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Multiple realizability and the spirit of functionalism

Cao, Rosa · 2022 · Synthese

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 71 of the 74 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

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Crossref · 10.1007/s11229-022-03524-1

Cites

71 of 71 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Citations

Cites

Show all 71 references

Research works printed but not linked: 8

  1. Aaronson, S. (2011). Why Philosophers Should Care About Complexity, in Copeland, B., Posy, C., and Shagrir, O. (eds.), Computability: Turing, Gödel, Church, and Beyond, MIT Press, (2013)
  2. Dennett, D. C. (1986). “The Logical Geography of Computational Approaches: A View from the East Pole.“ In The Representation of Knowledge and Belief, edited by R. Harnish and M. Brand, 59–79. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.
  3. Dennett, D. C. (1987). “Fast Thinking” Chapter 9 from The Intentional Stance. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
  4. Dennett, D. C. (1990). True Believers: The intentional strategy and why it works, W. Lycan, ed., Mind and Cognition: A Reader, MIT Press.
  5. Dennett, D. (1996). Kinds of Minds. New York: Basic Books.
  6. Godfrey-Smith, P. (2008). Reduction in Real Life, In Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation. Oxford University Press.
  7. Mel, Bartlett W. (2007), 'Why have dendrites? A computational perspective’, in Greg Stuart, Nelson Spruston, and Michael Häusser (eds), Dendrites, 2nd edn (Oxford, 2007; online edn, Oxford Academic, 22 Mar. 2012).
  8. Shapiro, L. A. (2004). The Mind Incarnate. MIT Press.

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Cao, R.
Affiliations
Stanford University (US)
Corresponding author
Cao, Rosa
Venue
Synthese
Published
2022-12-01
Volume
200
Issue
6
ISSN
  • 0039-7857 (ISSN-L)
  • 1573-0964
OpenAlex
W4311064494
Cited by
58
References
74
Citations by year
2026: 33 · 2025: 15 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 3
FWCI
5.76
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
Locations
Synthese (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
Keywords
multiple realizability, functionalism, computational theory of mind, mental states, brain function, neural function, philosophy of mind, cognitive science, artificial intelligence, Putnam

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Multiple realizability and the spirit of functionalism. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s11229-022-03524-1
The paper
Cao, R. (2022). Multiple realizability and the spirit of functionalism. Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03524-1

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.