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Is supernatural belief unreliably formed?

Open access
Van Eyghen, Hans · 2019 · International Journal for Philosophy of Religion

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 50 of the 50 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 2 of the 38 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Abstract

I criticize 5 arguments for the conclusion that religious belief is unreliably formed and hence epistemically tainted. The arguments draw on scientific evidence from Cognitive Science of Religion. They differ considerably as to why the evidence points to unreliability. Two arguments conclude to unreliability because religious belief is shaped by evolutionary pressures; another argument states that the mechanism responsible for religious belief produces many false god-beliefs; a similar argument claims that the mechanism produces incompatible god-beliefs; and a final argument states that the mechanism is offtrack. I argue that the arguments fail to make the case for unreliability or that the unreliability can be overcome.

Overview

CoChat Summary

## TL;DR

Hans Van Eyghen argues that five CSR-based debunking arguments do not succeed in showing that supernatural belief is unreliably formed. He contends that even if some CSR mechanisms are unreliable or off-track, their unreliability can be mitigated by culture, upbringing, evidence, or pragmatic success.

## Key findings

  • The paper distinguishes five unreliability arguments in the literature: two evolutionary arguments, one false-god-beliefs argument, one incompatible-god-beliefs argument, and one off-track argument.
  • Against Goodnick’s evolutionary argument, Van Eyghen says the move from natural selection to unreliability fails, and notes that similar reasoning would create “evolutionary skepticism” for many ordinary belief-forming faculties.
  • Against Braddock’s false-god-beliefs argument, he grants that CSR mechanisms may produce many false outputs, but argues that upbringing, culture, and CREDs can redirect them; he cites Lanman and Buhrmester as showing that exposure to credibility enhancing displays predicts theism, certainty of God’s existence, and religiosity.
  • Against the incompatible-beliefs argument, he argues that CSR mechanisms yield vague supernatural beliefs, not full-blown beliefs that a being is a “god,” so the apparent monotheism/polytheism conflict is not attributable to the mechanisms themselves.
  • Against the off-track argument, he says that being somewhat offtrack does not imply unreliability and that similar worries would also undermine other faculties such as theory of mind.

## Methods

  • Conceptual/philosophical analysis of the CSR debunking literature, focusing on five arguments already in circulation rather than new empirical data.
  • The paper examines CSR theories and examples including HADD, EToM, Cognitive Optimum, Broad Supernatural Punishment Theory, and Big Gods Theory.
  • Main analysis is argumentative: Van Eyghen reconstructs each debunking argument’s premises and then critiques whether those premises support the conclusion that supernatural belief is unreliably formed.

## Limitations

  • The paper does not report a new empirical study; it is a philosophical critique of existing arguments rather than direct empirical testing. (evident from the text)
  • The author explicitly says he will not discuss criticisms of the CSR theories in detail and proceeds “as if they are true.” (stated in the paper)
  • He says he will not contest premise (2) of the generic unreliability schema. (stated in the paper)

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1007/s11153-018-9671-4

Cites

50 of 50 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

1 Valid · 5 Not valid · 33 Not checked · 94 Own results and interpretations

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  • Probably not a substantial claim. 70
  • It may state two separate claims as one. 29

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Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

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Citations

Cites

Show all 50 references

Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. Eddington, A. S. (1930). The nature of the physical world. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  2. Murray, M. J. (2008). Four arguments that the cognitive psychology of religion undermines the justification of religious belief. In J. Bulbulia, R. Sosis, E. Harris, R. Genet, C. Genet, & K. Wyman (Eds.), The evolution of religion: Studies, theories, and critiques. Santa Margarita: Collins Foundation Press.
  3. Priest, G., & Berto, F. (2013). Dialetheism. In E. N. Zalta (Eds.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (summer 2013 edition).

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Van Eyghen, H.
Venue
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
Published
2018-05-05
Volume
85
Issue
2
Pages
125-148
ISSN
  • 0020-7047 (ISSN-L)
  • 1572-8684
OpenAlex
W2802395739
Cited by
16
References
50
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 1 · 2018: 1
FWCI
15.43
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
  • cc-by
  • creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
Locations
  • International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • VU Research Portal (publishedVersion, other-oa)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
  • Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Study and Philosophy of Religion
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Keywords
supernatural beliefs, epistemic reliability, religious beliefs, cognitive science of religion, evolutionary pressure, belief formation

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Is supernatural belief unreliably formed? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s11153-018-9671-4
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Van Eyghen, H. (2019). Is supernatural belief unreliably formed? International Journal for Philosophy of Religion. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-018-9671-4

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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