The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Fulfilled Expectations Cournot Duopoly with Information Acquisition and Release
Abstract
This article studies the fulfilled expectations equilibrium for a Cournot duopoly model in which firms acquire information about uncertain linear demand. Several propositions are established concerning the incentives to acquire and release information in this duopoly environment.
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Citations
Cites
Strategic information transmission
Crawford, V. P., & Sobel, J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913390 · Cited by 4,293
Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth
Cournot, A. (2020) · Forerunners of Realizable Values Accounting in Financial Reporting · doi:10.4324/9781003051091-2 · Cited by 1,138
Cited by
Strategic information transmission
Crawford, V. P., & Sobel, J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913390 · Cited by 4,293
Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and bertrand
Vives, X. (1984) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(84)90162-5 · Cited by 719
Information Design: A Unified Perspective
Bergemann, D., & Morris, S. (2019) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20181489 · Cited by 527
Information Transmission--Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria
Gal-or, E. (1986) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297593 · Cited by 434
Strategic Information Revelation
Okuno-Fujiwara, M., Postlewaite, A., & Suzumura, K. (1990) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297541 · Cited by 338
Metadata
- Authors
- Novshek, W., & Sonnenschein, H.
- Venue
- The Bell Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1982
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 214
- ISSN
- 0361-915X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1592556530
- Cited by
- 307
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 10.15
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
