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Imperfect Strategy Transmission Can Reverse the Role of Population Viscosity on the Evolution of Altruism

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Débarre, F. · 2020 · Dynamic Games and Applications

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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 54 of the 54 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Population viscosity, i.e., low emigration out of the natal deme, leads to high within-deme relatedness, which is beneficial to the evolution of altruistic behavior when social interactions take place among deme-mates. However, a detrimental side effect of low emigration is the increase in competition among related individuals. The evolution of altruism depends on the balance between these opposite effects. This balance is already known to be affected by details of the life cycle; we show here that it further depends on the fidelity of strategy transmission from parents to their offspring. We consider different life cycles and identify thresholds of parent–offspring strategy transmission inaccuracy, above which higher emigration can increase the frequency of altruists maintained in the population. Predictions were first obtained analytically assuming weak selection and equal deme sizes and then confirmed with stochastic simulations relaxing these assumptions. Contrary to what happens with perfect strategy transmission from parent to offspring, our results show that higher emigration can be favorable to the evolution of altruism.

Overview

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Registry

Crossref · 10.1007/s13235-019-00326-y

Cites

54 of 54 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Citations

Cites

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Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. Hamilton WD (1975) Innate social aptitudes of man: an approach from evolutionary genetics. Biosoc Anthropol 53:133–55

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Metadata

Authors
Débarre, F.
Affiliations
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (FR)
Corresponding author
Débarre, F.
Venue
Dynamic Games and Applications
Published
2019-09-11
Volume
10
Issue
3
Pages
732-763
ISSN
  • 2153-0785 (ISSN-L)
  • 2153-0793
OpenAlex
W2973032299
Cited by
2
References
53
Citations by year
2023: 1 · 2022: 1
FWCI
0.50
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Dynamic Games and Applications (publishedVersion)
  • bioRxiv (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory) (acceptedVersion, cc-by)
  • HAL (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Funders
Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR-14-ACHN-0003-01)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Life Sciences › Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology › Genetics › Evolution and Genetic Dynamics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
Keywords
evolution of altruism, population viscosity, emigration, parent-offspring transmission, relatedness, life cycle, weak selection, stochastic population dynamics

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Imperfect Strategy Transmission Can Reverse the Role of Population Viscosity on the Evolution of Altruism. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s13235-019-00326-y
The paper
Débarre, F. (2020). Imperfect Strategy Transmission Can Reverse the Role of Population Viscosity on the Evolution of Altruism. Dynamic Games and Applications. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-019-00326-y

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