Where There is Life There is Mind: In Support of a Strong Life-Mind Continuity Thesis
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 54 of the 55 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper considers questions about continuity and discontinuity between life and mind. It begins by examining such questions from the perspective of the free energy principle (FEP). The FEP is becoming increasingly influential in neuroscience and cognitive science. It says that organisms act to maintain themselves in their expected biological and cognitive states, and that they can do so only by minimizing their free energy given that the long-term average of free energy is entropy. The paper then argues that there is no singular interpretation of the FEP for thinking about the relation between life and mind. Some FEP formulations express what we call an independence view of life and mind. One independence view is a cognitivist view of the FEP. It turns on information processing with semantic content, thus restricting the range of systems capable of exhibiting mentality. Other independence views exemplify what we call an overly generous non-cognitivist view of the FEP, and these appear to go in the opposite direction. That is, they imply that mentality is nearly everywhere. The paper proceeds to argue that non-cognitivist FEP, and its implications for thinking about the relation between life and mind, can be usefully constrained by key ideas in recent enactive approaches to cognitive science. We conclude that the most compelling account of the relationship between life and mind treats them as strongly continuous, and that this continuity is based on particular concepts of life (autopoiesis and adaptivity) and mind (basic and non-semantic).
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“This construction implies that a living system is composed of Markov blankets of Markov blankets [8]—reaching all the way down to cellular organelles and DNA [9] and all the way out to elements of the environment [10].”
From The Markov blankets of life: autonomy, active inference and the free energy principle (2018) · cites this paper as [10]
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Cites
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“Whereas the FEP takes its starting point in issues to do with self-organization in thermodynamic, non-equilibrium systems, and thus can be shown to apply to a wide range of different phenomena, prediction error minimization schemes have been more directly associated with brain functioning ([6]; see [1] for further ref…”
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“system that resists a tendency to disorder; from single-cell organisms to social networks” ([9], p.”
BackgroundSurfing Uncertainty: Prediction, Action, and the Embodied Mind
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“In addition to ergodicity, Friston appeals to the idea that a Markov blanket bounds systems.”
BackgroundInfluential
Research works printed but not linked: 3
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- Durt, C., Fuchs, T., and Tewes, C. (2016). Continuity scepticism in doubt: A radically enactive take. Embodiment, Enaction, and Culture, The MIT Press. · doi:10.7551/mitpress/10799.001.0001
Cited by
The Markov blankets of life: autonomy, active inference and the free energy principle
Kirchhoff, M., Parr, T., Palacios, E., Friston, K., & Kiverstein, J. (2018) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2017.0792 · Cited by 473
Self-citationA tale of two densities: active inference is enactive inference
Ramstead, M. J., Kirchhoff, M. D., & Friston, K. J. (2020) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/1059712319862774 · Cited by 220
“The notion of entailment captures the fact that the generative model is entailed by the dynamics of a living system under active inference (Kirchhoff, 2018; Kirchhoff & Froese, 2017; Kirchhoff & Robertson, 2018; Ramstead, Kirchhoff, et al., 2019).”
BackgroundSelf-citationEmbodied and Enactive Approaches to Cognition
Gallagher, S. (2023) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781009209793 · Cited by 190
Sentience and the Origins of Consciousness: From Cartesian Duality to Markovian Monism
Friston, K. J., Wiese, W., & Hobson, J. A. (2020) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e22050516 · Cited by 186
Corcoran, A. W., Pezzulo, G., & Hohwy, J. (2020) · Biology & Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10539-020-09746-2 · Cited by 161
“1 3 From allostatic agents to counterfactual cognisers: active… Page 33 of 45 32 Put differently, the free energy principle is neutral on the ontological relation between life and cognition (pace Kirchhoff and Froese 2017).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Kirchhoff, M. D., & Froese, T.
- Affiliations
- University of Wollongong (AU)
- Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (MX)
- Corresponding author
- Kirchhoff, Michael D.
- Venue
- Entropy
- Publisher
- MDPI AG
- Published
- 2017-04-14
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 169
- ISSN
- 1099-4300 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2606442355
- Cited by
- 114
- References
- 55
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 27 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 18 · 2020: 12 · 2019: 9 · 2018: 12 · 2017: 6
- FWCI
- 6.13
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Entropy (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Research Online (University of Wollongong) (submittedVersion)
- Figshare (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Australian Research Council (DP170102987)
- John Templeton Foundation
- UNAM-DGAPA-PAPIIT (IA104717)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Keywords
- free energy principle, autopoiesis, adaptivity, enactive cognition, cognitivism, information processing, semantic content, mentalities
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