The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and bertrand
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Citations
Cites
Strategic information transmission
Crawford, V. P., & Sobel, J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913390 · Cited by 4,293
A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
Milgrom, P. R., & Weber, R. J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911865 · Cited by 3,753
Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
Selten, R. (1975) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01766400 · Cited by 3,337
Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
Harsanyi, J. C. (1967) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159 · Cited by 2,147
Harsanyi, J. C. (1968) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.14.7.486 · Cited by 1,059
Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points
Harsanyi, J. C. (1968) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.14.5.320 · Cited by 988
A Model of Duopoly Suggesting a Theory of Entry Barriers
Dixit, A. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003317 · Cited by 948
Collusion and the Incentives for Information Sharing
Clarke, R. N. (1983) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003640 · Cited by 358
Fulfilled Expectations Cournot Duopoly with Information Acquisition and Release
Novshek, W., & Sonnenschein, H. (1982) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003442 · Cited by 307
The value of information in a sealed-bid auction
Milgrom, P., & Weber, R. J. (1982) · Journal of Mathematical Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-4068(82)90008-8 · Cited by 265
Cited by
The financial reporting environment: Review of the recent literature
Beyer, A., Cohen, D. A., Lys, T. Z., & Walther, B. R. (2010) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.10.003 · Cited by 2,609
LEUZ, C., & WYSOCKI, P. D. (2016) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1475-679x.12115 · Cited by 1,760
Financial disclosure policy in an entry game
Darrough, M. N., & Stoughton, N. M. (1990) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(90)90048-9 · Cited by 850
Information Transparency of Business-to-Business Electronic Markets: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
Zhu, K. (2004) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1040.0226 · Cited by 300
The Value of Personal Information in Online Markets with Endogenous Privacy
Montes, R., Sand-Zantman, W., & Valletti, T. (2019) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2017.2989 · Cited by 280
Metadata
- Authors
- Vives, X.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Theory
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1984-10
- Volume
- 34
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 71-94
- ISSN
- 0022-0531 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1994821844
- Cited by
- 719
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 6.03
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and bertrand. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/0022-0531(84)90162-5
- The paper
- Vives, X. (1984). Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and bertrand. Journal of Economic Theory. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(84)90162-5
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
