An Economic Theory of Planned Obsolescence
Abstract
“Planned Obsolescence” is the production of goods with uneconomically short useful lives so that customers will have to make repeat purchases. However, rational customers will pay for only the present value of the future services of a product. Therefore, profit maximization seemingly implies producing any given flow of services as cheaply as possible, with production involving efficient useful lives. This paper shows why this analysis is incomplete and therefore incorrect. Monopolists are shown to desire uneconomically short useful lives for their goods. Oligopolists have the monopolist's incentive for short lives as well as a second incentive that may either increase or decrease their chosen durability. However, oligopolists can generally gain by colluding to reduce durability and increase rentals relative to sales. Some evidence is presented that appears to be generally consistent with the predictions of the theory.
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Economic theory indicates that planned obsolescence can be an appealing business practice both in a market with a limited number of players or many competitors.
“The economic theory about planned obsolescence indicates that it can be an appealing business practice both in a market with a limited number of players or many competitors (Bulow, 1986).”
From Designed to break: planned obsolescence as corporate environmental crime (2022) · cites this paper as Bulow, 1986
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Creative Destruction and Destructive Creations: Environmental Ethics and Planned Obsolescence
Guiltinan, J. (2009) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-008-9907-9 · Cited by 312 · see citing works
Innovative approaches to optimising design and use of durable consumer goods
Mont, O. (2008) · International Journal of Product Development · doi:10.1504/ijpd.2008.020395 · Cited by 90 · see citing works
Designed to break: planned obsolescence as corporate environmental crime
Bisschop, L., Hendlin, Y., & Jaspers, J. (2022) · Crime Law and Social Change · doi:10.1007/s10611-022-10023-4 · Cited by 72 · see citing works
“Management science has a long tradition of studying planned obsolescence as an economic theory (Bulow, 1986), a business strategy (Iizuka, 2007) and a case for business ethics (Guiltinan, 2009).”
BackgroundInfluentialPlanned Obsolescence and Criminal Law: A Problematic Relationship?
La Rosa, E. (2020) · Sustainability and Law · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-42630-9_12 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
- Authors
- Bulow, J.
- Affiliations
- Stanford University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Bulow, Jeremy
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1986-11
- Volume
- 101
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 729
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2089191816
- Cited by
- 569
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 20 · 2025: 20 · 2024: 29 · 2023: 27 · 2022: 26 · 2021: 30 · 2020: 26 · 2019: 31 · 2018: 29 · 2017: 24 · 2016: 33 · 2015: 28 · 2014: 16 · 2013: 13 · 2012: 21
- FWCI
- 6.27
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Econstor (Econstor) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Marketing › Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Management of Technology and Innovation › Transportation Systems and Infrastructure
- Keywords
- planned obsolescence, product durability, monopolistic competition, oligopoly, collusion, profit maximization, repeat purchase, durable goods
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