Cited by 693Evolutionary Game Theory and CooperationLanguage and cultural evolutionEvolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior

The evolution of costly displays, cooperation and religion

Henrich, Joseph·2009·Evolution and Human Behavior

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2009.03.005

Cites

9 of 9 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Outward behavior by people who are monotheistic can make people more likely to become monotheistic themselves.

    “Outward behavior by people who are monotheistic can make people more likely to become monotheistic themselves.”

    From Is supernatural belief unreliably formed? (2019) · cites this paper as Henrich (2009)

  • Such knowledge acts as a reliable and credible cue that can foster group cohesion through identity and status formation.

    “Such knowledge acts as a reliable and credible cue that can foster group cohesion through identity and status formation (Henrich, 2009).”

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Authors
Henrich, J.
Affiliations
University of British Columbia (CA)
Corresponding author
Henrich, Joseph
Venue
Evolution and Human Behavior
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2009-07
Volume
30
Issue
4
Pages
244-260
ISSN
1090-5138 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2128261329
Cited by
693
References
9
Citations by year
2026: 50 · 2025: 56 · 2024: 48 · 2023: 35 · 2022: 40 · 2021: 56 · 2020: 84 · 2019: 49 · 2018: 42 · 2017: 54 · 2016: 40 · 2015: 31 · 2014: 30 · 2013: 20 · 2012: 29
FWCI
61.70
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Evolution and Human Behavior (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Cultural Studies › Language and cultural evolution
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
Keywords
costly signaling, ritual, animal sacrifice, martyrdom, cultural learning, learning bias, group competition, cooperation, religion, evolution of religion

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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

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