Cited by 764Taxation and Compliance StudiesExperimental Behavioral Economics StudiesDecision-Making and Behavioral Economics

The behavioralist as tax collector: Using natural field experiments to enhance tax compliance

Hallsworth, Michael, List, John A., Metcalfe, Robert D., Vlaev, Ivo·2017·Journal of Public Economics

Abstract

This paper presents results from two large-scale natural field experiments that tested the effect of social norm messages on tax compliance. Using administrative data from > 200,000 individuals in the United Kingdom, we show that including social norm messages in standard reminder letters increases payment rates for overdue tax . This result offers a rare example of social norm messages affecting tax compliance behavior in a real world setting. We find no evidence that loss framing is more effective than gain framing. Descriptive norms appear to be more effective than injunctive norms. Messages referring to public services or financial information also significantly increased payment rates. The field experiments accelerated the collection of tax revenue at little cost.

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Crossref · 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.02.003

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  • Conformist behavioural responses to majority information have been found for paying taxes, corrupt behaviour, and readiness to steal.

    “The same type of conformist behavioural response has been found with respect to majority information about various socially highly relevant actions, for instance, paying taxes (Hallsworth et al. [2017]), as well as corrupt behaviour (Köbis et al. [2015]) and even readiness to steal (Cialdini et al. [2006]).”

    From Science Communication and the Problematic Impact of Descriptive Norms (2023) · cites this paper as Hallsworth et al. [2017]

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Authors
Hallsworth, M., List, J. A., Metcalfe, R. D., & Vlaev, I.
Affiliations
  • The Behavioural Insights Team (GB)
  • University of Chicago (US)
  • University of Warwick (GB)
Corresponding author
Metcalfe, Robert D.
Venue
Journal of Public Economics
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2017-04
Volume
148
Pages
14-31
ISSN
0047-2727 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2148440443
Cited by
764
References
134
Citations by year
2026: 67 · 2025: 82 · 2024: 67 · 2023: 83 · 2022: 101 · 2021: 94 · 2020: 91 · 2019: 66 · 2018: 58 · 2017: 27 · 2016: 14 · 2015: 10 · 2014: 2 · 2013: 2
FWCI
123.31
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Journal of Public Economics (publishedVersion)
  • Warwick Research Archive Portal (University of Warwick) (acceptedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Taxation and Compliance Studies
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
Keywords
tax compliance, social norms, normative messages, loss framing, gain framing, descriptive norms, injunctive norms, behavioral interventions, tax collection

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