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Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science

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Clark, Andy · 2013 · Behavioral and Brain Sciences

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 387 of the 397 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 29 of the 152 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Abstract

Brains, it has recently been argued, are essentially prediction machines. They are bundles of cells that support perception and action by constantly attempting to match incoming sensory inputs with top-down expectations or predictions. This is achieved using a hierarchical generative model that aims to minimize prediction error within a bidirectional cascade of cortical processing. Such accounts offer a unifying model of perception and action, illuminate the functional role of attention, and may neatly capture the special contribution of cortical processing to adaptive success. This target article critically examines this "hierarchical prediction machine" approach, concluding that it offers the best clue yet to the shape of a unified science of mind and action. Sections 1 and 2 lay out the key elements and implications of the approach. Section 3 explores a variety of pitfalls and challenges, spanning the evidential, the methodological, and the more properly conceptual. The paper ends (sections 4 and 5) by asking how such approaches might impact our more general vision of mind, experience, and agency.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

Clark argues that hierarchical predictive processing—brains as prediction machines minimizing prediction error via bidirectional cortical cascades—offers the best clue yet to a unified science of mind and action. He critically reviews its evidence, conceptual implications, and limits, concluding it is a powerful but incomplete framework that must be paired with embodied, situated, and socio-cultural approaches.

Key findings

  • Hierarchical predictive processing treats perception as top-down probabilistic generative modeling that “explains away” sensory input, with forward connections carrying prediction error and backward connections carrying predictions; action-oriented predictive processing extends the same logic to motor action and active inference.
  • The framework unifies perception, action, attention, and learning: attention is modeled as precision-weighting or gain on error units, and the perception/cognition distinction becomes one of scale and precision-modulated influence rather than a stable interface.
  • Reviewed evidence includes Rao and Ballard’s model trained on image patches from five natural scenes, which learned oriented edges/bars and extra-classical receptive field effects; Hosoya et al.’s finding that within several seconds about 50% of retinal ganglion cells altered behavior with changing image statistics; Egner et al.’s finding that FFA responses to face and house stimuli became indistinguishable under high face expectation, with a best-fit simulation in which error units contributed twice as much to the fMRI signal as representation units; and Melloni et al.’s finding that reportable conscious percept onset varied by around 100 msec with expectations.
  • The account is extended speculatively to delusions and hallucinations in schizophrenia via false, highly weighted prediction errors, and to human cognition as shaped by culturally constructed “designer environments” that feed new statistical structures back into prediction-driven learning.

Methods

  • Design: theoretical target article and critical review, not an empirical study; it synthesizes computational neuroscience, Bayesian brain approaches, predictive coding, action-oriented predictive processing, and the free-energy principle.
  • Data/sample: no new data; it draws on prior computational models and empirical studies, including Rao and Ballard (1999), Hosoya et al. (2005), Hohwy et al. (2008), Friston and colleagues, Egner et al. (2010), and others.
  • Main analysis: conceptual and argumentative assessment of the hierarchical prediction machine framework, its neural plausibility, explanatory scope, and challenges across evidential, methodological, and conceptual dimensions.

Limitations

  • The paper states that direct neuroscientific testing of hierarchical predictive coding and its action-oriented extension “remains in its infancy,” that the best current evidence is indirect, and that “no single neuron study has systematically pursued the search for sensory prediction error responses” (quoting Summerfield & Egner 2009); direct unambiguous evidence for functionally distinct error and representation subpopulations is still missing.
  • The paper states that the framework does not by itself specify the full human cognitive architecture, including how cognitive labor is divided across areas, what aspects of the world are sensorially coded, how to navigate the explore–exploit continuum, and what representational formats are used; it also says the “desert landscape” replacement of goals and rewards by predictions remains unconvincing, and a full assessment of the free-energy principle is beyond its scope.
  • The text makes evident that many supporting findings are indirect, simulation-based, or compatible with alternative accounts; the included commentaries further highlight unresolved challenges concerning attention, adaptation, anti-predictive ERP patterns, the size–weight illusion, and the “dark room” problem.

Model-written summary of a shortened version of the paper’s full text (it is longer than we read). Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1017/s0140525x12000477

Cites

387 of 387 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Figures

Figure 1 (Block & Siegel). A display of one of the textured fi gures (the square on the right) used by Yeshurun and Carrasco (1998). The square appeared at varying degrees of eccentricity. With low resolution in peripheral locations, attention improved detection of the square; but with high resolution in central locations, attention impaired detection.
Figure 1 (Block & Siegel). A display of one of the textured fi gures (the square on the right) used by Yeshurun and Carrasco (1998). The square appeared at varying degrees of eccentricity. With low resolution in peripheral locations, attention improved detection of the square; but with high resolution in central locations, attention impaired detection.From the PDF
Figure 1 (Bowman et al.). An anti-predictive ERP pattern.
Figure 1 (Bowman et al.). An anti-predictive ERP pattern.From the PDF
Figure 1 (Gowaty & Hubbell). The hypothesis for the evolution of adaptively fl exible behavior (modi fi ed from fi gures in Gowaty & Hubbell 2005; 2009).
Figure 1 (Gowaty & Hubbell). The hypothesis for the evolution of adaptively fl exible behavior (modi fi ed from fi gures in Gowaty & Hubbell 2005; 2009).From the PDF
Figure 1 (Seth & Crichley). A model of interoceptive predictive coding according to which subjective feeling states are constituted by continually updated predictions of the causes of interoceptive input. Predictions are shaped by generative models informed by ' efference copies ' of visceral, autonomic, and motor control signals. These are generated, compared, and updated within a salience network anchored on the anterior insular and anterior cingulate cortices that engage brainstem regions as targets for visceromotor control and relays of afferent interoceptive signals. Adapted from Seth et al. (2011).
Figure 1 (Seth & Crichley). A model of interoceptive predictive coding according to which subjective feeling states are constituted by continually updated predictions of the causes of interoceptive input. Predictions are shaped by generative models informed by ' efference copies ' of visceral, autonomic, and motor control signals. These are generated, compared, and updated within a salience network anchored on the anterior insular and anterior cingulate cortices that engage brainstem regions as targets for visceromotor control and relays of afferent interoceptive signals. Adapted from Seth et al. (2011).From the PDF

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Citations

Cites

Show all 387 references

Research works printed but not linked: 11

  1. Pribram, 1980, The orienting reflex in humans, 3
  2. Velleman, 1989, Practical reflection
  3. Neisser, 1967, Cognitive psychology
  4. Pfeifer, 2007, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), 4850
  5. Geissler, 1991, Constraints of mental self-organization: The indirect validation approach toward perception, Estratto da Comunicazioni Scientifiche di Psicologia Generale, 5, 47
  6. Maher, 1988, Delusional beliefs, 15
  7. Dennett, 1991, Consciousness explained
  8. Mumford, 1994, Large-scale theories of the cortex, 125
  9. Linsker, 1989, Advances in neural information processing systems, vol. 1, 86
  10. Alais, 2005, Binocular rivalry
  11. Marr, 1982, Vision: A computational approach

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Metadata

Authors
Clark, A.
Affiliations
University of Edinburgh (GB)
Corresponding author
Clark, Andy
Venue
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Published
2013-05-10
Volume
36
Issue
3
Pages
181-204
ISSN
  • 0140-525X (ISSN-L)
  • 1469-1825
OpenAlex
W2153791616
Cited by
5,924
References
397
Citations by year
2026: 644 · 2025: 603 · 2024: 438 · 2023: 535 · 2022: 506 · 2021: 488 · 2020: 501 · 2019: 577 · 2018: 398 · 2017: 351 · 2016: 284 · 2015: 255 · 2014: 213 · 2013: 95
FWCI
24.16
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Behavioral and Brain Sciences (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Funders
  • University of Oxford
  • University of Edinburgh
  • Ruhr-Universität Bochum
  • School of Informatics, University of Edinburgh
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Keywords
predictive processing, top-down prediction, prediction error, generative models, perception-action coupling, attention, cortical processing, situated agents, agency, experience
MeSH terms
Attention, Brain, Cognition, Humans, Learning, Models, Neurological, Perception, Cognitive Science

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/s0140525x12000477
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Clark, A. (2013). Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x12000477

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