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Cited by 140

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Markets as institutions versus organizations as markets? Disentangling some fundamental concepts

Ménard, Claude·1995·Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
DOI 10.1016/0167-2681(95)00030-5
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Crossref · 10.1016/0167-2681(95)00030-5

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Research works printed but not linked: 36

  1. Alchian, 1972, Production, information costs and economic organizations, American Economic Review, 62, 777
  2. Arrow, 1964, Control in large organizations, Management Science, 10, 397, 10.1287/mnsc.10.3.397 · DOI
  3. Ben-Porath, 1980, The f-connection: families, friends, and firms and the organization of exchange, Population and Development Review, 6, 1, 10.2307/1972655 · DOI
  4. Cheung, 1983, The contractual nature of the firm, Journal of Law and Economics, 26, 1, 10.1086/467023 · DOI
  5. DeVille, 1990, Comportements concurrentiels et equilibre general, de la necessite des institutions, Economie Appliquee, 43, 9
  6. Edwards, 1990, The politics of conflict and consent, how the labor contract really works, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 13, 41, 10.1016/0167-2681(90)90052-F · DOI
  7. Fama, 1980, Agency theory and the theory of the firm, Journal of Political Economy, 88, 288, 10.1086/260866 · DOI
  8. Fama, 1983, Separation of ownership and control, Journal of Law and Economics, 26, 301, 10.1086/467037 · DOI
  9. Fama, 1983, Agency problems and residual claims, Journal of Law and Economics, 26, 327, 10.1086/467038 · DOI
  10. Granovetter, 1985, Economic action and social structure, the problem of embeddedness, American Journal of Sociology, 91, 481, 10.1086/228311 · DOI · Paper page
  11. Green, 1991, Shaping technologies and shaping markets, creating demand for biotechnology, Technological Assessment and Strategic Management, 3, 57, 10.1080/09537329108524032 · DOI
  12. Hurwicz, 1987, Inventing new institutions, the design perspective, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 69, 395, 10.2307/1242293 · DOI
  13. Jensen, 1976, Theory of the firm, managerial behavior, agency cost, and ownership structure, Journal of Financial Economics, 304
  14. Jensen, 1983, Organization theory and methodology, The Accounting Review, 58, 319
  15. Joskow, 1985, Vertical integration and long term contracts, the case of coal-burning electric generating plants, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1, 33
  16. Joskow, 1994, Privatization in Russia, what should be a firm?, Working Paper, In Transaction Costs Economics, Recent Developments, Sorbonne
  17. Langlois, 1993, Optimization, rule-following, and the methodology of situational analysis, 10.4324/9780203392805_chapter_5 · DOI
  18. Macaulay, 1963, Non contractual relations in business, a preliminary study, American Sociological Review, 28, 55, 10.2307/2090458 · DOI
  19. March, 1984, The new institutionalism, organizational factors in political life, American Political Science Review, 78, 734, 10.2307/1961840 · DOI
  20. Menard, 1994, Organizations as coordinating devices, Metroeconomica, 45, 224, 10.1111/j.1467-999X.1994.tb00021.x · DOI
  21. Menard, 1994, Comportement rationnel et cooperation, le dilemme organisationnel, Cahiers d'economie politique, 24–25, 163
  22. Moe, 1991, Politics and the theory of organization, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 7, 106, 10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.106 · DOI
  23. North, 1986, The new institutional economics, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 142, 230
  24. North, 1990, A Transaction cost theory of politics, 10.1177/0951692890002004001 · DOI
  25. Ouchi, 1979, A conceptual framework for the design of organizational control mechanisms, Management Science, 25, 833, 10.1287/mnsc.25.9.833 · DOI · Paper page
  26. Palay, 1984, Comparative institutional economics, the governance of the rail freight contract, Journal of Legal Studies, 13, 265, 10.1086/467741 · DOI
  27. Parsons, 1940, The motivation of economic activities, Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Sciences, 6, 187, 10.2307/137203 · DOI
  28. Radner, 1992, Hierarchy, the economics of managing, Journal of Economic Literature, 30, 1382
  29. Simon, 1991, Organizations and markets, Journal of Economic Perspective, 5, 25, 10.1257/jep.5.2.25 · DOI
  30. Stiglitz, 1974, Incentives and risk sharing in sharecropping, Review of Economic Studies, 41, 219, 10.2307/2296714 · DOI
  31. Thorelli, 1986, Networks, between markets and hierarchies, Strategic Management Journal, 7, 37, 10.1002/smj.4250070105 · DOI
  32. Vroey, 1990, S'il te plait, dessine-moi un marche, Economie Appliquee, 43, 67
  33. Vroey, 1990, The base camp paradox, Economies and Philosophy, 6, 235, 10.1017/S0266267100001231 · DOI
  34. Weingast, 1988, 96, 135
  35. Williamson, 1990, A comparison of alternative approaches to economic organization, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 146, 61
  36. Williamson, 1991, Economic institutions, spontaneous and intentional governance, Journal of law, Economics, and Organization, 7, 159, 10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.159 · DOI

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Metadata

Authors
Ménard, C.
Venue
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
1995-10
Volume
28
Issue
2
Pages
161-182
ISSN
0167-2681
DOI
10.1016/0167-2681(95)00030-5
Cited by
140
References
4
Language
en
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)

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