The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Dominance of accuracy information and neglect of base rates in probability estimation
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Citations
Cites
On the psychology of prediction.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1973) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0034747 · Cited by 6,202
Subjective probability: A judgment of representativeness
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1972) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/0010-0285(72)90016-3 · Cited by 4,851
Comparison of Bayesian and regression approaches to the study of information processing in judgment
Slovic, P., & Lichtenstein, S. (1971) · Organizational Behavior and Human Performance · doi:10.1016/0030-5073(71)90033-x · Cited by 1,819
Self-citationAntecedent probability and the efficiency of psychometric signs, patterns, or cutting scores.
Meehl, P. E., & Rosen, A. (1955) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/h0048070 · Cited by 1,207
Conservatism in human information processing
Edwards, W. (1982) · Judgment under Uncertainty · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511809477.026 · Cited by 1,004
Formal representation of human judgment
Kleinmuntz, B., & Cattell, R. B. (1968) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 683
A case of radical probability estimation.
Hammerton, M. (1973) · Journal of Experimental Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0035224 · Cited by 149
Cited by
Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.90.4.293 · Cited by 3,991
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives.
Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T. (1986) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.93.2.136 · Cited by 3,024
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.025 · Cited by 2,349
Self-citation“Clinical versus Actuarial Judgment.”
Dawes, R. M., Faust, D., & Meehl, P. E. (1989) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.2648573 · Cited by 2,298
Metadata
- Authors
- Lyon, D., & Slovic, P.
- Venue
- Acta Psychologica
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1976-08
- Volume
- 40
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 287-298
- ISSN
- 0001-6918 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2043017509
- Cited by
- 372
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 2.10
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Dominance of accuracy information and neglect of base rates in probability estimation. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/0001-6918(76)90032-9
- The paper
- Lyon, D., & Slovic, P. (1976). Dominance of accuracy information and neglect of base rates in probability estimation. Acta Psychologica. https://doi.org/10.1016/0001-6918(76)90032-9
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.