The DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Predictive coding and representationalism
Open accessAbstract
According to the predictive coding theory of cognition (PCT), brains are predictive machines that use perception and action to minimize prediction error, i.e. the discrepancy between bottom–up, externally-generated sensory signals and top–down, internally-generated sensory predictions. Many consider PCT to have an explanatory scope that is unparalleled in contemporary cognitive science and see in it a framework that could potentially provide us with a unified account of cognition. It is also commonly assumed that PCT is a representational theory of sorts, in the sense that it postulates that our cognitive contact with the world is mediated by internal representations. However, the exact sense in which PCT is representational remains unclear; neither is it clear that it deserves such status—that is, whether it really invokes structures that are truly and nontrivially representational in nature. In the present article, I argue that the representational pretensions of PCT are completely justified. This is because the theory postulates cognitive structures—namely action-guiding, detachable, structural models that afford representational error detection—that play genuinely representational functions within the cognitive system.
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Cites
The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory?
Friston, K. (2010) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2787 · Cited by 8,120 · cited 5×
“Here I will discuss what is perhaps the most theoretically ambitious version of PCT, namely that which situates predictive coding within the larger context of theoretical biology (Friston 2010, 2013a, b; Friston and Kiebel 2009; Friston and Stephan 2007; Hohwy 2013).”
BackgroundInfluentialWhatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science
Clark, A. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12000477 · Cited by 5,924
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“…the cognitive system (the brain) has to be able to infer “from the inside” the most likely worldly causes of incoming sensory signals (Clark 2013a, b; Friston 2010; Friston and Kiebel 2009; Friston and Stephan 2007; Hohwy 2013; Huang and Rao 2011; Lee and Mumford 2003; Rao and Ballard 1999).”
BackgroundLanguage, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism
Millikan, R. G. (1984) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4124.001.0001 · Cited by 4,758
Canonical Microcircuits for Predictive Coding
Bastos, A. M., Usrey, W. M., Adams, R. A., Mangun, G. R., Fries, P., & Friston, K. J. (2012) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2012.10.038 · Cited by 2,421
Hohwy, J. (2013) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682737.001.0001 · Cited by 1,914
Radical Embodied Cognitive Science
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How to grow a mind: Statistics, structure, and abstraction
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Predictive coding under the free-energy principle
Friston, K., & Kiebel, S. (2009) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2008.0300 · Cited by 1,579
Hierarchical Bayesian inference in the visual cortex
Lee, T. S., & Mumford, D. (2003) · Journal of the Optical Society of America A · doi:10.1364/josaa.20.001434 · Cited by 1,473 · cited 3×
“…the cognitive system (the brain) has to be able to infer “from the inside” the most likely worldly causes of incoming sensory signals (Clark 2013a, b; Friston 2010; Friston and Kiebel 2009; Friston and Stephan 2007; Hohwy 2013; Huang and Rao 2011; Lee and Mumford 2003; Rao and Ballard 1999).”
Background
Cited by
Sentience and the Origins of Consciousness: From Cartesian Duality to Markovian Monism
Friston, K. J., Wiese, W., & Hobson, J. A. (2020) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e22050516 · Cited by 186
Vanilla PP for Philosophers: A Primer on Predictive Processing
Wiese, W., & Metzinger, T. K. (2017) · Theoretical Philosophy/MIND Group – JGU Mainz · doi:10.15502/9783958573024 · Cited by 130
“There is some debate about whether PP posits representations, and if so how best to describe them (see Gładziejewski 2016; Downey 2017; Dołega 2017).”
BackgroundWhere There is Life There is Mind: In Support of a Strong Life-Mind Continuity Thesis
Kirchhoff, M. D., & Froese, T. (2017) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e19040169 · Cited by 114
“For example, Hohwy [3,6,7] draws such cognitivist results from the FEP (but see also [30]).”
BackgroundFrom symbols to icons: the return of resemblance in the cognitive neuroscience revolution
Williams, D., & Colling, L. (2018) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1578-6 · Cited by 69
Explanatory pluralism: An unrewarding prediction error for free energy theorists
Colombo, M., & Wright, C. (2017) · Brain and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.bandc.2016.02.003 · Cited by 67
Metadata
- Authors
- Gładziejewski, P.
- Venue
- Synthese
- Published
- 2015-05-10
- Volume
- 193
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 559-582
- ISSN
- 0039-7857 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0964
- OpenAlex
- W2150013078
- Cited by
- 185
- References
- 23
- FWCI
- 7.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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