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Cited by 2,494Game Theory and ApplicationsExperimental Behavioral Economics StudiesEvolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma

Kreps, David M, Milgrom, Paul, Roberts, John, Wilson, Robert·1982·Journal of Economic Theory
DOI 10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1
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Crossref · 10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1

Cites

4 of 4 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Citations

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Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. D. Kreps and R. Wilson, Sequential equilibrium, Econometrica, in press.

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Metadata

Authors
Kreps, D. M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., & Wilson, R.
Affiliations
  • Stanford University (US)
  • Northwestern University (US)
ORCID
Venue
Journal of Economic Theory
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
1982-08
Volume
27
Issue
2
Pages
245-252
ISSN
0022-0531 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1
OpenAlex
W2123850572
Cited by
2,494
References
4
Citations by year
2026: 50 · 2025: 46 · 2024: 38 · 2023: 50 · 2022: 48 · 2021: 63 · 2020: 51 · 2019: 81 · 2018: 79 · 2017: 70 · 2016: 83 · 2015: 86 · 2014: 79 · 2013: 90 · 2012: 125
FWCI
23.82
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
Locations
Journal of Economic Theory (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
Keywords
finitely repeated games, prisoner's dilemma, cooperation, incomplete information, commitment, tit-for-tat, Nash equilibrium, bounded rationality

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