Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
CoChat

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 141 of the 142 references it cites were found in a registry or an index, and 1 are not checked yet.

Deeply Felt Affect: The Emergence of Valence in Deep Active Inference

Open access

Abstract

The positive-negative axis of emotional valence has long been recognized as fundamental to adaptive behavior, but its origin and underlying function have largely eluded formal theorizing and computational modeling. Using deep active inference, a hierarchical inference scheme that rests on inverting a model of how sensory data are generated, we develop a principled Bayesian model of emotional valence. This formulation asserts that agents infer their valence state based on the expected precision of their action model—an internal estimate of overall model fitness (“subjective fitness”). This index of subjective fitness can be estimated within any environment and exploits the domain generality of second-order beliefs (beliefs about beliefs). We show how maintaining internal valence representations allows the ensuing affective agent to optimize confidence in action selection preemptively. Valence representations can in turn be optimized by leveraging the (Bayes-optimal) updating term for subjective fitness, which we label affective charge (AC). AC tracks changes in fitness estimates and lends a sign to otherwise unsigned divergences between predictions and outcomes. We simulate the resulting affective inference by subjecting an in silico affective agent to a T-maze paradigm requiring context learning, followed by context reversal. This formulation of affective inference offers a principled account of the link between affect, (mental) action, and implicit metacognition. It characterizes how a deep biological system can infer its affective state and reduce uncertainty about such inferences through internal action (i.e., top-down modulation of priors that underwrite confidence). Thus, we demonstrate the potential of active inference to provide a formal and computationally tractable account of affect. Our demonstration of the face validity and potential utility of this formulation represents the first step within a larger research program. Next, this model can be leveraged to test the hypothesized role of valence by fitting the model to behavioral and neuronal responses.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1162/neco_a_01341

Cites

141 of 142 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Figures

Figure 1: The first (M1, top panel) and second steps (M2, bottom panel) of a generative model of increasing complexity. M1: A minimal generative model of perception can infer hidden states s from an observation o, based on prior beliefs (D) and a likelihood mapping (A). M2: A generative model of anticipation extends perception (as in M1) forward into the future (and backward into the past) using a transition matrix (Bτ) for hidden states.
Figure 1: The first (M1, top panel) and second steps (M2, bottom panel) of a generative model of increasing complexity. M1: A minimal generative model of perception can infer hidden states s from an observation o, based on prior beliefs (D) and a likelihood mapping (A). M2: A generative model of anticipation extends perception (as in M1) forward into the future (and backward into the past) using a transition matrix (Bτ) for hidden states.CC BY-NC · PubMed Central
Figure 2: The third step (M3) of an incremental summary of active inference. In a generative model of action, state transitions are conditioned on policies π. Prior policy beliefs π are informed by the baseline prior over policies (“model free,” denoted Eπ) and the expected free energy (Gπ), which evaluates each policy-specific perception model (as in M2) in terms of the expected risk and ambiguity. Risk biases the action model toward phenotype-congruent preferences (C). Posterior policy beliefs are informed by the fit between anticipated (policy-specific) and preferred outcomes, while at the same time minimizing their ambiguity.
Figure 2: The third step (M3) of an incremental summary of active inference. In a generative model of action, state transitions are conditioned on policies π. Prior policy beliefs π are informed by the baseline prior over policies (“model free,” denoted Eπ) and the expected free energy (Gπ), which evaluates each policy-specific perception model (as in M2) in terms of the expected risk and ambiguity. Risk biases the action model toward phenotype-congruent preferences (C). Posterior policy beliefs are informed by the fit between anticipated (policy-specific) and preferred outcomes, while at the same time minimizing their ambiguity.CC BY-NC · PubMed Central
Figure 3: The fourth step (M4) of our incremental description of active inference in terms of the nested processes of perception (M1-2 in Figure 1), action (M3 in Figure 2), and implicit metacognition (M4 in this figure), emphasizing the inherently hierarchical, recurrent nature of these generative models. This generative model infers confidence in its own action model in terms of the expected precision (γ), which modulates reliance on Gπ for policy selection (as in M3), based on perceptual inferences (as in M2). Expected precision (γ) changes when inferred policies differ from expected policies. This term increases when posterior (policy-averaged) expected free energy is lower than when averaged under the policy prior (AC=(π-π¯)·Gπ<0), and decreases when it is higher AC>0).
Figure 3: The fourth step (M4) of our incremental description of active inference in terms of the nested processes of perception (M1-2 in Figure 1), action (M3 in Figure 2), and implicit metacognition (M4 in this figure), emphasizing the inherently hierarchical, recurrent nature of these generative models. This generative model infers confidence in its own action model in terms of the expected precision (γ), which modulates reliance on Gπ for policy selection (as in M3), based on perceptual inferences (as in M2). Expected precision (γ) changes when inferred policies differ from expected policies. This term increases when posterior (policy-averaged) expected free energy is lower than when averaged under the policy prior (AC=(π-π¯)·Gπ<0), and decreases when it is higher AC>0).CC BY-NC · PubMed Central
Figure 4: The setup of the T-maze task (top panel) and its typical solution (bottom panel). The synthetic agent (here, a rat) starts in the middle of the T-maze. If it moves up, it will encounter two one-way doors, left and right, which lead to either a rewarding food source or a painful shock (high versus low pragmatic value, respectively). If it moves downward, it will encounter an informative cue (high epistemic value) that indicates whether the food is in the left or right arm.
Figure 4: The setup of the T-maze task (top panel) and its typical solution (bottom panel). The synthetic agent (here, a rat) starts in the middle of the T-maze. If it moves up, it will encounter two one-way doors, left and right, which lead to either a rewarding food source or a painful shock (high versus low pragmatic value, respectively). If it moves downward, it will encounter an informative cue (high epistemic value) that indicates whether the food is in the left or right arm.CC BY-NC · PubMed Central
Figure 5: A generative model for the T-maze setup of Figure 4, with the priors (top-left panel) as in Figure 3, now specified as vectors or matrices. Here, the probabilities reflect a set of simple assumptions embedded in the agent's generative model, each of which could itself be optimized by fitting to empirical data. Middle-left panel: Prior expectations D for initial states are defined as uniform, given the rat has been trained in a series of random left and right trials. Middle panel: The vector C encoding preferences is defined such that reward outcomes are strongly preferred (green circles): odds e⁴:1 compared to “none” outcomes labeled “none” (gray crosses), and punishments are extremely nonpreferred (red): odds e⁻⁶:1 compared to outcomes labeled “none.” Bottom-left panel: The matrix A for the likelihood mapping reflects two assumptions about the agent's beliefs given each particular context (which could be trained through prior trials). First, the location-reward mappings always have some minimal amount of uncertainty (.02 probability). Second, the cue is a completely reliable context indicator. Top-right panel: The matrix B for the state transitions reflects the fact that changing location is either very easy (100% efficacious) or impossible when stuck in one of the one-way arms. Bottom-right panel: The vector V for the policies reflects possible combinations of actions over the two time steps and associated baseline prior over policies E, which starts at an initial, uniformly distributed level of evidence for each policy, which can be seen as reflecting an initial period of free exploration of the maze structure (here the value of 2.3 regulates the impact of subsequently observed policies, where the value for each policy increments by 1 each time it is subsequently chosen).
Figure 5: A generative model for the T-maze setup of Figure 4, with the priors (top-left panel) as in Figure 3, now specified as vectors or matrices. Here, the probabilities reflect a set of simple assumptions embedded in the agent's generative model, each of which could itself be optimized by fitting to empirical data. Middle-left panel: Prior expectations D for initial states are defined as uniform, given the rat has been trained in a series of random left and right trials. Middle panel: The vector C encoding preferences is defined such that reward outcomes are strongly preferred (green circles): odds e⁴:1 compared to “none” outcomes labeled “none” (gray crosses), and punishments are extremely nonpreferred (red): odds e⁻⁶:1 compared to outcomes labeled “none.” Bottom-left panel: The matrix A for the likelihood mapping reflects two assumptions about the agent's beliefs given each particular context (which could be trained through prior trials). First, the location-reward mappings always have some minimal amount of uncertainty (.02 probability). Second, the cue is a completely reliable context indicator. Top-right panel: The matrix B for the state transitions reflects the fact that changing location is either very easy (100% efficacious) or impossible when stuck in one of the one-way arms. Bottom-right panel: The vector V for the policies reflects possible combinations of actions over the two time steps and associated baseline prior over policies E, which starts at an initial, uniformly distributed level of evidence for each policy, which can be seen as reflecting an initial period of free exploration of the maze structure (here the value of 2.3 regulates the impact of subsequently observed policies, where the value for each policy increments by 1 each time it is subsequently chosen).CC BY-NC · PubMed Central
Figure 6: Simulated responses over 32 trials with food located on the left side of the T-maze. This figure reports the behavioral and (simulated) affective charge responses during successive trials. The top panel shows, for each trial, the selected policy (in image format) over the policies considered (arrows indicate moving to each respective arm; circles indicate staying in, or returning to, the center position). The policy selected in the first 12 trials corresponds to an exploratory policy, which involves examining the cue in the lower arm and then going to the left or right arm to secure the reward (i.e., depending on the cue, which here always indicates that reward is on the left). After the agent becomes sufficiently confident that the context does not change (after trial 12), she indulges in pragmatic behavior, moving immediately to the reward without checking the cue. The middle panel shows the associated fluctuations in affective charge. The bottom panel shows the accumulated posterior beliefs about the initial state.
Figure 6: Simulated responses over 32 trials with food located on the left side of the T-maze. This figure reports the behavioral and (simulated) affective charge responses during successive trials. The top panel shows, for each trial, the selected policy (in image format) over the policies considered (arrows indicate moving to each respective arm; circles indicate staying in, or returning to, the center position). The policy selected in the first 12 trials corresponds to an exploratory policy, which involves examining the cue in the lower arm and then going to the left or right arm to secure the reward (i.e., depending on the cue, which here always indicates that reward is on the left). After the agent becomes sufficiently confident that the context does not change (after trial 12), she indulges in pragmatic behavior, moving immediately to the reward without checking the cue. The middle panel shows the associated fluctuations in affective charge. The bottom panel shows the accumulated posterior beliefs about the initial state.CC BY-NC · PubMed Central
Figure 7: A generative model for affective inference in terms of its key equations and probabilistic graphical model (top left panel) and the associated matrices, again reflecting a number of relatively minimal assumptions about the agent's beliefs concerning the experimental setup—where each of these parameters could itself be optimized by fitting to empirical data. Bottom left: Prior expectations D⁽²⁾ for initial states at the second level are distributed uniformly. (Bottom middle) The likelihood matrix A^(A) reflects some degree of uncertainty in the affective predictions (.03), which, when multiplied by β^(+,-), sets the lower-level prior on expected precision, allowing it to vary between 0.5 and 2.0. Bottom right: The matrix A^(C) for the likelihood mapping from context states to the lower level reflects that the agent is always certain which context she observed after each trial is over. Top right: The matrix B⁽²⁾ for the state transitions at the second level reflects two assumptions for cross-trial changes: (1) Both affective and contextual states vary strongly but have some stability across trials (.2–.3 probability of changing) and (2) the agent has a positivity bias in the sense that she is more likely to switch from a negative to a positive state than vice versa (.3 versus .2 probability). The lower-level model is the same as in Figure 5.
Figure 7: A generative model for affective inference in terms of its key equations and probabilistic graphical model (top left panel) and the associated matrices, again reflecting a number of relatively minimal assumptions about the agent's beliefs concerning the experimental setup—where each of these parameters could itself be optimized by fitting to empirical data. Bottom left: Prior expectations D⁽²⁾ for initial states at the second level are distributed uniformly. (Bottom middle) The likelihood matrix A^(A) reflects some degree of uncertainty in the affective predictions (.03), which, when multiplied by β^(+,-), sets the lower-level prior on expected precision, allowing it to vary between 0.5 and 2.0. Bottom right: The matrix A^(C) for the likelihood mapping from context states to the lower level reflects that the agent is always certain which context she observed after each trial is over. Top right: The matrix B⁽²⁾ for the state transitions at the second level reflects two assumptions for cross-trial changes: (1) Both affective and contextual states vary strongly but have some stability across trials (.2–.3 probability of changing) and (2) the agent has a positivity bias in the sense that she is more likely to switch from a negative to a positive state than vice versa (.3 versus .2 probability). The lower-level model is the same as in Figure 5.CC BY-NC · PubMed Central
Figure 8: A summary of belief updating and behavior of our simulated affective agent over 64 trials. Probabilistic beliefs are plotted using a blue-yellow gradient (corresponding with high-low certainty). As shown in the graphic that connects panels c and d, the dynamics of this simulation can be divided into four quarters: two periods within each of the 32 trials before and after the context reversal, each comprising an initial phase of negative valence (anxiety; quarters 1 and 3), followed by a phase of positive valence (confidence; quarters 2 and 4). (a) The context changed midway through the experiment (indicated in all panels with a vertical green line): food was on the left for the first 32 trials (L) and on the right for the subsequent 32 trials (R). (b, c) These density plots show the subject's beliefs about the best course of action, both before (panel b) and after the trial (panel c). Prior beliefs were based purely on baseline priors and her action model, which entailed high ambiguity (yellow) during quarters 1 and 3 of the trial series (corresponding with cue-checking policies V8-9) and high certainty (blue) during quarters 2 and 4 (corresponding to shortcut policies V5-6). After perceptual evidence was accumulated (after the trial), posterior beliefs about policies always converged to the best policy, except in the first trial after context reversal (trial 33, when the rat receives a highly unexpected shock), which explains her initial confusion. Whenever prior certainty about policies was high, expectations agreed with posterior beliefs about policies (again, except for trial 33). (d) This density plot illustrates affective inference in terms of beliefs about her valence state (confident positive or anxious negative states s^(A)). Roughly speaking, our rat experienced a negatively valenced state during quarters 1 and 3 and a positively valenced state during quarters 2 and 4. (e) We plot lower-level expected precision (γ), overlaid on a density plot of valence beliefs (grayscale version of panel d).
Figure 8: A summary of belief updating and behavior of our simulated affective agent over 64 trials. Probabilistic beliefs are plotted using a blue-yellow gradient (corresponding with high-low certainty). As shown in the graphic that connects panels c and d, the dynamics of this simulation can be divided into four quarters: two periods within each of the 32 trials before and after the context reversal, each comprising an initial phase of negative valence (anxiety; quarters 1 and 3), followed by a phase of positive valence (confidence; quarters 2 and 4). (a) The context changed midway through the experiment (indicated in all panels with a vertical green line): food was on the left for the first 32 trials (L) and on the right for the subsequent 32 trials (R). (b, c) These density plots show the subject's beliefs about the best course of action, both before (panel b) and after the trial (panel c). Prior beliefs were based purely on baseline priors and her action model, which entailed high ambiguity (yellow) during quarters 1 and 3 of the trial series (corresponding with cue-checking policies V8-9) and high certainty (blue) during quarters 2 and 4 (corresponding to shortcut policies V5-6). After perceptual evidence was accumulated (after the trial), posterior beliefs about policies always converged to the best policy, except in the first trial after context reversal (trial 33, when the rat receives a highly unexpected shock), which explains her initial confusion. Whenever prior certainty about policies was high, expectations agreed with posterior beliefs about policies (again, except for trial 33). (d) This density plot illustrates affective inference in terms of beliefs about her valence state (confident positive or anxious negative states s^(A)). Roughly speaking, our rat experienced a negatively valenced state during quarters 1 and 3 and a positively valenced state during quarters 2 and 4. (e) We plot lower-level expected precision (γ), overlaid on a density plot of valence beliefs (grayscale version of panel d).CC BY-NC · PubMed Central
Figure 9: A comparison of belief updating (four top rows) and behavior (bottom row) over 64 trials in our affective agent (plotted in orange) and an agent without higher-level contextual and affective states (plotted in gray). Context was changed midway through (vertical green line): food was on the left for the first 32 trials and on the right for the subsequent 32 trials. (First panel) The top panel shows differences in temporal dynamics of food location expectations. Thanks to her higher-level context states (which decayed over time due to uncertainty about cross-trial state transitions as defined in Figure 8), our affective agent (orange) weighed recent evidence more heavily, allowing her to shift context beliefs. In contrast, the agent without the higher affective level (gray) counted events only over time. While her expectations developed similarly to the affective agent for the first 32 trials, she was much slower in adjusting to the change in context (her beliefs return to 50/50 only after observing 32 trials for both left and right). (Second panel) This panel displays the strongest prior belief about policies for each agent (pretrial), tracking the product of the expected precision and the maximum of model evidence (negative Gπ). The affective agent varied (pretrial) her expected precision dynamically with context reliability. The nonaffective agent instead obtained (initial) certainty about the best course of action much more slowly, only as a function of her action model (as initial expected precision was constant). (Third and fourth panels) A comparison of within-trial AC responses (fluctuations in expected precision) between the affective agent (third panel, orange) and the nonaffective agent (fourth panel, gray). Our affective agent exhibited large fluctuations in expected precision within trials only when she was switching between affective states: she attenuated AC responses by integrating them across trials, adjusting expected precision preemptively. In contrast, the nonaffective agent exhibited large fluctuations throughout the series of trials, being surprised repeatedly because she was unable to integrate affective charge. (Fifth panel) The bottom panel shows the behavioral outcomes for both agents. Before context reversal, their behaviors were indistinguishable. After context reversal, the nonaffective agent only foraged for information and exhibited avoidance behaviors, either staying down (policy 10) or moving back to the center (policy 7).
Figure 9: A comparison of belief updating (four top rows) and behavior (bottom row) over 64 trials in our affective agent (plotted in orange) and an agent without higher-level contextual and affective states (plotted in gray). Context was changed midway through (vertical green line): food was on the left for the first 32 trials and on the right for the subsequent 32 trials. (First panel) The top panel shows differences in temporal dynamics of food location expectations. Thanks to her higher-level context states (which decayed over time due to uncertainty about cross-trial state transitions as defined in Figure 8), our affective agent (orange) weighed recent evidence more heavily, allowing her to shift context beliefs. In contrast, the agent without the higher affective level (gray) counted events only over time. While her expectations developed similarly to the affective agent for the first 32 trials, she was much slower in adjusting to the change in context (her beliefs return to 50/50 only after observing 32 trials for both left and right). (Second panel) This panel displays the strongest prior belief about policies for each agent (pretrial), tracking the product of the expected precision and the maximum of model evidence (negative Gπ). The affective agent varied (pretrial) her expected precision dynamically with context reliability. The nonaffective agent instead obtained (initial) certainty about the best course of action much more slowly, only as a function of her action model (as initial expected precision was constant). (Third and fourth panels) A comparison of within-trial AC responses (fluctuations in expected precision) between the affective agent (third panel, orange) and the nonaffective agent (fourth panel, gray). Our affective agent exhibited large fluctuations in expected precision within trials only when she was switching between affective states: she attenuated AC responses by integrating them across trials, adjusting expected precision preemptively. In contrast, the nonaffective agent exhibited large fluctuations throughout the series of trials, being surprised repeatedly because she was unable to integrate affective charge. (Fifth panel) The bottom panel shows the behavioral outcomes for both agents. Before context reversal, their behaviors were indistinguishable. After context reversal, the nonaffective agent only foraged for information and exhibited avoidance behaviors, either staying down (policy 10) or moving back to the center (policy 7).CC BY-NC · PubMed Central
Figure 10: A schematic breakdown of the nested processes of Bayesian inference in terms of the affective agent presented in this letter. At each level, top-down prior beliefs change along a gradient ascent on bottom-up model evidence (negative F), moving the entire hierarchy toward mutually constrained posteriors. Perception (light blue; M2 in Figure 1 and Table 2) provides evidence for beliefs over policies (blue; M3 in Figure 2 and Table 3) and higher-level contextual states. Action outcomes inform subjective fitness estimates through affective charge (brown; M4 in Figure 3 and Table 4), which provides evidence to inform valence beliefs (orange). These nested processes of inference unfold continuously in each individual phenotype throughout development and learning (e.g., neural Darwinism, natural selection; see Campbell, 2016; Constant et al., 2018). In turn, the reproductive success of each phenotype provides model evidence that shapes the evolution of a species.
Figure 10: A schematic breakdown of the nested processes of Bayesian inference in terms of the affective agent presented in this letter. At each level, top-down prior beliefs change along a gradient ascent on bottom-up model evidence (negative F), moving the entire hierarchy toward mutually constrained posteriors. Perception (light blue; M2 in Figure 1 and Table 2) provides evidence for beliefs over policies (blue; M3 in Figure 2 and Table 3) and higher-level contextual states. Action outcomes inform subjective fitness estimates through affective charge (brown; M4 in Figure 3 and Table 4), which provides evidence to inform valence beliefs (orange). These nested processes of inference unfold continuously in each individual phenotype throughout development and learning (e.g., neural Darwinism, natural selection; see Campbell, 2016; Constant et al., 2018). In turn, the reproductive success of each phenotype provides model evidence that shapes the evolution of a species.CC BY-NC · PubMed Central

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 126 references

Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. Gray, J. A. (1994). Three fundamental emotion systems. In P.Ekman & R. J.Davidson (Eds.), The nature of emotion (pp. 243–247). New York: Oxford University Press.

Cited by

See all 246

Metadata

Authors
Hesp, C., Smith, R., Parr, T., Allen, M., Friston, K. J., & Ramstead, M. J. D.
Affiliations
  • Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging (GB)
  • Laureate Institute for Brain Research (US)
  • Aarhus University (DK)
Corresponding author
  • Hesp, Casper
  • Smith, Ryan
  • Parr, Thomas
  • Allen, Micah
  • Friston, Karl J.
  • Ramstead, Maxwell J. D.
Venue
Neural Computation
Publisher
MIT Press
Published
2021-02-01
Volume
33
Issue
2
Pages
398-446
ISSN
  • 0899-7667 (ISSN-L)
  • 1530-888X
OpenAlex
W3108742966
Cited by
246
References
126
Citations by year
2026: 32 · 2025: 29 · 2024: 40 · 2023: 40 · 2022: 47 · 2021: 38
FWCI
19.22
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
cc-by
Locations
  • Neural Computation (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
  • PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
  • PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
Funders
  • William K. Warren Foundation
  • Aarhus Universitet
  • McGill University
  • Wellcome Trust (R272-2017-4345, 088130, 754513, 088130/Z/09/Z)
  • European Commission (HORIZON2020, 754513)
  • Rosetrees Trust (173346)
  • Aarhus Universitets Forskningsfond (754513, R272-2017-4345)
  • Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (406.18, 406.18.535)
  • Lundbeckfonden (R272‐2017‐4345, 754513)
  • Canada First Research Excellence Fund
  • Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
  • H2020 Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions (754513, HORIZON2020, R272-2017-4345)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Cognitive Science and Education Research
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Psychiatry, Mental Health, Neuroscience
Keywords
emotional valence, second-order beliefs, metacognition, Bayesian inference, top-down modulation, T-maze

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Deeply Felt Affect: The Emergence of Valence in Deep Active Inference. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1162/neco_a_01341
The paper
Hesp, C., Smith, R., Parr, T., Allen, M., Friston, K. J., & Ramstead, M. J. D. (2021). Deeply Felt Affect: The Emergence of Valence in Deep Active Inference. Neural Computation. https://doi.org/10.1162/neco_a_01341

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.