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Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture
Open accessAbstract
Subgame-perfect equilibria are characterized for a market in which the seller quotes a price each period. Assume zero costs, positive interest rate, continuum of buyers, and some technical conditions. If buyers' valuations are positive then equilibrium is unique, buyers' strategies are stationary, and the price sequence is determinant along the equilibrium path but possibly randomized elsewhere. Otherwise a continuum of stationary equilibria can exist, but at most one with analytic strategies. Coase's conjecture is verified for stationary strategies: reducing the period length drives all prices to zero or the least valuation. Connections to bargaining models are described.
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Citations
Cited by
An Economic Theory of Planned Obsolescence
Bulow, J. (1986) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1884176 · Cited by 569
Optimal Price Skimming by a Monopolist Facing Rational Consumers
Besanko, D., & Winston, W. L. (1990) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.36.5.555 · Cited by 431
Chapter 10 Price discrimination
Varian, H. R. (1989) · Handbook of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/s1573-448x(89)01013-7 · Cited by 343
Nair, H. (2007) · Quantitative Marketing and Economics · doi:10.1007/s11129-007-9026-4 · Cited by 331
Incentives and Political Economy
Laffont, J.-J. (2001) · doi:10.1093/0199248680.001.0001 · Cited by 299
Metadata
- Authors
- Gul, F., Sonnenschein, H., & Wilson, R.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Theory
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1986-06
- Volume
- 39
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 155-190
- ISSN
- 0022-0531 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2141481859
- Cited by
- 700
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 20.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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