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Cited by 299

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 89 of the 89 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Incentives and Political Economy

Laffont, Jean-Jacques·2001
DOI 10.1093/0199248680.001.0001
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Abstract

This book presents a detailed exposition of models of incentives in political economy using the tools of contemporary information economics. The emphasis is on small, loosely connected models that describe the rationale behind many of today's political procedures, while paying attention to the intellectual history of the ideas that are discussed. A number of topics in constitutional design are detailed including corruption, separation of powers, and reciprocal supervision. The book is also concerned with the relationship between economists and politicians and looks at the trade‐off between discretion and economic efficiency. Topics in industrial policy and environmental policy are reconsidered from a political economy point of view, emphasizing the role played by politicians, elections, and interest groups in the choice of policy instruments. Additionally, the optimal choice of government centralization is discussed.

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Metadata

Authors
Laffont, J.-J.
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford
Published
2001-10-18
DOI
10.1093/0199248680.001.0001
OpenAlex
W2169069950
Cited by
299
References
89
FWCI
30.25
Type
book
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Incentives and Political Economy. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/0199248680.001.0001
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Laffont, J.-J. (2001). Incentives and Political Economy. https://doi.org/10.1093/0199248680.001.0001

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.