Imperfect Strategy Transmission Can Reverse the Role of Population Viscosity on the Evolution of Altruism
Open accessPublished version of a preprint
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 54 of the 54 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Population viscosity, i.e., low emigration out of the natal deme, leads to high within-deme relatedness, which is beneficial to the evolution of altruistic behavior when social interactions take place among deme-mates. However, a detrimental side effect of low emigration is the increase in competition among related individuals. The evolution of altruism depends on the balance between these opposite effects. This balance is already known to be affected by details of the life cycle; we show here that it further depends on the fidelity of strategy transmission from parents to their offspring. We consider different life cycles and identify thresholds of parent–offspring strategy transmission inaccuracy, above which higher emigration can increase the frequency of altruists maintained in the population. Predictions were first obtained analytically assuming weak selection and equal deme sizes and then confirmed with stochastic simulations relaxing these assumptions. Contrary to what happens with perfect strategy transmission from parent to offspring, our results show that higher emigration can be favorable to the evolution of altruism.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The text we found for this paper looks like another document, so the self-check wasn’t run.
Citations
Cites
The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I
Hamilton, W. D. (1964) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/0022-5193(64)90038-4 · Cited by 15,725 · cited 1×
“In his pioneering work on the evolution of social behavior, Hamilton suggested that al-truistic behavior would be associated to limited dispersal (Hamilton, 1964, p. 10).”
BackgroundA simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks
Ohtsuki, H., Hauert, C., Lieberman, E., & Nowak, M. A. (2006) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature04605 · Cited by 2,208
Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
Kandori, M., Mailath, G. J., & Rob, R. (1993) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951777 · Cited by 2,044
Cooperation and Competition Between Relatives
West, S. A., Pen, I., & Griffin, A. S. (2002) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1065507 · Cited by 798
Altruism in viscous populations — an inclusive fitness model
Taylor, P. D. (1992) · Evolutionary Ecology · doi:10.1007/bf02270971 · Cited by 648
Genetic Structure and Selection in Subdivided Populations
Rousset, F. (2004) · Cited by 554
Evolutionary dynamics on any population structure
Allen, B., Lippner, G., Chen, Y.-T., Fotouhi, B., Momeni, N., Yau, S.-T., & Nowak, M. A. (2017) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature21723 · Cited by 534
Group beneficial norms can spread rapidly in a structured population.
BOYD, R., & RICHERSON, P. J. (2002) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1006/jtbi.2001.2515 · Cited by 455
A simple and general explanation for the evolution of altruism
Fletcher, J. A., & Doebeli, M. (2009) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2008.0829 · Cited by 452
Genetic Structure and Selection in Subdivided Populations (MPB-40)
Rousset, F. (2004) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400847242 · Cited by 437
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Hamilton WD (1975) Innate social aptitudes of man: an approach from evolutionary genetics. Biosoc Anthropol 53:133–55
Cited by
Strategy evolution on dynamic networks
Su, Q., McAvoy, A., & Plotkin, J. B. (2023) · Nature Computational Science · doi:10.1038/s43588-023-00509-z · Cited by 97
Evaluating the structure-coefficient theorem of evolutionary game theory
McAvoy, A., & Wakeley, J. (2022) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2119656119 · Cited by 23
“F. Débarre, Imperfect strategy transmission can reverse the role of population viscosity on the evolution of altruism.”
ResultInfluential
Metadata
- Authors
- Débarre, F.
- Affiliations
- Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (FR)
- Corresponding author
- Débarre, F.
- ORCID
- Débarre, F.
- Venue
- Dynamic Games and Applications
- Published
- 2019-09-11
- Volume
- 10
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 732-763
- ISSN
- 2153-0785 (ISSN-L)
- 2153-0793
- OpenAlex
- W2973032299
- Cited by
- 2
- References
- 53
- Citations by year
- 2023: 1 · 2022: 1
- FWCI
- 0.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- www.springer.com/tdm (vor)
- Locations
- Dynamic Games and Applications (publishedVersion)
- bioRxiv (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory) (acceptedVersion, cc-by)
- HAL (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR-14-ACHN-0003-01)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Life Sciences › Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology › Genetics › Evolution and Genetic Dynamics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Keywords
- evolution of altruism, population viscosity, emigration, parent-offspring transmission, relatedness, life cycle, weak selection, stochastic population dynamics
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Imperfect Strategy Transmission Can Reverse the Role of Population Viscosity on the Evolution of Altruism. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s13235-019-00326-y
- The paper
- Débarre, F. (2020). Imperfect Strategy Transmission Can Reverse the Role of Population Viscosity on the Evolution of Altruism. Dynamic Games and Applications. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-019-00326-y
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.