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Algorithmic Accountability and Public Reason

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Binns, Reuben · 2018 · Philosophy & Technology

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 61 of the 61 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 4 of the 35 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Abstract

The ever-increasing application of algorithms to decision-making in a range of social contexts has prompted demands for algorithmic accountability. Accountable decision-makers must provide their decision-subjects with justifications for their automated system's outputs, but what kinds of broader principles should we expect such justifications to appeal to? Drawing from political philosophy, I present an account of algorithmic accountability in terms of the democratic ideal of 'public reason'. I argue that situating demands for algorithmic accountability within this justificatory framework enables us to better articulate their purpose and assess the adequacy of efforts toward them.

Overview

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TL;DR

Binns argues that algorithmic accountability should be understood through the democratic ideal of public reason, requiring decision-makers to justify automated decisions using epistemic and normative standards acceptable to all reasonable people. This framework helps address conflicts arising from reasonable pluralism and assess whether accountability efforts are adequate.

Key findings

  • Algorithmic decision-making necessarily embeds contestable epistemic and normative assumptions, so accountability should draw out those assumptions rather than merely provide technical explanations.
  • Because decision-makers and decision-subjects may reasonably disagree about epistemic and moral standards, algorithmic accountability faces a dilemma: giving absolute primacy to either side would make accountability too one-sided.
  • Public reason offers a partial resolution by requiring justifications grounded in common principles acceptable to all reasonable people; it can reassert universal principles against biases inherited by code, force articulation of goals and constraints, help navigate public/private boundaries, clarify epistemic standards, and constrain decision-subjects’ grievances.
  • Opacity is a challenge, but the paper argues it is not hopeless: many systems use interpretable models, explanation methods exist, and public reason can help decide whether opacity is acceptable or whether a system should be built at all.

Methods

  • Conceptual and normative analysis in philosophy and technology; no empirical data, sample, or experimental design.
  • Draws on political philosophy accounts of accountability and public reason, especially Rawls, Quong, and related debates, to analyze algorithmic decision-making and accountability.
  • Argument proceeds by identifying the dilemma of reasonable pluralism in algorithmic accountability, proposing public reason as a justificatory framework, and considering objections and limitations.

Limitations

  • The paper states two potential limitations: public reason may be redundant if substantive laws already regulate algorithmic decision-making, and opacity of machine learning models may threaten decision-makers’ ability to account for systems.
  • The paper acknowledges that it does not presuppose any particular form of public reason and that disagreements about its scope, content, and basis remain.
  • Evident from the text: the argument is theoretical and programmatic, with no empirical testing or case study, and the precise content of common principles is left to reflective equilibrium.

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Integrity signals

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Crossref · 10.1007/s13347-017-0263-5

Cites

61 of 61 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Citations

Cites

Show all 61 references

Research works printed but not linked: 5

  1. Barocas, S., & Selbst, A. D.. (2016). “Big Data’s Disparate Impact.” https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2477899 .
  2. Deville, J. (2013). “Leaky Data: How Wonga Makes Lending Decisions.” Charisma: Consumer Market Studies . http://www.academia.edu/download/34144234/Deville_-_2014_-_Leaky_data.doc .
  3. Rawls, J. (1996). Political liberalism (with a new introduction and the “reply to Habermas”). New York, Columbia University Press, 1(5), 11–11.
  4. Sandvig, C. (2015). “Seeing the Sort: The Aesthetic and Industrial Defense of ‘the Algorithm.” Journal of the New Media Caucus| ISSN, 017X.
  5. Sandvig, C., Hamilton, K., Karahalios, K., and Langbort, C. (2014). “Auditing Algorithms: Research Methods for Detecting Discrimination on Internet Platforms.” Data and Discrimination: Converting Critical Concerns into Productive Inquiry. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/b722/7cbd34766655dea10d0437ab10df3a127396.pdf

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Binns, R.
Affiliations
University of Oxford (GB)
Corresponding author
Binns, Reuben
Venue
Philosophy & Technology
Published
2017-05-24
Volume
31
Issue
4
Pages
543-556
ISSN
  • 2210-5433 (ISSN-L)
  • 2210-5441
OpenAlex
W2619904157
Cited by
457
References
58
Citations by year
2026: 96 · 2025: 94 · 2024: 28 · 2023: 115 · 2022: 37 · 2021: 37 · 2020: 24 · 2019: 20 · 2018: 6
FWCI
31.35
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
  • cc-by
  • creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
Locations
  • Philosophy & Technology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, other-oa)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Funders
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EP/J017728/2)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Philosophy and Ethics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI)
Keywords
algorithmic accountability, public reason, automated decision-making, justification, democratic theory, political philosophy, algorithmic governance, transparency

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Algorithmic Accountability and Public Reason. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s13347-017-0263-5
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Binns, R. (2018). Algorithmic Accountability and Public Reason. Philosophy & Technology. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-017-0263-5

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