Cited by 569Merger and Competition AnalysisConsumer Market Behavior and PricingTransportation Systems and Infrastructure

An Economic Theory of Planned Obsolescence

Bulow, Jeremy·1986·The Quarterly Journal of Economics

Abstract

“Planned Obsolescence” is the production of goods with uneconomically short useful lives so that customers will have to make repeat purchases. However, rational customers will pay for only the present value of the future services of a product. Therefore, profit maximization seemingly implies producing any given flow of services as cheaply as possible, with production involving efficient useful lives. This paper shows why this analysis is incomplete and therefore incorrect. Monopolists are shown to desire uneconomically short useful lives for their goods. Oligopolists have the monopolist's incentive for short lives as well as a second incentive that may either increase or decrease their chosen durability. However, oligopolists can generally gain by colluding to reduce durability and increase rentals relative to sales. Some evidence is presented that appears to be generally consistent with the predictions of the theory.

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Crossref · 10.2307/1884176

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  • Economic theory indicates that planned obsolescence can be an appealing business practice both in a market with a limited number of players or many competitors.

    “The economic theory about planned obsolescence indicates that it can be an appealing business practice both in a market with a limited number of players or many competitors (Bulow, 1986).”

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Authors
Bulow, J.
Affiliations
Stanford University (US)
Corresponding author
Bulow, Jeremy
Venue
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
Published
1986-11
Volume
101
Issue
4
Pages
729
ISSN
0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2089191816
Cited by
569
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 20 · 2025: 20 · 2024: 29 · 2023: 27 · 2022: 26 · 2021: 30 · 2020: 26 · 2019: 31 · 2018: 29 · 2017: 24 · 2016: 33 · 2015: 28 · 2014: 16 · 2013: 13 · 2012: 21
FWCI
6.27
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • The Quarterly Journal of Economics (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • Econstor (Econstor) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Marketing › Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Management of Technology and Innovation › Transportation Systems and Infrastructure
Keywords
planned obsolescence, product durability, monopolistic competition, oligopoly, collusion, profit maximization, repeat purchase, durable goods

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