The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory
Open accessAbstract
The theory of biological autonomy provides a naturalized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purposively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition.
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“Theorists from biology associate agenc y with autonomy and self-maintenance [ 66,67], AI researchers have recently focused on goal-directedness [ 68], and traditional philosophical views understand agency in terms of beliefs, desires, and intentions [ 69,70].”
From Identifying indicators of consciousness in AI systems (2026) · cites this paper as [67]
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Cites
Developmental Plasticity and Evolution
West-Eberhard, M. J. (2003) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780195122343.001.0001 · Cited by 6,115
Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living
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Mind in life: biology, phenomenology, and the sciences of mind
(2008) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.45-2543 · Cited by 2,696
Principles of Biological Autonomy
Varela, F. J. (2025) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/14875.001.0001 · Cited by 1,885
Simberloff, D., Levins, R., & Lewontin, R. (1987) · The Condor · doi:10.2307/1368785 · Cited by 1,387
Autopoiesis, Adaptivity, Teleology, Agency
Di Paolo, E. A. (2005) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-005-9002-y · Cited by 806
Life after Kant: Natural purposes and the autopoietic foundations of biological individuality
Weber, A., & Varela, F. J. (2002) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1023/a:1020368120174 · Cited by 566
Davidson, D. (1982) · Dialectica · doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1982.tb01546.x · Cited by 531
Defining Agency: Individuality, Normativity, Asymmetry, and Spatio-temporality in Action
Barandiaran, X. E., Di Paolo, E., & Rohde, M. (2009) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/1059712309343819 · Cited by 497 · cited 2×
“…such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). bring back to the biological realm what has been neglected since the…”
Organisms, Agency, and Evolution
Walsh, D. M. (2015) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781316402719 · Cited by 481
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- Frankfurt HG (1978) The problem of action. Am Philos Q 15(2):157–162
- von Uexküll J (1934) A foray into the Worlds of animals and humans: with a theory of meaning. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis/London
Cited by
Identifying indicators of consciousness in AI systems
Butlin, P., Long, R., Bayne, T., Bengio, Y., Birch, J., Chalmers, D., Constant, A., Deane, G., Elmoznino, E., Fleming, S. M., et al. (2026) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2025.10.011 · Cited by 56
Baedke, J. (2025) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781009495035 · Cited by 16
Agency as an Inherent Property of Living Organisms
Rosslenbroich, B., Kümmell, S. B., & Bembé, B. (2024) · Biological Theory · doi:10.1007/s13752-024-00471-7 · Cited by 18
Agency in the Evolutionary Transition to Multicellularity
Newman, S. A., Benítez, M., Bhat, R., Glimm, T., Kumar, K. V., Nanjundiah, V., Nicholson, D. J., & Sarkar, S. (2025) · The Quarterly Review of Biology · doi:10.1086/735964 · Cited by 22
Characterising the low-tech approach through a value-driven model
Gaultier, A., Masclet, C., & Boujut, J.-F. (2024) · Proceedings of the Design Society · doi:10.1017/pds.2024.238 · Cited by 7
Metadata
- Authors
- Virenque, L., & Mossio, M.
- Affiliations
- Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (FR)
- Corresponding author
- Mossio, Matteo
- Venue
- Biological Theory
- Published
- 2023-06-30
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 11-15
- ISSN
- 1555-5542 (ISSN-L)
- 1555-5550
- OpenAlex
- W4382864527
- Cited by
- 35
- References
- 29
- Citations by year
- 2026: 13 · 2025: 15 · 2024: 7
- FWCI
- 31.19
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- hal.science
- Licence
- cc-by-nc-nd
- www.springernature.com/gp/researchers/text-and-data-mining (tdm)
- www.springernature.com/gp/researchers/text-and-data-mining (vor)
- Locations
- Biological Theory (publishedVersion)
- HAL (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- Funders
- CNRS - Toronto Joint Program (CNRS - Toronto Joint Program)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- agency, biological autonomy, purposive action, organism-environment interaction, self-determination, intentionality, mental causation
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.