Cited by 671Taxation and Compliance StudiesEconomic and Fiscal StudiesTaxation and Legal Issues

Tax morale and conditional cooperation

Open access
Frey, Bruno S., Torgler, Benno·2007·Journal of Comparative Economics

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1016/j.jce.2006.10.006

Cites

86 of 86 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Claims the paper makes

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Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Behavioural experiments on the PGG have shown that most people contribute to the common pool, and only a few individuals free ride.

    “However, contrary to the predictions made by standard game theory, behavioural experiments on the PGG have shown that most people contribute to the common pool, and only a few individuals free ride16,16,26,27.”

    From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [26]

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Authors
Frey, B. S., & Torgler, B.
Affiliations
  • University of Zurich (CH)
  • University of California, Berkeley (US)
Corresponding author
Torgler, Benno
Venue
Journal of Comparative Economics
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2007-03
Volume
35
Issue
1
Pages
136-159
ISSN
0147-5967 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3023361769
Cited by
671
References
90
Citations by year
2026: 38 · 2025: 43 · 2024: 34 · 2023: 55 · 2022: 42 · 2021: 53 · 2020: 38 · 2019: 49 · 2018: 38 · 2017: 38 · 2016: 30 · 2015: 38 · 2014: 34 · 2013: 43 · 2012: 28
FWCI
32.40
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Journal of Comparative Economics (publishedVersion)
  • Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Taxation and Compliance Studies
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic and Fiscal Studies
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Taxation and Legal Issues
Keywords
tax morale, tax compliance, conditional cooperation, tax evasion, institutional quality, audit probability, tax fines, homo economicus

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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

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