The DOI matches its Crossref record; 76 of the 78 references it cites were found in a registry or an index, and 2 are not checked yet.
Cognitive ontology and the search for neural mechanisms: three foundational problems
Open accessAbstract
The central task of cognitive neuroscience to map cognitive capacities to neural mechanisms faces three interlocking conceptual problems that together frame the problem of cognitive ontology. First, they must establish which tasks elicit which cognitive capacities, and specifically when different tasks elicit the same capacity. To address this operationalization problem , scientists often assess whether the tasks engage the same neural mechanisms. But to determine whether mechanisms are of the same or different kinds, we need to solve the abstraction problem by determining which mechanistic differences are and are not relevant, and also the boundary problem by distinguishing the mechanism from its background conditions. Solving these problems, in turn, requires understanding how cognitive capacities are elicited in tasks. These three problems, which have been noted and discussed elsewhere in the literature, together form a ‘cycle of kinds’ that frames the central problem-space of cognitive ontology. We describe this cycle to clarify the intellectual challenges facing the cognitive ontologist and to reveal the kind of iterative process by which ontological revision in cognitive neuroscience is likely to unfold.
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“The investigation of cognitive capacities in LLMs is best viewed as an iterative process in which our conception of LLM competencies, and of the mechanisms that implement them, mutually inform and revise each other.”
From Anthropocentric Bias in Language Model Evaluation (2026) · cites this paper as Francken et al. 2022
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“Alternatively, it may not be clear what inferences to draw about neural mechanisms from e.g. fMRI data (e.g., Logothetis et al. 2001).”
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“’ The family of stop signal tasks has been endlessly varied to study this cognitive capacity and disorders believed to involve deficits in response inhibition (Logan and Cowan 1984; Verbruggen & Logan 2008).”
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“The family of stop signal tasks has been endlessly varied to study this cognitive capacity and disorders believed to involve deficits in response inhibition (Logan and Cowan 1984; Verbruggen & Logan 2008).”
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“Such divisions may not be available if mechanism boundaries are interest-dependent or if there are different mechanisms at different levels of abstraction (Craver 2009, Francken et al. 2020).”
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“On the ground, however, such refinement will often be arduous, with many starts and stops and occasional dead ends (Francken et al., 2022; Kuhn, 1962; Shadish et al., 2002).”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Francken, J. C., Slors, M., & Craver, C. F.
- Affiliations
- Radboud University Nijmegen (NL)
- Washington University in St. Louis (US)
- Corresponding author
- Francken, Jolien C.
- Slors, Marc
- Venue
- Synthese
- Published
- 2022-09-07
- Volume
- 200
- Issue
- 5
- ISSN
- 0039-7857 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0964
- OpenAlex
- W3136399569
- Cited by
- 39
- References
- 78
- Citations by year
- 2026: 10 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 1
- FWCI
- 6.68
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (vor)
- Locations
- Synthese (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PhilSci-Archive (University of Pittsburgh) (acceptedVersion)
- Radboud Repository (Radboud University) (submittedVersion)
- Radboud Repository (Radboud University) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Funders
- University of Pittsburgh
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Keywords
- cognitive ontology, neural mechanisms, cognitive ability, boundary problem, cognitive neuroscience methodology
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