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Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
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“This has been shown theoretically (Kreps et al. 1982) and experimentally (Gächter and Falk, forthcoming).”
From Psychological foundations of incentives (2002) · cites this paper as Kreps et al. 1982
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Metadata
- Authors
- Kreps, D. M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., & Wilson, R.
- Affiliations
- Stanford University (US)
- Northwestern University (US)
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Theory
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1982-08
- Volume
- 27
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 245-252
- ISSN
- 0022-0531 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2123850572
- Cited by
- 2,494
- References
- 4
- Citations by year
- 2026: 50 · 2025: 46 · 2024: 38 · 2023: 50 · 2022: 48 · 2021: 63 · 2020: 51 · 2019: 81 · 2018: 79 · 2017: 70 · 2016: 83 · 2015: 86 · 2014: 79 · 2013: 90 · 2012: 125
- FWCI
- 23.82
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Economic Theory (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Keywords
- finitely repeated games, prisoner's dilemma, cooperation, incomplete information, commitment, tit-for-tat, Nash equilibrium, bounded rationality
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