Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Clarke-Doane, J. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198823667.001.0001 · Cited by 146
Evolutionary Debunking of Moral Realism
Vavova, K. (2015) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/phc3.12194 · Cited by 108
McGrath, S. (2019) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198805410.001.0001 · Cited by 106
Sinclair, N. (2021) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198866107.001.0001 · Cited by 61
Are the Moral Fixed Points Conceptual Truths?
Evers, D., & Streumer, B. (2016) · Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy · doi:10.26556/jesp.v10i1.183 · Cited by 61
Metadata
- Authors
- Cuneo, T., & Shafer-Landau, R.
- Affiliations
- University of Vermont (US)
- ORCID
- Cuneo, Terence
- Venue
- Philosophical Studies
- Published
- 2014-01-09
- Volume
- 171
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 399-443
- ISSN
- 0031-8116 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0883
- OpenAlex
- W2019272718
- Cited by
- 270
- References
- 136
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 27 · 2024: 26 · 2023: 35 · 2022: 23 · 2021: 44 · 2020: 25 · 2019: 19 · 2018: 20 · 2017: 19 · 2016: 15 · 2015: 6 · 2014: 3
- FWCI
- 87.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Philosophical Studies (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art
- Keywords
- moral realism, moral propositions, moral norms, moral metaphysics, moral epistemology
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review