Is supernatural belief unreliably formed?
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 50 of the 50 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 2 of the 38 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
I criticize 5 arguments for the conclusion that religious belief is unreliably formed and hence epistemically tainted. The arguments draw on scientific evidence from Cognitive Science of Religion. They differ considerably as to why the evidence points to unreliability. Two arguments conclude to unreliability because religious belief is shaped by evolutionary pressures; another argument states that the mechanism responsible for religious belief produces many false god-beliefs; a similar argument claims that the mechanism produces incompatible god-beliefs; and a final argument states that the mechanism is offtrack. I argue that the arguments fail to make the case for unreliability or that the unreliability can be overcome.
Overview
CoChat Summary
## TL;DR
Hans Van Eyghen argues that five CSR-based debunking arguments do not succeed in showing that supernatural belief is unreliably formed. He contends that even if some CSR mechanisms are unreliable or off-track, their unreliability can be mitigated by culture, upbringing, evidence, or pragmatic success.
## Key findings
- The paper distinguishes five unreliability arguments in the literature: two evolutionary arguments, one false-god-beliefs argument, one incompatible-god-beliefs argument, and one off-track argument.
- Against Goodnick’s evolutionary argument, Van Eyghen says the move from natural selection to unreliability fails, and notes that similar reasoning would create “evolutionary skepticism” for many ordinary belief-forming faculties.
- Against Braddock’s false-god-beliefs argument, he grants that CSR mechanisms may produce many false outputs, but argues that upbringing, culture, and CREDs can redirect them; he cites Lanman and Buhrmester as showing that exposure to credibility enhancing displays predicts theism, certainty of God’s existence, and religiosity.
- Against the incompatible-beliefs argument, he argues that CSR mechanisms yield vague supernatural beliefs, not full-blown beliefs that a being is a “god,” so the apparent monotheism/polytheism conflict is not attributable to the mechanisms themselves.
- Against the off-track argument, he says that being somewhat offtrack does not imply unreliability and that similar worries would also undermine other faculties such as theory of mind.
## Methods
- Conceptual/philosophical analysis of the CSR debunking literature, focusing on five arguments already in circulation rather than new empirical data.
- The paper examines CSR theories and examples including HADD, EToM, Cognitive Optimum, Broad Supernatural Punishment Theory, and Big Gods Theory.
- Main analysis is argumentative: Van Eyghen reconstructs each debunking argument’s premises and then critiques whether those premises support the conclusion that supernatural belief is unreliably formed.
## Limitations
- The paper does not report a new empirical study; it is a philosophical critique of existing arguments rather than direct empirical testing. (evident from the text)
- The author explicitly says he will not discuss criticisms of the CSR theories in detail and proceeds “as if they are true.” (stated in the paper)
- He says he will not contest premise (2) of the generic unreliability schema. (stated in the paper)
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
1 Valid · 5 Not valid · 33 Not checked · 94 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources that could be checked couldn’t confirm or dispute this claim.
In the paper
“The beliefs produced by CSR-mechanisms are rather vague.”
What the sources say
- Could not verifycites Van Eyghen 2018 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Our copy of Van Eyghen's review (State of the Art) discusses CSR-theories about 'general human cognitive mechanisms and their outputs' and Boyer's minimally counterintuitive concepts, but nowhere states that the beliefs produced by those mechanisms are vague. The only use of 'vague' in the review attaches to the contributors, not to belief-content: 'most contributors remain vague about how interdisciplinary research can help move CSR forward.' Since the review neither asserts nor denies vagueness of the beliefs themselves, the claim cannot be settled from our copy. (LLM, conf=0.72)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Could not verify
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“All the unreliability arguments conclude to some serious epistemic deficiency of supernatural belief.”
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on an assumption not shown here.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Clearly their responses rely on a form of theistic evolution.”
boostedstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Evolutionary skepticism also casts doubt on Goodnick's own premises since they were likely formed by common sense.”
hedgedstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on an assumption not shown here.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Clearly supernatural beliefs can differ to some extent depending on the experience an individual has had.”
boostedstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
41 more claims
Create a free account to see all 133 claims and every source verdict.
- Probably not a substantial claim. 70
- It may state two separate claims as one. 29
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Epistemic deficiencies
“In what follows, I discuss five unreliability arguments.”
§ Is supernatural belief unreliably formed?
“In this paper, I distinguish four unreliability arguments in the literature.”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Is supernatural belief unreliably formed?
“Abstract I criticize 5 arguments for the conclusion that religious belief is unreliably formed and hence epistemically tainted.”
§ Is supernatural belief unreliably formed?
“In this paper, I distinguish four unreliability arguments in the literature.”
Citations
Cites
An Experimental Study of Apparent Behavior
Heider, F., & Simmel, M. (1944) · The American Journal of Psychology · doi:10.2307/1416950 · Cited by 3,340 · cited 3×
“68 Barrett refers to the famous Heider Simmel study (Heider and Simmel 1944).”
BackgroundInfluential(1927) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 1,656
The psychology of emotion regulation: An integrative review
Koole, S. L. (2009) · Cognition & Emotion · doi:10.1080/02699930802619031 · Cited by 1,490 · cited 2×
“2 Examples are Wilkins and Griffiths (2013), Murray (2008), Jones (2016), Leech and Visala (2011) and Nola (2013).”
BackgroundWhy would anyone believe in God?
(2005) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.42-3375a · Cited by 955 · cited 9×
“3 Clark (2010), Clark and Barrett (2010). 4 Goodnick (2016). 5 Thurow (2013: 77). 6 Barrett (2007: 57). 7 Clark and Rabinowitz (2011). 126 Int J Philos Relig (2019) 85:125–148”
InfluentialSelf-threat magnifies the self-serving bias: A meta-analytic integration
Campbell, W. K., & Sedikides, C. (1999) · Review of General Psychology · doi:10.1037/1089-2680.3.1.23 · Cited by 873 · cited 1×
“45 Campbell and Sedikides (1999).”
The evolution of costly displays, cooperation and religion
Henrich, J. (2009) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2009.03.005 · Cited by 693 · cited 1×
“59 Henrich (2009). incompatible (and thus false) god beliefs?’’”
Perceiving God: the epistemology of religious experience
(1992) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.30-0228 · Cited by 630
Where the Conflict Really LiesScience, Religion, and Naturalism
Plantinga, A. (2011) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199812097.001.0001 · Cited by 478
(2002) · Vintage Books · Cited by 431
The Generality Problem for Reliabilism
Conee, E., & Feldman, R. (1998) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1023/a:1004243308503 · Cited by 401 · cited 1×
“Some criticisms against reliabilism in general will also count against this arguments (e.g.Conee and Feldman 1998).”
Result
Research works printed but not linked: 3
- Eddington, A. S. (1930). The nature of the physical world. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Murray, M. J. (2008). Four arguments that the cognitive psychology of religion undermines the justification of religious belief. In J. Bulbulia, R. Sosis, E. Harris, R. Genet, C. Genet, & K. Wyman (Eds.), The evolution of religion: Studies, theories, and critiques. Santa Margarita: Collins Foundation Press.
- Priest, G., & Berto, F. (2013). Dialetheism. In E. N. Zalta (Eds.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (summer 2013 edition).
Cited by
Exploring gaslighting effects via the VAPUS model for ghost narratives
Drinkwater, K. G., Dagnall, N., Laythe, B. R., Houran, J., O’Keeffe, C., & Hill, S. A. (2019) · Bucks New University Repository (Bucks New University) · Cited by 35
The Cognitive Science of Religion, Philosophy and Theology: A Survey of the Issues
Eyghen, H. V., Peels, R., & van den Brink, G. (2018) · New approaches to the scientific study of religion · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-90239-5_1 · Cited by 13
Self-citationStepanenko, W. S. (2020) · Open Theology · doi:10.1515/opth-2020-0007 · Cited by 2
Grygiel, W. P. (2021) · Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) · doi:10.59203/zfn.70.543 · Cited by 3
Christianity, ‘supernatural’ beliefs and COVID-19
Shoko, E. (2023) · Acta Theologica · doi:10.38140/at.v43i1.6314 · Cited by 4
Metadata
- Authors
- Van Eyghen, H.
- ORCID
- Van Eyghen, Hans
- Venue
- International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
- Published
- 2018-05-05
- Volume
- 85
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 125-148
- ISSN
- 0020-7047 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8684
- OpenAlex
- W2802395739
- Cited by
- 16
- References
- 50
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 1 · 2018: 1
- FWCI
- 15.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
- Locations
- International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- VU Research Portal (publishedVersion, other-oa)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Study and Philosophy of Religion
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- supernatural beliefs, epistemic reliability, religious beliefs, cognitive science of religion, evolutionary pressure, belief formation
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