Multiscale integration: beyond internalism and externalism
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 40 of the 40 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We present a multiscale integrationist interpretation of the boundaries of cognitive systems, using the Markov blanket formalism of the variational free energy principle. This interpretation is intended as a corrective for the philosophical debate over internalist and externalist interpretations of cognitive boundaries; we stake out a compromise position. We first survey key principles of new radical (extended, enactive, embodied) views of cognition. We then describe an internalist interpretation premised on the Markov blanket formalism. Having reviewed these accounts, we develop our positive multiscale account. We argue that the statistical seclusion of internal from external states of the system—entailed by the existence of a Markov boundary—can coexist happily with the multiscale integration of the system through its dynamics. Our approach does not privilege any given boundary (whether it be that of the brain, body, or world), nor does it argue that all boundaries are equally prescient. We argue that the relevant boundaries of cognition depend on the level being characterised and the explanatory interests that guide investigation. We approach the issue of how and where to draw the boundaries of cognitive systems through a multiscale ontology of cognitive systems, which offers a multidisciplinary research heuristic for cognitive science.
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Cites
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“Where to draw the scientifically relevant boundaries will depend both on the nature of the phenomenon being investigated and on our explanatory interests S43 1 3 Synthese (2021) 198 (Suppl 1):S41–S70 (Clark 2017; Hutchins 1995).”
BackgroundThe free-energy principle: a unified brain theory?
Friston, K. (2010) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2787 · Cited by 8,120 · cited 3×
“…how expected free energy minimisation occurs across many different spatial and temporal scales; which call for complementary explanations in terms of, e.g., neuroscience (Friston 2010), embodied cognition (Allen and Friston 2018), ecological psychology (Bruineberg and Rietveld 2014; Ramstead et al.”
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Clark, A. (2008) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195333213.001.0001 · Cited by 2,201
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Radical Embodied Cognitive Science
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Participatory sense-making: An enactive approach to social cognition
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Cited by
Gallagher, S. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198846345.001.0001 · Cited by 359
Deeply Felt Affect: The Emergence of Valence in Deep Active Inference
Hesp, C., Smith, R., Parr, T., Allen, M., Friston, K. J., & Ramstead, M. J. D. (2021) · Neural Computation · doi:10.1162/neco_a_01341 · Cited by 246
Self-citationThe first prior: From co-embodiment to co-homeostasis in early life
Ciaunica, A., Constant, A., Preissl, H., & Fotopoulou, K. (2021) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2021.103117 · Cited by 105
Self-citationLaying down a forking path: tensions between enaction and the free energy principle
Di Paolo, E., Thompson, E., & Beer, R. (2022) · Philosophy and the Mind Sciences · doi:10.33735/phimisci.2022.9187 · Cited by 94
Hipólito, I., Ramstead, M. J. D., Convertino, L., Bhat, A., Friston, K., & Parr, T. (2021) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2021.02.003 · Cited by 79
“A growing literature leverages the Markov blanket construct (Pearl, 1998) to formalise dynamic coupling in physical and biological systems (Friston, 2019a, 2019b, Hipólito, 2019; Ramstead et al., 2018, 2019; Palacios et al., 2020; Kirchhoff et al., 2018).”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Ramstead, M. J. D., Kirchhoff, M. D., Constant, A., & Friston, K. J.
- Venue
- Synthese
- Published
- 2019-02-21
- Volume
- 198
- Issue
- S1
- Pages
- 41-70
- ISSN
- 0039-7857 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0964
- OpenAlex
- W2914342221
- Cited by
- 150
- References
- 40
- FWCI
- 14.60
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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