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Inner speech and “pure” Thought – do we think in language?

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Kompa, Nikola A. · 2024 · Review of Philosophy and Psychology

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 92 of the 96 references it cites were found in a registry or an index, and 1 are not checked yet.

Abstract

While the idea that thinking is a form of silent self-talk goes back at least to Plato, it is not immediately clear how to state this thesis precisely. The aim of the paper is to spell out the notion that we think in language by recourse to recent work on inner speech. To that end, inner speech and overt speech are briefly compared. I then propose that inner speaking be defined as a mental episode that substantially engages the speech production system; the underlying model of speech production is sketched. Next, the cognitive role of inner speaking is explored, especially its role in thinking and reasoning. The question of whether it is a way of making thoughts accessible (to whomever) or whether it is a means of thinking itself is raised. I argue that there are two reasons for assuming that, occasionally, we think in language. More specifically, I will claim that some instances of thinking are instances of inner speaking as they exploit certain properties of natural language, and that some instances of inner speaking are instances of thinking as they play a decisive role in paradigmatic cases of thinking that result from internalizing and re-using certain social-linguistic practices. Finally, the Language-of-Thought hypothesis as an alternative account is critically discussed.

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Research works printed but not linked: 13

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Metadata

Authors
Kompa, N. A.
Affiliations
Osnabrück University (DE)
Corresponding author
Kompa, Nikola A.
Venue
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Published
2023-01-31
Volume
15
Issue
2
Pages
645-662
ISSN
  • 1878-5158 (ISSN-L)
  • 1878-5166
OpenAlex
W4318618186
Cited by
21
References
96
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 4
FWCI
5.07
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
Review of Philosophy and Psychology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
  • Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (GRK-2185/2)
  • Universität Osnabrück
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Social Representations and Identity
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Categorization, perception, and language
Keywords
inner speech, pure thought, speech production, overt speech, reasoning, language of thought hypothesis

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Kompa, N. A. (2024). Inner speech and “pure” Thought – do we think in language? Review of Philosophy and Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-023-00678-w

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