Substitutive, Complementary and Constitutive Cognitive Artifacts: Developing an Interaction-Centered Approach
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“Given that cognitive artefacts engage with different cognitive processes simultaneously, rather than discretely (Fasoli, 2016(Fasoli, , 2017(Fasoli, , 2018)), the reliance on technology X may undermine the development of some specific brain-based cognitive abilities A and B, while boosting other parts of the brain-based cognitive character, such as the cognitive ability C and the intellectual”
From ChatGPT and the Technology-Education Tension: Applying Contextual Virtue Epistemology to a Cognitive Artifact (2024) · cites this paper as Fasoli, 2017
In the citing paper
“Since ChatGPT is used to supplement operations required for the completion of cognitive tasks, I will characterize it by using Fasoli's (2017) taxonomy of cognitive artifacts.”
From ChatGPT and the Technology-Education Tension: Applying Contextual Virtue Epistemology to a Cognitive Artifact (2024) · cites this paper as Fasoli, 2017
In the citing paper
“Complementarity, constitution, and substitution are thus recognized as the three possible fundamental relationships between cognitive artifacts and our cognitive processes.”
From ChatGPT and the Technology-Education Tension: Applying Contextual Virtue Epistemology to a Cognitive Artifact (2024) · cites this paper as Fasoli, 2017
In the citing paper
“Nevertheless, cognitive artifacts often not only interact with one of our cognitive abilities at a time, but may engage our cognitive system in many ways simultaneously (Fasoli, 2017, p. 679).”
From ChatGPT and the Technology-Education Tension: Applying Contextual Virtue Epistemology to a Cognitive Artifact (2024) · cites this paper as Fasoli, 2017
In the citing paper
“Fasoli's framework offers a new and fine-grained taxonomy of embedded and extended cognitive systems, which may be constitutive, complementary, or substitutive.”
From ChatGPT and the Technology-Education Tension: Applying Contextual Virtue Epistemology to a Cognitive Artifact (2024) · cites this paper as Fasoli, 2017
Citations
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“Unfortunately, in the past philosophers and cognitive scientists did not make a great effort in classifying cognitive artifacts, and today we have few theoretical classifications at our disposal (Norman 1993; Brey 2005; Heersmink 2013).”
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“We create artifacts and offload information into the world to augment human capacities (Kirsh 1995; Hutchins 1999; Brey 2000; Clark 2004), and our brains often tend to avoid the most demanding cognitive tasks (Kahneman 2011).”
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“As Hutchins has recently noted, «the interesting questions concern the elements of the cognitive systems, the relation among the elements , and how cognitive processes arise from interactions among these elements» (Hutchins 2014, emphasis added, see also Davies and Michaelian 2016, p. 312).”
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Gelman, S. A., & Bloom, P. (2000) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00071-8 · Cited by 318 · cited 1×
“…is not available for the artificial objects that populate our modern life, but we do have intuitions of a different nature regarding how these objects should be grouped together, and we tend to categorize them automatically (Bloom 1998; Gelman and Bloom 2000; Malt and Sloman 2007a, 2007b).”
BackgroundWhy is a Wing Like a Spoon? A Pluralist Theory of Function
Preston, B. (1998) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2564689 · Cited by 304 · cited 1×
“Investigating the metaphysical structure of cognitive artifacts, Heersmink (2014) develops a pluralistic notion of functions, grounded in the previous analysis by Preston (1998, 2013), in which a distinction is made between the proper function and the system function.”
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A Taxonomy of Cognitive Artifacts: Function, Information, and Categories
Heersmink, R. (2013) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-013-0148-1 · Cited by 164 · cited 29×
“In the first case, as already noted, B the intelligent use of space enables us to encode important information into artifacts that are typically neither designed nor made for cognitive purposes ^ (Heersmink 2013, p. 477).”
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Kornblith, H. (1980) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2184866 · Cited by 144 · cited 2×
“Chairs, sofas and couches are regarded as ‘ kin ’ in virtue of the similar function we assign to them, as happens in many cases (Kornblith 1980; Baker 2007).”
BackgroundBloom, P. (1998) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/s0010-0277(98)00003-1 · Cited by 130 · cited 1×
“…is not available for the artificial objects that populate our modern life, but we do have intuitions of a different nature regarding how these objects should be grouped together, and we tend to categorize them automatically (Bloom 1998; Gelman and Bloom 2000; Malt and Sloman 2007a, 2007b).”
BackgroundA Philosophy of Material Culture: Action, Function, and Mind
Preston, B. (2012) · Cited by 125
A Philosophy of Material Culture: Action, Function, and Mind
Preston, B. (2013) · doi:10.4324/9780203069844 · Cited by 114
Extended mind and cognitive enhancement: moral aspects of cognitive artifacts
Heersmink, R. (2015) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-015-9448-5 · Cited by 111 · cited 4×
“…technology) can, in some way, elicit certain specific behaviours has rarely been definitively denied (Pitt 2014), it is still not clear how, and to what degree, they do so (an important contribution to the understanding of this point has been made by Latour 1994, see also Heersmink 2015, p. 9).”
BackgroundInfluentialThe Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism
Baker, L. R. (2009) · Cited by 107
“Guns Don’t Kill, People Kill”; Values in and/or Around Technologies
Pitt, J. C. (2013) · Philosophy of engineering and technology · doi:10.1007/978-94-007-7914-3_6 · Cited by 91 · cited 1×
“…the fact that artifacts (and more generally, technology) can, in some way, elicit certain specific behaviours has rarely been definitively denied (Pitt 2014), it is still not clear how, and to what degree, they do so (an important contribution to the understanding of this point has been made by…”
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Brey, P. A. E. (2005) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1007/s11023-005-9003-1 · Cited by 83 · cited 11×
“Brey (2005), for instance, maintains that B various classes of cognitive artifacts may be distinguished, based on primary cognitive capacity or capacities they extend or aid ^ (Brey 2005, p. 385).”
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(2013) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/11097.1572-8676 · Cited by 74
Artifact Categorization: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly
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Category essence or essentially pragmatic? Creator’s intention in naming and what’s really what
Malt, B. C., & Sloman, S. A. (2006) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2006.10.001 · Cited by 43 · cited 1×
“…is not available for the artificial objects that populate our modern life, but we do have intuitions of a different nature regarding how these objects should be grouped together, and we tend to categorize them automatically (Bloom 1998; Gelman and Bloom 2000; Malt and Sloman 2007a, 2007b).”
BackgroundBird, A. (2016) · doi:10.1093/obo/9780195396577-0322 · Cited by 41
The metaphysics of cognitive artefacts
Heersmink, R. (2016) · Philosophical Explorations · doi:10.1080/13869795.2014.910310 · Cited by 39
Being-in-the-flow: expert coping as beyond both thought and automaticity
Bergamin, J. A. (2016) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-016-9463-1 · Cited by 38
Artifact Categorization. Trends and Problems
Carrara, M., & Mingardo, D. (2013) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-013-0151-6 · Cited by 32 · cited 1×
“For example, we recognize the differences between various fur-bearing animals, correctly distinguishing dogs from cats, and recognize objects with different shapes as exemplars, for instance, of chairs or of tables (Carrara and Mingardo 2013).”
BackgroundFunctionalism and mental boundaries
Shapiro, L. A. (2007) · Cognitive Systems Research · doi:10.1016/j.cogsys.2007.07.008 · Cited by 26 · cited 2×
“…runs into more general and well-known problems with functionalism» (Vaccari 2016, p. 4) and in particular into the so-called boundary problem (see also Shapiro 2008): «there is no principled way to distinguish a realizer of a function from a causal inference on the realizer» (Vaccari 2016, p. 4).”
BackgroundMethodDavies, J., & Michaelian, K. (2016) · Cognitive Processing · doi:10.1007/s10339-016-0759-4 · Cited by 26 · cited 1×
“As Hutchins has recently noted, «the interesting questions concern the elements of the cognitive systems, the relation among the elements , and how cognitive processes arise from interactions among these elements» (Hutchins 2014, emphasis added, see also Davies and Michaelian 2016, p. 312).”
BackgroundAgainst cognitive artifacts: extended cognition and the problem of defining ‘artifact’
Vaccari, A. P. (2016) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-016-9484-9 · Cited by 12 · cited 5×
“…runs into more general and well-known problems with functionalism» (Vaccari 2016, p. 4) and in particular into the so-called boundary problem (see also Shapiro 2008): «there is no principled way to distinguish a realizer of a function from a causal inference on the realizer» (Vaccari 2016, p. 4).”
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“We can thus distinguish between simple cognitive artifacts that interact with only one of our abilities, and complex cognitive artifacts that interact with many (see also Fasoli and Carrara 2016).”
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Cited by
What is an affective artifact? A further development in situated affectivity
Piredda, G. (2019) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-019-09628-3 · Cited by 115
“…cognitive artifacts, defined as Bphysical objects that have been created or modified in order to functionally contribute to a * Giulia Piredda giulia.piredda@iusspavia.it 1 Scuola Superiore Universitaria IUSS Pavia, Piazza della Vittoria 15, 27100 Pavia, Italy cognitive task^ (Fasoli 2018, p. 672).”
BackgroundInfluentialVarieties of Artifacts: Embodied, Perceptual, Cognitive, and Affective
Heersmink, R. (2021) · Topics in Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/tops.12549 · Cited by 93
“18 For other taxonomies of cognitive artifacts, see Brey (2005), Nickerson (2005), Clowes (2013), John Sutton (2016), Casati (2017), and Fasoli (2018a).”
BackgroundNarrative niche construction: memory ecologies and distributed narrative identities
Heersmink, R. (2020) · Biology & Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10539-020-09770-2 · Cited by 56
“Most research, including my own, has looked at the informational properties of objects (Donald 1991; Hutchins 1999; Heersmink 2013, 2016) but has not paid much attention to interactional processes (but see, e.g., Bietti and Sutton 2015; Steffensen 2017; Fasoli 2018).”
BackgroundCassinadri, G. (2024) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-024-00701-7 · Cited by 54
“This approach should be complemented with an even more encompassing framework of tool-use, which should include both representational (Fasoli, 2017; Heersmink, 2013) and non-representational artefacts (Mala-fouris, 2013).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialGenerative Artificial Intelligence and Extended Cognition in Science Learning Contexts
Novoa, Á. R., & Arias, D. A. D. (2025) · Science & Education · doi:10.1007/s11191-025-00660-1 · Cited by 50
Metadata
- Authors
- Fasoli, M.
- Affiliations
- University of Milano-Bicocca (IT)
- Corresponding author
- Fasoli, Marco
- ORCID
- Fasoli, Marco
- Venue
- Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Published
- 2017-09-21
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 671-687
- ISSN
- 1878-5158 (ISSN-L)
- 1878-5166
- OpenAlex
- W2760087798
- Cited by
- 49
- References
- 38
- Citations by year
- 2026: 10 · 2025: 10 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 1
- FWCI
- 12.45
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Review of Philosophy and Psychology (publishedVersion)
- BOA (University of Milano-Bicocca) (submittedVersion)
- IRIS Research product catalog (Sapienza University of Rome) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Cybernetics and Technology in Society
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Communication › Digital Media and Philosophy
- Keywords
- cognitive artifacts, complementary functions, constitutive functions, human-computer interaction, cognitive processes
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