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Cited by 574Philosophy and Theoretical SciencePhilosophy and History of ScienceEpistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

Consciousness and its Place in Nature

Chalmers, David J.·2003·The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind
DOI 10.1002/9780470998762.ch5
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Abstract

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction1 The Problem Arguments Against Materialism Type-A Materialism Type-B Materialism15 The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Type-B Materialism Type-C Materialism Interlude Type-D Dualism Type-E Dualism Type-F Monism Conclusions

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Crossref · 10.1002/9780470998762.ch5

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89 of 89 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Unless we solve the hard problem of consciousness and explain what makes brains different from the inanimate universe as a whole in this regard, if brains correspond to inner life it is not at all implausible that the inanimate universe as a whole could as well.

    “unless we solve the 'hard problem of consciousness' (Chalmers 2003) and explain what makes brains different from the inanimate universe as a whole in this regard, if brains correspond to inner life it is not at all implausible that the inanimate universe as a whole could as well.”

    From On the Plausibility of Idealism: Refuting Criticisms (2017) · cites this paper as Chalmers 2003

  • Categorical properties are, for Chalmers, the concrete instantiations of causal forces, and are themselves dispositions.

    “These 'categorical properties' are, for Chalmers, the concrete instantiations of causal forces, and are themselves dispositions (see Banks, 2009).”

    From Neutral monism reconsidered (2010) · cites this paper as Chalmers (2003)

  • Type-F monism is the view that consciousness is constituted by the intrinsic properties of fundamental physical entities, that is, by the categorical bases of fundamental physical dispositions.

    “Type F monism is the view that consciousness is constituted by the intrinsic properties of fundamental physical entities: that is, by the categorical bases of fundamental physical dispositions.”

    From Neutral monism reconsidered (2010) · cites this paper as Chalmers (2003)

  • Type-F monism is perfectly compatible with the causal closure of the microphysical and with existing physical laws.

    “As a bonus this view is perfectly compatible with the causal closure of the microphysical, and indeed with existing physical laws.”

    From Neutral monism reconsidered (2010) · cites this paper as Chalmers (2003)

  • On Type-F monism, phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are located at the fundamental level of physical reality and underlie physical reality itself.

    “On this view, phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are located at the fundamental level of physical reality and in a certain sense, underlie physical reality itself . . . .”

    From Neutral monism reconsidered (2010) · cites this paper as Chalmers (2003)

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Authors
Chalmers, D. J.
Corresponding author
Chalmers, David J.
ORCID
Chalmers, David J.
Venue
The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2003-01
Pages
102-142
DOI
10.1002/9780470998762.ch5
OpenAlex
W1597944512
Cited by
574
References
89
Citations by year
2026: 14 · 2025: 13 · 2024: 20 · 2023: 46 · 2022: 39 · 2021: 29 · 2020: 31 · 2019: 52 · 2018: 22 · 2017: 17 · 2016: 23 · 2015: 31 · 2014: 26 · 2013: 41 · 2012: 17
Type
other
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
ANU Open Research (Australian National University) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
Keywords
consciousness, materialism, dualism, monism, philosophy of mind, nature of consciousness

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