The DOI matches its Crossref record; 42 of the 42 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Public good provision under dictatorship and democracy
Open accessAbstract
The allocation of a government budget between a public good and transfers is modeled under different systems of government. The relatively even distribution of political power among groups in a democracy favors spending on nonexclusive public goods. The more concentrated pattern of political power in a dictatorship favors spending on transfers targeted to powerful groups. The hypothesis on public good provision is examined using cross-country data on public good provision and empirical indicators of political regime. Dictatorial governments are found to provide public schooling, roads, safe water, public sanitation, and pollution control at levels far below democracies.
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Cites
Journal of economic literature
Armstrong, J. S. (1996) · International Journal of Forecasting · doi:10.1016/0169-2070(96)88197-0 · Cited by 9,923
The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2001) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.91.5.1369 · Cited by 8,517
The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation: Reply
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.6.3077 · Cited by 6,047
Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy
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The Logic of Political Survival
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4292.001.0001 · Cited by 4,217 · cited 15×
“Lake and Baum (2001) and Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) present empirical evidence supporting this prediction for public education (literacy rates, enrollment rates, persistence to grade level) and public health (immunization rates, access to clean water, infant mortality rates).”
BackgroundResultInfluentialPolitical Economics: Explaining Economic Policy
Bucovetsky, S., Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (2002) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1061733 · Cited by 3,748
Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E. (2008) · 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2 · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_7 · Cited by 3,302
Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions
Alesina, A., Baqir, R., & Easterly, W. (1999) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355399556269 · Cited by 2,328
Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions
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Cited by
Bollyky, T. J., Templin, T., Cohen, M., Schoder, D., Dieleman, J. L., & Wigley, S. (2019) · The Lancet · doi:10.1016/s0140-6736(19)30235-1 · Cited by 189
Metadata
- Authors
- Deacon, R. T.
- Venue
- Public Choice
- Published
- 2009-01-13
- Volume
- 139
- Issue
- 1-2
- Pages
- 241-262
- ISSN
- 0048-5829 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-7101
- OpenAlex
- W1993398954
- Cited by
- 272
- References
- 42
- FWCI
- 17.01
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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