The DOI matches its Crossref record; 122 of the 136 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“Moreover, asCuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014) emphasize, a given system of rules might only count as a moral system if it agrees with a sufficiently large number of claims that they call 'moral fixed points'”
From Hope for the Evolutionary Debunker: How Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and Arguments from Moral Disagreement Can Join Forces (2022) · cites this paper as Cuneo and Shafer-Landau 2014
Citations
Cites
Johnson, K., & Nozick, R. (1975) · The Western Political Quarterly · doi:10.2307/447864 · Cited by 7,692
Nozick, R. (2018) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctv19fvzzk.69 · Cited by 6,691
Putnam, H. (1981) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625398 · Cited by 5,626
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.
Feldman, F., & Mackie, J. L. (1979) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2184791 · Cited by 5,076
Scanlon, T. (2000) · Harvard University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctv134vmrn · Cited by 3,053
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy
Williams, B. (2006) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780203969847 · Cited by 2,741
Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics
Brink, D. O. (1989) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511624612 · Cited by 1,932
Plantinga, A. (1993) · doi:10.1093/0195078640.001.0001 · Cited by 1,703
Dancy, J. (2004) · doi:10.1093/0199270023.001.0001 · Cited by 1,677
Dworkin, R. M. (2011) · Harvard University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctvjf9vkt · Cited by 1,461
Research works printed but not linked: 7
- Audi, R. (2004). The good in the right. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Aune, B. (1985). Metaphysics. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Blackburn, S. (1971). Moral realism. Essays in quasi-realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Reprinted from Blackburn 1993).
- Blackburn, S. (1985). Errors and the phenomenology of value. Essays in quasi-realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Reprinted from Blackburn 1993).
- Cuneo, T. (forthcoming b). The evolutionary objection to knowing moral reasons. In D. Star (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of reasons and normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- FitzPatrick, W. (forthcoming b). Why there is no Darwinian dilemma for moral realism. In M. Bergman & P. Kain (Eds.), Challenges to religious and moral belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sturgeon, N. (1988). Moral explanations. In G. Sayre-McCord (Ed.), Essays on moral realism (pp. 229–255). Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Clarke-Doane, J. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198823667.001.0001 · Cited by 146
Evolutionary Debunking of Moral Realism
Vavova, K. (2015) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/phc3.12194 · Cited by 108
McGrath, S. (2019) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198805410.001.0001 · Cited by 106
Sinclair, N. (2021) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198866107.001.0001 · Cited by 61
Are the Moral Fixed Points Conceptual Truths?
Evers, D., & Streumer, B. (2016) · Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy · doi:10.26556/jesp.v10i1.183 · Cited by 61
Deep Disagreement (Part 1): Theories of Deep Disagreement
Ranalli, C., & Lagewaard, T. (2022) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/phc3.12886 · Cited by 64
Moral inferentialism and the Frege-Geach problem
Warren, M. D. (2015) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0447-8 · Cited by 57
Bengson, J., Cuneo, T. D., & Shafer‐Landau, R. (2024) · doi:10.1093/9780198914594.001.0001 · Cited by 50
Self-citationKorman, D. Z. (2019) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/phc3.12638 · Cited by 47
FitzPatrick, W. J. (2022) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108580885 · Cited by 46
Epistemology and Methodology in Ethics
McPherson, T. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108581493 · Cited by 37
How to avoid begging the question against evolutionary debunking arguments
Copp, D. (2018) · Ratio · doi:10.1111/rati.12222 · Cited by 37
Hattiangadi, A. (2018) · Canadian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00455091.2018.1436034 · Cited by 36
Kahane, G. (2016) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12146 · Cited by 33
A dilemma for non-naturalists: irrationality or immorality?
Bedke, M. S. (2019) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-018-01228-2 · Cited by 32
Fletcher, G. (2019) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198841449.003.0004 · Cited by 31
What Makes Evolution a Defeater?
Lutz, M. (2017) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-017-9931-1 · Cited by 31
Rossian Conceptual Intuitionism
Cowan, R. (2017) · Ethics · doi:10.1086/691566 · Cited by 29
The sense of incredibility in ethics
Laskowski, N. G. (2017) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-017-1007-1 · Cited by 29
Must realists be skeptics? An Aristotelian reply to a Darwinian Dilemma
Lott, M. (2017) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-017-0856-y · Cited by 28
Assertion and Practical Reasoning, Fallibilism and Pragmatic Skepticism
Kyriacou, C. (2019) · Acta Analytica · doi:10.1007/s12136-019-00414-z · Cited by 28
Sepielli, A. (2022) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192856500.001.0001 · Cited by 28
Evolutionary Hypotheses and Moral Skepticism
Isserow, J. (2018) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-018-9993-8 · Cited by 27
Moral Distinctiveness and Moral Inquiry
Dorsey, D. (2016) · Ethics · doi:10.1086/684710 · Cited by 26
Fletcher, G. (2021) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198858263.001.0001 · Cited by 25
A semantic challenge to non-realist cognitivism
Copp, D. (2018) · Canadian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00455091.2018.1432392 · Cited by 24
Model Theory, Hume's Dictum, and the Priority of Ethical Theory
Woods, J., & Maguire, B. (2017) · Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.3998/ergo.12405314.0004.014 · Cited by 23
Can Moral Principles Explain Supervenience?
Elliott, A. (2014) · Res Philosophica · doi:10.11612/resphil.2014.91.4.6 · Cited by 22
Evolutionary arguments against moral realism: Why the empirical details matter (and which ones do)
Hopster, J. K. G. (2018) · Biology & Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10539-018-9652-0 · Cited by 21
Debunking Morality: Lessons from the EAAN Literature
Moon, A. (2016) · Pacific philosophical quarterly · doi:10.1111/papq.12165 · Cited by 21
Ethics and Evolutionary Theory
Wielenberg, E. J. (2016) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/anw061 · Cited by 21
Causal Impotence and Evolutionary Influence: Epistemological Challenges for Non-Naturalism
Crow, D. (2015) · Ethical Theory and Moral Practice · doi:10.1007/s10677-015-9625-1 · Cited by 20
Cognitivism and Metaphysical Weight: A Dilemma for Relaxed Realism
Böddeling, A. (2019) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048402.2019.1651355 · Cited by 19
Are Moral Error Theorists Intellectually Vicious?
Ingram, S. (2018) · Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy · doi:10.26556/jesp.v13i1.228 · Cited by 18
There’s Nothing Quasi About Quasi-Realism: Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine
Kramer, M. H. (2017) · The Journal of Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10892-017-9247-z · Cited by 18
Intuitions, Meaning, and Normativity: Why Intuition Theory Supports a Non‐Descriptivist Metaethic
Bedke, M. S. (2015) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.12187 · Cited by 17
Ethics and the Question of What to Do
Risberg, O. (2023) · Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy · doi:10.26556/jesp.v25i2.1117 · Cited by 17
Dehorning the Darwinian dilemma for normative realism
Deem, M. J. (2016) · Biology & Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10539-016-9529-z · Cited by 19
Anthropomorphism, False Beliefs, and Conversational AIs : How Chatbots Undermine Users' Autonomy
Marchegiani, B. (2025) · Journal of Applied Philosophy · doi:10.1111/japp.70008 · Cited by 17
Non-Realist Cognitivism, Truthmaking, and Ontological Cheating
Akhlaghi, F. (2021) · Ethics · doi:10.1086/716872 · Cited by 16
Why conceptual competence won’t help the non-naturalist epistemologist
Werner, P. J. (2017) · Canadian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00455091.2017.1410417 · Cited by 15
Deliberative Authority and Representational Determinacy: A Challenge for the Normative Realist
McPherson, T. (2020) · Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.3998/ergo.12405314.0006.045 · Cited by 14
The argument from agreement: How universal values undermine moral realism
Sauer, H. (2019) · Ratio · doi:10.1111/rati.12233 · Cited by 16
The limits of rational belief revision: A dilemma for the Darwinian debunker
Vavova, K. (2020) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12327 · Cited by 14
Grounding the normative: a problem for structured non-naturalism
Morton, J. (2018) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-018-1184-6 · Cited by 13
Werner, P. J. (2020) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/phc3.12640 · Cited by 12
From Moral Fixed Points to Epistemic Fixed Points
Kyriacou, C. (2018) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-93369-6_4 · Cited by 12
Sauer, H. (2023) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781003375753 · Cited by 13
Klenk, M. (2017) · Ethical Theory and Moral Practice · doi:10.1007/s10677-017-9797-y · Cited by 11
Are Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Self-Debunking?
Kyriacou, C. (2016) · Philosophia · doi:10.1007/s11406-016-9780-1 · Cited by 10
Is there a Good Moral Argument against Moral Realism?
Golub, C. (2020) · Ethical Theory and Moral Practice · doi:10.1007/s10677-020-10129-5 · Cited by 10
Why Care About Moral Fixed Points?
Killoren, D. (2016) · Analytic Philosophy · doi:10.1111/phib.12079 · Cited by 10
Moral Fixed Points and Conceptual Deficiency: Reply to Ingram
Kyriacou, C. (2017) · Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy · doi:10.26556/jesp.v11i3.190 · Cited by 10
Streumer, B. (2023) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.13029 · Cited by 9
Expressivism, question substitution and evolutionary debunking
Kyriacou, C. (2017) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2017.1324622 · Cited by 9
A new argument for moral error theory
Cowie, C. (2020) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12357 · Cited by 9
Moral hinges and steadfastness
Ranalli, C. (2021) · Metaphilosophy · doi:10.1111/meta.12499 · Cited by 9
Against inferential moral knowledge: A defence of Hume’s Law
Backes, M. (2025) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1093/pq/pqaf012 · Cited by 8
Fuqua, J. (2021) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03100-z · Cited by 8
The Supervenience Challenge to Non-Naturalism
Väyrynen, P. (2017) · White Rose Research Online (University of Leeds, The University of Sheffield, University of York) · Cited by 7
van Woudenberg, R. (2017) · Philosophy · doi:10.1017/s003181911700047x · Cited by 7
From Non-Usability to Non-Factualism
Clarke‐Doane, J. (2021) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/anab029 · Cited by 7
Normative Objectivity Without Ontological Commitments?
Gasser, G. (2017) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-016-9448-2 · Cited by 6
Kauppinen, A. (2017) · Philosophia · doi:10.1007/s11406-017-9816-1 · Cited by 6
Moral Phenomenology and the Value-Laden World
FitzPatrick, W. J. (2021) · Ethical Theory and Moral Practice · doi:10.1007/s10677-021-10213-4 · Cited by 6
Footing the Cost (of Normative Subjectivism)
Woods, J. (2018) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780429452284-9 · Cited by 5
Moral Fixed Points, Rationality and the ‘Why Be Moral?’ Question
Kyriacou, C. (2019) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-019-00124-3 · Cited by 5
Horgan, T. G., & Timmons, M. (2018) · Canadian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00455091.2018.1432393 · Cited by 5
How Gene–Culture Coevolution can—but Probably did not—Track Mind-Independent Moral Truth
Cofnas, N. (2022) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1093/pq/pqac047 · Cited by 6
Evolutionary debunking: the Milvian Bridge destabilized
Kyriacou, C. (2017) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1555-0 · Cited by 5
Five Kinds of Epistemic Arguments against Robust Moral Realism
Schechter, J. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190068226.013.16 · Cited by 4
A Rawlsian Solution to the New Demarcation Problem
Cabrera, F. (2022) · Canadian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1017/can.2023.19 · Cited by 4
Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and the Moral Niche
Severini, E. (2016) · Philosophia · doi:10.1007/s11406-016-9708-9 · Cited by 4
Against deliberative indispensability as an independent guide to what there is
Cline, B. (2016) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0661-z · Cited by 4
What's to be Said for Moral Non‐Naturalism?
Cuneo, T. D. (2016) · doi:10.1002/9781118657775.ch28 · Cited by 4
Self-citationMoral Generalism and Moral Particularism
Väyrynen, P. (2023) · The Bloomsbury Handbook of Ethics · doi:10.5040/9781350217911.0025 · Cited by 3
Pravato, G. (2020) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-020-00293-6 · Cited by 3
Ethical Theories as Methods of Ethics
Suikkanen, J. (2021) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192856913.003.0013 · Cited by 3
Some moral benefits of ignorance
Licon, J. A. (2022) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2022.2042230 · Cited by 3
Probability fixed points, (in)adequate concept possession and COVID-19 irrationalities
Kyriacou, C., & Stylianou, N. (2023) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2023.2202184 · Cited by 3
Zormpalas, S. O. (2023) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-023-01939-1 · Cited by 3
Ingram, S. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198886488.001.0001 · Cited by 3
Ethical Theories and Controversial Intuitions
Cosker-Rowland, R. (2023) · International Journal of Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1080/09672559.2023.2264721 · Cited by 3
Hill, S. (2015) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-015-9760-z · Cited by 3
Moral Realism and the Argument from Skepticism
Risberg, O., & Tersman, F. (2020) · International Journal for the Study of Skepticism · doi:10.1163/22105700-bja10017 · Cited by 3
Debunking, Epistemic Achievement, and Undermining Defeat
Klenk, M. (2022) · American Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.5406/21521123.59.1.04 · Cited by 3
Reid on the first principles of morals
Cuneo, T. D. (2014) · Canadian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00455091.2014.897476 · Cited by 4
Self-citationToward a Perceptual Solution to Epistemological Objections to Nonnaturalism
Werner, P. J. (2023) · Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy · doi:10.26556/jesp.v24i3.1624 · Cited by 3
Tersman, F., & Risberg, O. (2022) · Ethical Theory and Moral Practice · doi:10.1007/s10677-022-10275-y · Cited by 2
Grounding Thick Normative Facts
Morton, J. (2018) · Pacific philosophical quarterly · doi:10.1111/papq.12266 · Cited by 2
The Projectability Challenge to Moral Naturalism
Bengson, J., Cuneo, T. D., & Reisner, A. E. (2020) · Journal of Moral Philosophy · doi:10.1163/17455243-20202934 · Cited by 2
Self-citationImplicit and Explicit Examples of the Phenomenon of Deviant Encodings
Quinon, P. (2020) · Studies in Logic Grammar and Rhetoric · doi:10.2478/slgr-2020-0027 · Cited by 2
Why Quasi-Realism cannot Accommodate Moral Mind-Independence
Sun, Y. (2022) · Philosophia · doi:10.1007/s11406-022-00607-8 · Cited by 2
Normativity, prudence and welfare
Ridge, M. (2024) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-024-02144-4 · Cited by 2
Artificial moral intelligence and computability: an Aristotelian perspective
Kyriacou, C. (2024) · AI and Ethics · doi:10.1007/s43681-024-00543-1 · Cited by 2
Non-realist cognitivism, partners-in-innocence, and No dilemma
Jack, E., & Khuramy, M. (2025) · Asian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s44204-025-00268-w · Cited by 2
Dissolving the Debunker’s Puzzle
Cuneo, T. D. (2014) · Cited by 2
Self-citationStreet on evolution and the normativity of epistemic reasons
Evers, D. (2015) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0714-4 · Cited by 2
What if God commanded something horrible? A pragmatics-based defence of divine command metaethics
Kremers, P. (2020) · Religious Studies · doi:10.1017/s0034412519000684 · Cited by 2
Getting a Moral Thing into a Thought
Werner, P. J. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198859512.003.0007 · Cited by 2
Metadata
- Authors
- Cuneo, T., & Shafer-Landau, R.
- Affiliations
- University of Vermont (US)
- ORCID
- Cuneo, Terence
- Venue
- Philosophical Studies
- Published
- 2014-01-09
- Volume
- 171
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 399-443
- ISSN
- 0031-8116 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0883
- OpenAlex
- W2019272718
- Cited by
- 270
- References
- 136
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 27 · 2024: 26 · 2023: 35 · 2022: 23 · 2021: 44 · 2020: 25 · 2019: 19 · 2018: 20 · 2017: 19 · 2016: 15 · 2015: 6 · 2014: 3
- FWCI
- 87.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Philosophical Studies (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art
- Keywords
- moral realism, moral propositions, moral norms, moral metaphysics, moral epistemology
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review