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Cognitive ontology and the search for neural mechanisms: three foundational problems

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Abstract

The central task of cognitive neuroscience to map cognitive capacities to neural mechanisms faces three interlocking conceptual problems that together frame the problem of cognitive ontology. First, they must establish which tasks elicit which cognitive capacities, and specifically when different tasks elicit the same capacity. To address this operationalization problem , scientists often assess whether the tasks engage the same neural mechanisms. But to determine whether mechanisms are of the same or different kinds, we need to solve the abstraction problem by determining which mechanistic differences are and are not relevant, and also the boundary problem by distinguishing the mechanism from its background conditions. Solving these problems, in turn, requires understanding how cognitive capacities are elicited in tasks. These three problems, which have been noted and discussed elsewhere in the literature, together form a ‘cycle of kinds’ that frames the central problem-space of cognitive ontology. We describe this cycle to clarify the intellectual challenges facing the cognitive ontologist and to reveal the kind of iterative process by which ontological revision in cognitive neuroscience is likely to unfold.

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Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. Strevens, M. (2008). Depth: An Account of Scientific Explanation. Harvard University Press
  2. Uttal, W. R. (2001). The New Phrenology: The Limits of Localizing Cognitive Processes in the Brain. MIT Press

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Metadata

Authors
Francken, J. C., Slors, M., & Craver, C. F.
Affiliations
  • Radboud University Nijmegen (NL)
  • Washington University in St. Louis (US)
Corresponding author
  • Francken, Jolien C.
  • Slors, Marc
Venue
Synthese
Published
2022-09-07
Volume
200
Issue
5
ISSN
  • 0039-7857 (ISSN-L)
  • 1573-0964
OpenAlex
W3136399569
Cited by
39
References
78
Citations by year
2026: 10 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 1
FWCI
6.68
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Synthese (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PhilSci-Archive (University of Pittsburgh) (acceptedVersion)
  • Radboud Repository (Radboud University) (submittedVersion)
  • Radboud Repository (Radboud University) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
Funders
University of Pittsburgh
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
Keywords
cognitive ontology, neural mechanisms, cognitive ability, boundary problem, cognitive neuroscience methodology

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Cognitive ontology and the search for neural mechanisms: three foundational problems. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s11229-022-03701-2
The paper
Francken, J. C., Slors, M., & Craver, C. F. (2022). Cognitive ontology and the search for neural mechanisms: three foundational problems. Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03701-2

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