Cognitive ontology and the search for neural mechanisms: three foundational problems
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Abstract
The central task of cognitive neuroscience to map cognitive capacities to neural mechanisms faces three interlocking conceptual problems that together frame the problem of cognitive ontology. First, they must establish which tasks elicit which cognitive capacities, and specifically when different tasks elicit the same capacity. To address this operationalization problem , scientists often assess whether the tasks engage the same neural mechanisms. But to determine whether mechanisms are of the same or different kinds, we need to solve the abstraction problem by determining which mechanistic differences are and are not relevant, and also the boundary problem by distinguishing the mechanism from its background conditions. Solving these problems, in turn, requires understanding how cognitive capacities are elicited in tasks. These three problems, which have been noted and discussed elsewhere in the literature, together form a ‘cycle of kinds’ that frames the central problem-space of cognitive ontology. We describe this cycle to clarify the intellectual challenges facing the cognitive ontologist and to reveal the kind of iterative process by which ontological revision in cognitive neuroscience is likely to unfold.
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“The investigation of cognitive capacities in LLMs is best viewed as an iterative process in which our conception of LLM competencies, and of the mechanisms that implement them, mutually inform and revise each other.”
From Anthropocentric Bias in Language Model Evaluation (2026) · cites this paper as Francken et al. 2022
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Is the Next Frontier in Neuroscience a ‘Decade of the Mind’?
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“The slow and iterative nature of developing cognitive ontologies has been highlighted by different authors (e.g. Sullivan 2014, 2016; Francken & Slors 2014).”
MethodThe inchworm episode: Reconstituting the phenomenon of kinesin motility
Bollhagen, A. (2021) · European Journal for Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1007/s13194-021-00358-5 · Cited by 12 · cited 1×
“2 This does not mean that this is the only scientifically respectable way of lumping and/or splitting cognitive capacity-kinds (for an example of kind-splitting of a biological function that is not based on mechanistic anchoring, see Bollhagen 2021).”
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Registration Pluralism and the Cartographic Approach to Data Aggregation across Brains
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“1 Another problem at play here is that there might well be cross-subject variation in the ways tasks are performed (Ward, 2019; Viola, 2021; Seghier & Price, 2018).”
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Transdiagnostic distortions in autobiographical memory recollection
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Diner, S. (2023) · Neuroethics · doi:10.1007/s12152-023-09533-2 · Cited by 39
“In the philosophical literature this issue has been addressed in terms of the “Bound-ary Problem” ([48], p. 378), i.e., the problem of reliably distinguishing neural mechanisms associated with targeted cognitive abilities from background processes.”
BackgroundCognitive Variation: The Philosophical Landscape
Ward, Z. B. (2022) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/phc3.12882 · Cited by 23
“Such divisions may not be available if mechanism boundaries are interest-dependent or if there are different mechanisms at different levels of abstraction (Craver 2009, Francken et al. 2020).”
BackgroundAndonovski, N. (2023) · European Journal for Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1007/s13194-023-00548-3 · Cited by 26
“On the ground, however, such refinement will often be arduous, with many starts and stops and occasional dead ends (Francken et al., 2022; Kuhn, 1962; Shadish et al., 2002).”
BackgroundInfluentialGrounding neuroscience in behavioral changes using artificial neural networks
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Metadata
- Authors
- Francken, J. C., Slors, M., & Craver, C. F.
- Affiliations
- Radboud University Nijmegen (NL)
- Washington University in St. Louis (US)
- Corresponding author
- Francken, Jolien C.
- Slors, Marc
- Venue
- Synthese
- Published
- 2022-09-07
- Volume
- 200
- Issue
- 5
- ISSN
- 0039-7857 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0964
- OpenAlex
- W3136399569
- Cited by
- 39
- References
- 78
- Citations by year
- 2026: 10 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 1
- FWCI
- 6.68
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (vor)
- Locations
- Synthese (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PhilSci-Archive (University of Pittsburgh) (acceptedVersion)
- Radboud Repository (Radboud University) (submittedVersion)
- Radboud Repository (Radboud University) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Funders
- University of Pittsburgh
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Keywords
- cognitive ontology, neural mechanisms, cognitive ability, boundary problem, cognitive neuroscience methodology
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