Multiple realizability and the spirit of functionalism
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 71 of the 74 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
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Cites
A neural substrate of prediction and reward
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“For a discussion of the constraints faced by such simulations, see Hollingsworth and Dror (2018).”
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“…want from functionalism is a conceptual analysis of mental state talk— that analytical functionalism in no way threatened by the implausibility of multiple realizability.42 Some functionalists, including Lewis and Armstrong, and perhaps also Clark (2008) are understanding their project in this way.”
BackgroundSpecial sciences (or: The disunity of science as a working hypothesis)
Fodor, J. A. (1974) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/bf00485230 · Cited by 1,815 · cited 1×
“Fodor (1974) thought multiple realizability “increasingly likely” in automata, and took it as support for the autonomy of psychology.”
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“And for a few quite sophisticated capacities (as well as many simpler ones), we are now able to simulate species-typical responses within a plausible marginal of error (see e.g. Yamins and DiCarlo 2016).”
Background
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Cited by
Tests for consciousness in humans and beyond
Bayne, T., Seth, A. K., Massimini, M., Shepherd, J., Cleeremans, A., Fleming, S. M., Malach, R., Mattingley, J. B., Menon, D. K., Owen, A. M., et al. (2024) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2024.01.010 · Cited by 198
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Identifying indicators of consciousness in AI systems
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Is artificial consciousness achievable? Lessons from the human brain
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Consciousness science: where are we, where are we going, and what if we get there?
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Metadata
- Authors
- Cao, R.
- Affiliations
- Stanford University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Cao, Rosa
- ORCID
- Cao, Rosa
- Venue
- Synthese
- Published
- 2022-12-01
- Volume
- 200
- Issue
- 6
- ISSN
- 0039-7857 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0964
- OpenAlex
- W4311064494
- Cited by
- 58
- References
- 74
- Citations by year
- 2026: 33 · 2025: 15 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 3
- FWCI
- 5.76
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springernature.com/gp/researchers/text-and-data-mining (tdm)
- www.springernature.com/gp/researchers/text-and-data-mining (vor)
- Locations
- Synthese (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Keywords
- multiple realizability, functionalism, computational theory of mind, mental states, brain function, neural function, philosophy of mind, cognitive science, artificial intelligence, Putnam
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- Cao, R. (2022). Multiple realizability and the spirit of functionalism. Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03524-1
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.