CoChat

Where There is Life There is Mind: In Support of a Strong Life-Mind Continuity Thesis

Open access

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 54 of the 55 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

This paper considers questions about continuity and discontinuity between life and mind. It begins by examining such questions from the perspective of the free energy principle (FEP). The FEP is becoming increasingly influential in neuroscience and cognitive science. It says that organisms act to maintain themselves in their expected biological and cognitive states, and that they can do so only by minimizing their free energy given that the long-term average of free energy is entropy. The paper then argues that there is no singular interpretation of the FEP for thinking about the relation between life and mind. Some FEP formulations express what we call an independence view of life and mind. One independence view is a cognitivist view of the FEP. It turns on information processing with semantic content, thus restricting the range of systems capable of exhibiting mentality. Other independence views exemplify what we call an overly generous non-cognitivist view of the FEP, and these appear to go in the opposite direction. That is, they imply that mentality is nearly everywhere. The paper proceeds to argue that non-cognitivist FEP, and its implications for thinking about the relation between life and mind, can be usefully constrained by key ideas in recent enactive approaches to cognitive science. We conclude that the most compelling account of the relationship between life and mind treats them as strongly continuous, and that this continuity is based on particular concepts of life (autopoiesis and adaptivity) and mind (basic and non-semantic).

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.3390/e19040169

Cites

54 of 54 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 54 references

Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. Varela, F.J., and Bourgine, P. (1992). Life = Cognition: The Epistemological and Ontological Significance of Artificial Life. Toward a Practice of Autonomous Systems: Proceedings of the First European Conference on Artificial Life, MIT Press.
  2. Shani, 2006, Intentional directedness, Cybern. Hum. Know., 13, 87
  3. Durt, C., Fuchs, T., and Tewes, C. (2016). Continuity scepticism in doubt: A radically enactive take. Embodiment, Enaction, and Culture, The MIT Press. · doi:10.7551/mitpress/10799.001.0001

Cited by

See all 121

Metadata

Authors
Kirchhoff, M. D., & Froese, T.
Affiliations
  • University of Wollongong (AU)
  • Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (MX)
Corresponding author
Kirchhoff, Michael D.
Venue
Entropy
Publisher
MDPI AG
Published
2017-04-14
Volume
19
Issue
4
Pages
169
ISSN
1099-4300 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2606442355
Cited by
114
References
55
Citations by year
2026: 6 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 27 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 18 · 2020: 12 · 2019: 9 · 2018: 12 · 2017: 6
FWCI
6.13
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Entropy (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
  • Research Online (University of Wollongong) (submittedVersion)
  • Figshare (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • Australian Research Council (DP170102987)
  • John Templeton Foundation
  • UNAM-DGAPA-PAPIIT (IA104717)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
Keywords
free energy principle, autopoiesis, adaptivity, enactive cognition, cognitivism, information processing, semantic content, mentalities

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Where There is Life There is Mind: In Support of a Strong Life-Mind Continuity Thesis. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.3390/e19040169
The paper
Kirchhoff, M. D., & Froese, T. (2017). Where There is Life There is Mind: In Support of a Strong Life-Mind Continuity Thesis. Entropy. https://doi.org/10.3390/e19040169

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.