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Evaluating the structure-coefficient theorem of evolutionary game theory

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McAvoy, Alex, Wakeley, John · 2022 · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 118 of the 120 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

In order to accommodate the empirical fact that population structures are rarely simple, modern studies of evolutionary dynamics allow for complicated and highly heterogeneous spatial structures. As a result, one of the most difficult obstacles lies in making analytical deductions, either qualitative or quantitative, about the long-term outcomes of evolution. The “structure-coefficient” theorem is a well-known approach to this problem for mutation–selection processes under weak selection, but a general method of evaluating the terms it comprises is lacking. Here, we provide such a method for populations of fixed (but arbitrary) size and structure, using easily interpretable demographic measures. This method encompasses a large family of evolutionary update mechanisms and extends the theorem to allow for asymmetric contests to provide a better understanding of the mutation–selection balance under more realistic circumstances. We apply the method to study social goods produced and distributed among individuals in spatially heterogeneous populations, where asymmetric interactions emerge naturally and the outcome of selection varies dramatically, depending on the nature of the social good, the spatial topology, and the frequency with which mutations arise.

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Crossref · 10.1073/pnas.2119656119

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Figures

Fig. 1. Intuition for the effects of selection on trait frequency. A location, i, is first chosen with probability proportional to its mutation-weighted reproductive value, πi^mut. Although all individuals are replaced with the same probability under dB updating, πi^mut quantifies how important i is as a location for a social trait to be propagated. If i is replaced, then neighbors compete to fill the vacancy. Since we are concerned with producers of a social good (blue), the relevant comparison is between a neighboring producer and other neighbors. We choose two neighbors, j and k, with probability Aij and Aik, respectively, which represent the probabilities of j and k replacing i under neutral drift (conditioned on i being replaced). If a producer is placed at j, then the probability that another node, ℓ, is a producer is equal to the probability that j and ℓ are identical by state, ϕjℓ. Using this distribution, we can calculate the expected payoffs for the two neighbors, j and k, which are depicted next to each of the corresponding nodes. It is the difference between the payoff to the producer, j, and the other neighbor, k, that determines the effects of selection on the mean frequency of producers. The larger this difference is, the more strongly favored producers are.
Fig. 1. Intuition for the effects of selection on trait frequency. A location, i, is first chosen with probability proportional to its mutation-weighted reproductive value, πi^mut. Although all individuals are replaced with the same probability under dB updating, πi^mut quantifies how important i is as a location for a social trait to be propagated. If i is replaced, then neighbors compete to fill the vacancy. Since we are concerned with producers of a social good (blue), the relevant comparison is between a neighboring producer and other neighbors. We choose two neighbors, j and k, with probability Aij and Aik, respectively, which represent the probabilities of j and k replacing i under neutral drift (conditioned on i being replaced). If a producer is placed at j, then the probability that another node, ℓ, is a producer is equal to the probability that j and ℓ are identical by state, ϕjℓ. Using this distribution, we can calculate the expected payoffs for the two neighbors, j and k, which are depicted next to each of the corresponding nodes. It is the difference between the payoff to the producer, j, and the other neighbor, k, that determines the effects of selection on the mean frequency of producers. The larger this difference is, the more strongly favored producers are.CC BY-NC-ND · PubMed Central
Fig. 2. Effects of selection on the mean frequencies of simple prosocial behaviors. The solid lines indicate calculations performed by using the structure-coefficient theorem (Eqs. 4 and 5). Dots depict the simulated first-order effects of selection, (〈xS〉−1/2)/δ, where 〈xS〉 is calculated for a selection intensity of δ=0.05 by observing the mean frequency of S over 108 generations. A and B show a single Barabási–Albert (preferential attachment) graph of size N = 50, with b < c in A and b > c in B. Even when b < c (here, b = 0.9 and c = 1), we see that producers of ff-goods can be favored in the mutation–selection equilibrium. C and D show a single Erdös–Rényi graph of size N = 50, with b < c in C and b > c in D. When b > c (here, b = 5 and c = 1), whether selection favors producers of ff-goods more than those of pp-goods can depend on the mutation probability. In this example, producers of pp-goods are favored more when the mutation probability is small, but this ranking reverses for slightly larger values of u (even when both are favored relative to neutral drift). The scales of the vertical axes vary to best illustrate the results.
Fig. 2. Effects of selection on the mean frequencies of simple prosocial behaviors. The solid lines indicate calculations performed by using the structure-coefficient theorem (Eqs. 4 and 5). Dots depict the simulated first-order effects of selection, (〈xS〉−1/2)/δ, where 〈xS〉 is calculated for a selection intensity of δ=0.05 by observing the mean frequency of S over 108 generations. A and B show a single Barabási–Albert (preferential attachment) graph of size N = 50, with b < c in A and b > c in B. Even when b < c (here, b = 0.9 and c = 1), we see that producers of ff-goods can be favored in the mutation–selection equilibrium. C and D show a single Erdös–Rényi graph of size N = 50, with b < c in C and b > c in D. When b > c (here, b = 5 and c = 1), whether selection favors producers of ff-goods more than those of pp-goods can depend on the mutation probability. In this example, producers of pp-goods are favored more when the mutation probability is small, but this ranking reverses for slightly larger values of u (even when both are favored relative to neutral drift). The scales of the vertical axes vary to best illustrate the results.CC BY-NC-ND · PubMed Central

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Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. A. McAvoy, J. Wakeley, Code from Evaluating the structure-coefficient of evolutionary game theory. GitHub. https://github.com/alexmcavoy/sigma. Deposited 21 July 2021. PMC9282417 35787041

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Metadata

Authors
McAvoy, A., & Wakeley, J.
Affiliations
Harvard University (US)
Corresponding author
  • McAvoy, Alex
  • Wakeley, John
Venue
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Published
2022-07-05
Volume
119
Issue
28
Pages
e2119656119-e2119656119
ISSN
  • 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
  • 1091-6490
OpenAlex
W3096390162
Cited by
23
References
120
Citations by year
2026: 6 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 2
FWCI
6.12
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Life Sciences › Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology › Genetics › Evolution and Genetic Dynamics
  • Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Applied Mathematics › Mathematical and Theoretical Epidemiology and Ecology Models
Keywords
evolutionary game theory, spatial structure, weak selection, mutation-selection balance, asymmetric contests, social good, population size, spatial topology, mutation rate
MeSH terms
Animals, Biological Evolution, Game Theory, Genetics, Population, Mutation

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McAvoy, A., & Wakeley, J. (2022). Evaluating the structure-coefficient theorem of evolutionary game theory. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2119656119

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