The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Relational Incentive Contracts
Abstract
Standard incentive theory models provide a rich framework for studying informational problems but assume that contracts can be perfectly enforced. This paper studies the design of self-enforced relational contracts. I show that optimal contracts often can take a simple stationary form, but that self-enforcement restricts promised compensation and affects incentive provision. With hidden information, it may be optimal for an agent to supply the same inefficient effort regardless of cost conditions. With moral hazard, optimal contracts involve just two levels of compensation. This is true even if performance measures are subjective, in which case optimal contracts terminate following poor performance.
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Citations
Cites
The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance
Klein, B., & Leffler, K. B. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260996 · Cited by 3,653
Cited by
Jacob, B. A., & Lefgren, L. (2008) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/522974 · Cited by 494
Intermediation in a Sharing Economy: Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Rent Extraction
Weber, T. A. (2014) · Journal of Management Information Systems · doi:10.1080/07421222.2014.995520 · Cited by 233
Salvato, C., Reuer, J. J., & Battigalli, P. (2017) · Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.5465/annals.2014.0001 · Cited by 86
A MECHANISM DESIGN APPROACH TO CLIMATE-CHANGE AGREEMENTS
Martimort, D., & Sand-Zantman, W. (2016) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1111/jeea.12150 · Cited by 53
Formal and Informal Contracting: Theory and Evidence
Gil, R., & Zanarone, G. (2017) · Annual Review of Law and Social Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-110316-113413 · Cited by 56
Metadata
- Authors
- Levin, J.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2003-05-01
- Volume
- 93
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 835-857
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1994524956
- Cited by
- 1,099
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 66.01
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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