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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 34 of the 34 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 5 of the 15 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Are Large Language Models Intentional? The Limits of Referential Grounding

Open access
García-Valdecasas, Miguel · 2026 · Philosophy & Technology

Abstract

This paper reassesses Searle’s Chinese Room argument in light of Large Language Models (LLMs). While Searle criticized computational systems for being mere “syntax manipulators,” transformer models of the kind exemplified by LLMs complicate this characterization. Earlier computational systems relied on a more rigid logical foundation, based largely on pattern recognition and mechanical substitution. By tracking patterns of use, maintaining rich contextual dependencies, and exploiting implicit regularities in large datasets, LLMs show an unprecedented capacity for semantic modelling. And yet, LLMs remain limited in several respects. For instance, even the most advanced AI model suffers from impaired referential grounding and a good model of the external world. I argue that this is because they fail to successfully reproduce the spontaneous, nonsymbolic, biologically entrenched forms of semiosis that characterize the simplest biological organizations. After examining two plausible strategies to cope with these deficits, I conclude that the algorithmic implementation of formal symbol systems diverges in fundamental ways from experience-based intentional representations. This, in turn, warrants skepticism toward bald attributions of intentionality to LLMs and substantiates the core of Searle’s original argument against strong AI.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

The paper argues that LLMs have genuine representational capacities and referential grounding through distributional semantics, so Searle’s “mere syntax manipulator” premise needs revision. However, because intentionality requires embodiment and sensorimotor/indexical grounding, LLMs still lack intentionality, vindicating Searle’s conclusion for different reasons.

Key findings

  • LLMs are not mere syntactic pattern matchers: they manipulate tokens that are semantically structured and referentially grounded, preserving distributional regularities and modeling semantic relationships. The paper notes that by 2025 LLMs perform well on medical licensing exams such as NBME and JNME, and cites reported GPT-4 parameter counts of around 1.7–1.8 trillion versus GPT-3’s 175 billion, though the company has not confirmed these data.
  • Referential grounding is not the same as intentionality. Using Peirce’s semiotics, the paper argues that symbols require embedded indexical relations and experiential contents, while formal symbol systems remain self-referential; LLM tokens preserve statistical patterns but do not produce meaningful recognitions.
  • The metacognitive strategy (e.g., RAG, verifier layers) only adds more symbol manipulation and does not introduce new semantic resources. The multimodal strategy is better positioned to improve grounding, but it still lacks biological features such as light-to-neural transduction, selective attention, and saccadic vision.
  • The conclusion is that LLMs have representational capacities but lack intentionality; the paper denies they are “stochastic parrots” while still upholding Searle’s conclusion that they are not intentional.

Methods

  • Conceptual/philosophical analysis reassessing Searle’s Chinese Room argument in light of LLMs; no empirical data collection or sample is reported.
  • The paper examines early symbolic AI, transformer/LLM architecture, Peircean semiotics, the symbol/vector grounding problem, internalist vs. externalist responses, and two proposed grounding strategies: metacognitive and multimodal.
  • Main analysis is argument reconstruction: premises P1–P5 lead to conclusion C, with comparisons between LLM processing and biological semiosis/human vision.

Limitations

  • The paper states caveats: it will not reassess the validity of the robot reply to Searle; it uses “representation” loosely; and it adopts a stricter concept of intentionality requiring embodiment.
  • The paper states there is no consensus on the definition of intentionality or its implications, which partially obscures the positions of internalist and externalist strategies.
  • Evident from the text: the argument is conceptual rather than experimental, relies on cited literature, and some cited empirical claims—such as GPT-4 parameter counts—are noted as unconfirmed by the company.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1007/s13347-026-01079-4

Cites

34 of 34 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

4 Valid · 8 Not valid · 11 Not checked · 69 Own results and interpretations

39 more claims

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  • Probably not a substantial claim. 34
  • It may state two separate claims as one. 22

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Citations

Cites

  • Minds, brains, and programs

    Searle, J. R. (1980) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00005756 · Cited by 6,954 · cited 5×

    “Whether or not Searle’s thought experiment applies directly to them, the sheer complexity of their operations weakens the force of the assumption that machines have “only syntax but no semantics” (Searle, 1980: 422).”
    Influential
  • The symbol grounding problem

    Harnad, S. (1990) · Physica D: Nonlinear Phenomena · doi:10.1016/0167-2789(90)90087-6 · Cited by 4,235 · cited 1×

    “The question of whether a formal system can itself interpret machine tokens highlights the centrality of the “symbol grounding problem” (Harnad, 1990 ), which Har - nad defined as the problem of how to make semantic interpretations intrinsic to the symbol system, rather than merely parasitic on the…”
  • Gorillas in our midst: sustained inattentional blindness for dynamic events

    Simons, D. J., & Chabris, C. F. (1999) · Perception · doi:10.1068/p281059 · Cited by 3,181 · cited 1×

    “The biological footprint of these processes defines human perception and determines what information is available to it (Simons & Chabris, 1999).”
  • Meaning

    Grice, H. P. (1957) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2182440 · Cited by 2,824

  • Meaning and Reference

    Putnam, H. (2011) · The Pragmatism Reader · doi:10.1515/9781400838684-021 · Cited by 1,190

  • Climbing towards NLU: On Meaning, Form, and Understanding in the Age of Data

    Bender, E. M., & Koller, A. (2020) · Proceedings of the 58th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics · doi:10.18653/v1/2020.acl-main.463 · Cited by 1,082 · cited 1×

    “By relocating the missing element from semantics to embodiment and intentionality, my account attributes LLMs greater cognitive sophistication than is allowed by the Chinese Room argument, and denies, for this very reason, that they are “stochastic parrots” (Bender & Koller, 2020).”
  • Meaning and Reference

    Putnam, H. (1973) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2025079 · Cited by 464

  • Experience Grounds Language

    Bisk, Y., Holtzman, A., Thomason, J., Andreas, J., Bengio, Y., Chai, J., Lapata, M., Lazaridou, A., May, J., Nisnevich, A., et al. (2020) · Proceedings of the 2020 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing (EMNLP) · doi:10.18653/v1/2020.emnlp-main.703 · Cited by 274 · cited 1×

    “Combining different source types, the system simulates the way the human brain integrates sight, sound, touch, and language to produce a coherent experience (Bisk et al., 2020).”
  • Meaning without reference in large language modelsPreprint

    Piantadosi, S. T., & Hill, F. (2022) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2208.02957 · Cited by 249

  • Word meaning in minds and machines.

    Lake, B. M., & Murphy, G. L. (2023) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/rev0000297 · Cited by 131 · cited 1×

    “…the limits of current models, focusing research efforts on increasing the size of LLMs by multiplying the number of internal parameters will scarcely contribute to solving the critical problem of the lack of situated perception and causal interaction with the physical world (Lake & Murphy, 2023).”

Show all 31 references

Research works printed but not linked: 7

  1. Fodor, J. A. (1975). The language of thought (Vol. 5). Harvard University Press.
  2. Kurzweil, R. (2000). The Age of Spiritual Machines: When Computers Exceed Human Intelligence, Penguin.
  3. Patel, R., & Pavlick, E. (2022). Mapping language models to grounded conceptual spaces. In Int. Conf. on Learning Representations, Online, 25–29 April 2022. https://openreview.net/forum?id=gJcEM8sxHK
  4. Putnam, H. (1975). The meaning of ‘meaning’. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 7, 131–193.
  5. Searle, J. (1984). Minds, Brains and Science. Harvard University Press.
  6. Vaswani, A. (2017). Attention is All You Need. In Guyon, I. et al. (Eds.), 31st Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS). Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems. Vol. 30. Curran Associates, Inc.
  7. Wittgenstein, L. (2009). Philosophical Investigations. Wiley-Blackwell. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe.

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
García-Valdecasas, M.
Affiliations
Universidad de Navarra (ES)
Corresponding author
García-Valdecasas, Miguel
Venue
Philosophy & Technology
Published
2026-03-25
Volume
39
Issue
2
ISSN
  • 2210-5433 (ISSN-L)
  • 2210-5441
OpenAlex
W7140189339
Cited by
6
References
31
Citations by year
2026: 6
FWCI
47.01
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
Philosophy & Technology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
Universidad de Navarra
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Cybernetics and Technology in Society
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
Keywords
large language models, intentionality, artificial general intelligence, semiosis, semantic modeling

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García-Valdecasas, M. (2026). Are Large Language Models Intentional? The Limits of Referential Grounding. Philosophy & Technology. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-026-01079-4

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