Free Will and Luck
Abstract
This book aims to help readers think more clearly about free will. It identifies and makes vivid the most important conceptual obstacles to the justified belief in the existence of free will, and meets them head on. It also clarifies the central concepts in the philosophical debate about free will and moral responsibility, criticizes various influential contemporary theories about free will, and develops two overlapping conceptions of free will: one for readers who are convinced that free will is incompatible with determinism (incompatibilists), and another for readers who are convinced of the opposite (compatibilists). Luck poses problems for all believers in free will, and this book offers novel solutions. One chapter explains influential neuroscientific studies of free will, and debunks some extravagant interpretations of the data. Other featured topics include abilities and alternative possibilities, control and decision-making, the bearing of manipulation on free will, and the development of human infants into free agents.
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Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
LLMs do not have free will.
“because LLMs do not have free will and therefore cannot be held morally or legally responsible for what they do.”
From The ethics of disclosing the use of artificial intelligence tools in writing scholarly manuscripts (2023) · cites this paper as Mele, 2006
For an individual to make a deliberate choice, they must have consciousness, self-awareness, understanding, the ability to reason, information, and values or preferences.
“For an individual to make a deliberate choice, they must have consciousness, self-awareness, understanding, the ability to reason, information, and values or preferences (see Mele, 2006; O’Connor, 2022).”
From The ethics of disclosing the use of artificial intelligence tools in writing scholarly manuscripts (2023) · cites this paper as Mele, 2006
One can be held morally and legally responsible for an action only if that action results from one's free choices.
“One can be held morally and legally responsible for an action only if that action results from one’s free choices (Mele, 2006).”
From The ethics of disclosing the use of artificial intelligence tools in writing scholarly manuscripts (2023) · cites this paper as Mele, 2006
Cites
Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action
Libet, B. (1985) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00044903 · Cited by 2,623 · see citing works
Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility
Fischer, J. M., & Ravizza, M. (1998) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511814594 · Cited by 2,249 · see citing works
Flagged first, then by citations
Cited by
Sorted by citations
The ethics of disclosing the use of artificial intelligence tools in writing scholarly manuscripts
Hosseini, M., Resnik, D. B., & Holmes, K. (2023) · Research Ethics · doi:10.1177/17470161231180449 · Cited by 253 · see citing works
The Explanatory Component of Moral Responsibility
Björnsson, G., & Persson, K. (2012) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00813.x · Cited by 81 · see citing works
Agency, Teleological Control and Robust Causation
Usher, M. (2020) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.12537 · Cited by 29 · see citing works
Agent-Causation, Explanation, and Akrasia: A Reply to Levy’s Hard Luck
Franklin, C. E. (2015) · Criminal Law and Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s11572-013-9274-1 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
- Authors
- Mele, A. R.
- Affiliations
- Florida State University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Mele, Alfred R.
- ORCID
- Mele, Alfred R.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressNew York
- Published
- 2006-02-01
- OpenAlex
- W4239043303
- Cited by
- 493
- References
- 2
- Citations by year
- 2026: 28 · 2025: 24 · 2024: 34 · 2023: 34 · 2022: 15 · 2021: 43 · 2020: 23 · 2019: 36 · 2018: 32 · 2017: 15 · 2016: 28 · 2015: 21 · 2014: 21 · 2013: 22 · 2012: 20
- FWCI
- 5.61
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Digital Access to Libraries (Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), l'Université de Namur (UNamur) and the Université Saint-Louis (USL-B)) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Free Will and Agency
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Theology and Philosophy of Evil
- Keywords
- free will, luck, moral responsibility, incompatibilism, compatibilism, determinism, free will and determinism, neuroscience of free will, alternative possibilities, ability, control, decision-making, manipulation, infant development, free agency
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